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ABSTRACT 
JEN CADWALLADER: Spirits of the Age: Ghost Stories and the Victorian Psyche 
(Under the direction of Beverly Taylor) 
 
“Spirits of the Age: Ghost Stories and the Victorian Psyche” situates the ghost as a central figure 
in an on-going debate between nascent psychology and theology over the province of the psyche.  
Early in the nineteenth century, physiologists such as Samuel Hibbert, John Ferriar and William 
Newnham posited theories that sought to trace spiritual experiences to physical causes, a move 
that participated in the more general “attack on faith” lamented by intellectuals of the Victorian 
period.  By mid-century, various of these theories – from ghosts as a form of “sunspot” to ghost-
seeing as a result of strong drink – had disseminated widely across popular culture, and, I argue, 
had become a key feature of the period’s ghost fiction.  Fictional ghosts provided an access point 
for questions regarding the origins and nature of experience: Ebenezer Scrooge, for example, 
must decide if he is being visited by his former business partner or a particularly nasty stomach 
disorder.  The answer to this question, here and in ghost fiction across the period, points toward 
the shifting dynamic between spiritual and scientific epistemologies.  As I demonstrate, 
Victorian ghost stories reveal an intellectual climate wherein writers such as Charles Dickens, 
Elizabeth Gaskell and Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu reject the rigid binary in which the meaning of 
experience is dictated by either religious or scientific thought; instead, by drawing on the very 
psychological theories which sought to dismiss the divine nature of the supernatural, these 
writers argue for a greater degree of human agency in determining experience’s spiritual value. 
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Ghost stories thus represent a countercurrent in the trend toward increased secularism in the 
Victorian period.  By employing the theories and methodologies of the psychologist, ghost story 
writers reimagined the mind’s ability to access the divine.  In each of the ghost stories I examine, 
I argue that a new faith in the power of the mind reinvigorated Victorian spiritual faith. 
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Introduction 
 
 
The familiar story about the nineteenth century, and particularly the Victorian 
period, is a story of eroding faith, of growing doubt.  It was a time of “living without God 
in the world” (Miller 1).  John Ruskin famously wrote in an 1851 letter to a friend, “You 
speak of the Flimsiness of your own faith. Mine, which was never strong, is being beaten 
into mere gold leaf, and flutters in weak rags from the letter of its old forms . . . If only 
the Geologists would let me alone, I could do very well, but those dreadful Hammers! I 
hear the clink of them at the end of every cadence of the Bible verses” (qtd in Alexander 
72).  Ruskin, at least, was still reading his Bible.  Fifty years later, Thomas Hardy 
reflected nostalgically, “How sweet it was in years far hied /To start the wheels of day 
with trustful prayer, /To lie down liegely at the eventide /And feel a blest assurance he 
was there!” (41-44).  This, from a poem called “God’s Funeral.”  In Hardy’s estimation, 
God was a “man-projected Figure” created when we once needed solace, destroyed now 
in our new understanding of the world (21).  What Hardy and Ruskin both hint at is the 
other half of this familiar story of the “age of doubt”: while people’s faith was cast as the 
tragically doomed hero, the villain of the story is science.  From the geologists mentioned 
by Ruskin who helped discountenance belief in Biblical time, to astronomers who 
extended the size of the universe and thereby shrunk Victorians’ place within it, to 
naturalists such as Darwin and Spenser whose evolutionary theory recast the orderly,  
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God-controlled world as a messy, disorganized chaos where chance ruled supreme, 
science, in its many forms, was blamed for Christianity’s dwindling following.  
“Spirits of the Age: Ghost Stories and the Victorian Psyche” is situated in this 
context.  Once exclusively the property of religion, the ghost was appropriated by science 
early in the nineteenth century and became a much-contested figure during the Victorian 
period.  Through an examination of the treatment of ghosts in the nineteenth century, I 
would like to suggest a new way to read the old familiar story of the conflict between 
science and religion.  My dissertation is divided into three parts: in this introduction, I 
will outline some theories for ghost-seeing which brought the ghost into the conflicted 
space between scientific and religious thought; in my chapters on Joseph Sheridan Le 
Fanu, Charles Dickens, and Margaret Oliphant and Rhoda Broughton I will discuss  ghost 
stories that, as a reaction to the debate over ghost-seeing, helped create a more hopeful 
model for interactions between these two types of thought; and in my final dissertation 
chapter I will discuss the Spiritualist Movement and the ways in which, out of initial 
conflict, we see Victorians adapting scientific thinking to a new form of faith. 
Scientific rationalizations for ghost-seeing began appearing early in the nineteenth 
century.  First among them was Manchester physician John Ferriar’s 1813 Essay 
Towards a Theory of Apparitions.  Ferriar’s theory, which depends on Erasmus Darwin’s 
research on vision,1 likens ghosts to sunspots: both are impressions left on the eye which 
appear visible after the actual object has left the field of vision.  A deceased relative 
might seem to appear to the living because the image of the deceased had been imprinted 
                                                 
1
 See Darwin’s Zoonomia, Section XL. “On the Ocular Spectra of Light and Colours,” pp. 605-608 
particularly. 
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on the brain.  In certain states of excitement, that mental impression may transmit itself 
once more the eye, creating the appearance of a ghost.     
Ferriar’s work was based on his extensive treatment of the mentally ill in the 
Manchester Infirmary’s lunatic hospital. Antiquarian and geologist Samuel Hibbert 
lacked Ferriar’s medical credentials, yet his 1824 Sketches of the Philosophy of 
Apparitions was rather popular, going on to a second edition within a year of being 
published.  Hibbert takes a different approach than Ferriar’s work, and instead of relying 
solely on optics to explain ghost-seeing (though his text does refer to Ferriar’s argument), 
Hibbert traces these visions to the circulatory system.  He elaborates on “certain states of 
the sanguineous system, in which a remarkable connexion between such states and an 
undue vividness of mental feelings appears to be established” (10).  For example, too 
much or too little blood, or missing one’s regularly scheduled blood-letting, could result 
in a taxation of the mind which in turn could cause spectral illusions to appear. 
Yet another theory is propounded in William Newnham’s 1830 Essay on 
Superstition.  Newnham, a general medical practitioner who specialized in obstetrics and 
gynecology, argues that ghost-seeing is based on what he terms the “extensive sympathy” 
of the brain.  He explains, “It is, however, accepted in the present discussion, that the 
brain stands so closely related to other organs of the body, that it possesses the capacity 
of suffering with them whenever they are in a state of irritation; and also, of reflecting 
upon them its own morbid actions, which they in their turn oftentimes assume, and then 
become secondary irritants to the brain” (75).  Thus any bodily illness, like indigestion, 
for example, can cause a “cerebral disorder” which in turn might produce spectral 
illusions (119). 
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Finally, drawing on the work of his predecessors, the famed optician Sir David 
Brewster’s Natural Magic argues “In a state of indisposition, the phosphorescence of the 
retina appears in new and more alarming forms.  When the stomach is under a temporary 
derangement accompanied with headache, the pressure of the blood-vessels upon the 
retina shows itself, in total darkness, by a faint blue light floating before the eye, varying 
in its shape” (20).  Brewster here combines elements of Ferriar’s ocular theory with 
Newnham’s “sympathy of the organs” theory in order to produce his ghosts. 
While these theories vary in their particulars, they have one thing in common: 
each theory suggests that in one way or another, our own bodies are producing the 
specters that haunt us.  Ferriar, Hibbert, Newnham, and Brewster each trace spectral 
visions to physiological causes, which indeed explains their interest in ghost-seeing in the 
first place.  Like many scientific disciplines, psychology was in its nascence in the early 
years of the nineteenth century.  As psychologist and historian Daniel Robinson notes, 
“before 1750, works of a psychological nature are actually and purely philosophical” 
(xviii).  Today, “brain” and “mind” are used mostly interchangeably; however, to the 
early psychologist, the two had distinct meanings and it was unclear whether the mind 
was a wholly insubstantial part of the soul or if it had a material presence, inextricably 
linking it to the brain.  In fact, the term “psychology” from its first use in the mid-
seventeenth century referred to “a doctrine which searches out mans Soul and the effects 
of it” (OED, W. Harvey’s Anatomical Exercises, 1653).  It was not until the second half 
of the nineteenth century that the term took on its present day meaning, when, for 
example, Thomas Huxley states, “Psychology is a part of the science of life or biology . . 
. . the psychologist studies the so-called ‘faculties’ of the mind” (OED, Hume 1879).  
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Thus, in this transitional period for the field of psychology, areas of study which could 
help scientists map out physical connections between the senses and the brain – 
connections that suggested that how we think was related physically to how we perceive 
– were of the highest interest.  Ghost-seeing provided a really useful subject for this type 
of work because a ghost’s existence was entirely a matter of personal perception, 
unverifiable except through the senses.  As Hibbert states, “these illusions . . . more than 
almost every other class of mental phenomena, [are calculated] to throw considerable 
light upon certain important laws connected with the physiology of the human mind” (vi).   
But to suggest that the ghost was an entirely “man-projected Figure,” to use 
Hardy’s phrase, is to raise two contentious, and, I hope to demonstrate, related issues.  
Physiological theories for ghost-seeing create a number of potential causes for alarm: 
indigestion, poor circulation, certain states of sleepiness, temporary malfunctions of the 
senses were all linked to spectral visions.  In effect, these theories leave the mind prey to 
the body.  Brewster writes, “ . . . we never think of distrusting an organ [the eye] which 
we have never found to deceive us; and the truth of the maxim that ‘seeing is believing’ 
is too deeply rooted in our nature to admit on any occasion of a single exception” (17).  
Brewster suggests that we should, in fact, distrust our senses: they are waiting to “deceive 
us.”  Like the ghosts now lodged in our minds, our bodies are alien, hostile entities 
completely out of our control, ready to betray us at any time.  A ghost is a trick, an 
imposition of our gross physical bodies on our rational being, with no other significance 
than to tell us that one system or another is on the fritz.  In assigning this form of 
“madness” various physical causes, early psychologists in a way oversimplify the matter, 
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and there is a very dangerous logical extension to this line of reasoning.  Newnham 
argues, 
 There are also many finer shades of cerebral disturbance, which . . . 
 pass off as peculiarity of manner, odd habits, whim, ill-humour, or 
 eccentricity.  But from what source is this peculiarity of manner 
 derived? . . .  It cannot be derived from any peculiarity of the spiritual 
 essence: for it is absurd to suppose, that there are souls of different 
 kinds . . . .  But the difficulty is easily removed, by considering it as 
 the character which is stamped upon the manifestation of spiritual 
 existence, by the material medium through which it is rendered 
 cognizable: and thus it is, that these changes of thought and feeling 
 are often ascribable to variations of health . . . .  
(76-7 italics original) 
 
The human soul, indistinguishable one from another, is colored as it is filtered through 
the brain, Newnham theorizes.  Newnham reduces personality – those “whims,” “odd 
habits,” and “eccentricities” that mark individuality – to a species of “mental 
disturbance” caused by “variations of health.”  That which makes us, us, is thus entirely 
out of our control: shaped by physical frailties rather than conscious choices.   
The second troubling issue raised by physiological theories for ghost-seeing is 
that by denying ghosts autonomy or any sort of existence separate from our 
malfunctioning senses, these theories directly conflicted with religious doctrine.  
Physiological theories for ghost-seeing, like theories in other scientific disciplines, were 
guilty of what was termed “materialism”: thinking only in terms of the physical or 
material, these theories denied the existence of the spiritual.  Of course Ferriar, Hibbert, 
Newnham, and Brewster were entirely cognizant that they were treading on hallowed 
ground, so to speak, and preface their works with various comments meant to disarm 
Christian critics.  Ferriar writes, “Observe, however, that the following treatise is 
applicable, in its principles, to profane history, and to the delusions of individuals only.  
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If any thing contained in the ensuing pages could be construed into the most indirect 
reference to theological discussions, the manuscript would have been committed, without 
mercy, to the flames” (ix).  Ferriar implies that his work has no bearing on theological 
discussions because ghosts themselves should have no place in these discussions.  
Similarly, Newnham states, the “Author most sincerely and fervently prays, that [these 
essays] may prove the means of widening the agency of real religion, by contracting the 
limits of the prejudices against its influence” (x).  In other words, by disproving 
superstitious beliefs, Newnham claims to be, in a way, purifying Christianity, making it 
more respectable.  But how justified are these theorists in separating ghost-seeing from 
Christian doctrine?   
This was a question being debated even among theologians.  If we go back to the 
previous century, we find evidence which suggests that belief in ghosts was still an 
integral part of Christian faith.  The Sadducismus Triumpatus: Or, a full and plain 
Evidence Concerning Witches and Apparitions, written by Charles II’s chaplain, Joseph 
Glanvil, had by 1726 reached its fourth edition: evidence that it was continuing to find a 
strong readership well after its original printing in 1681.  As Glanvil states in his preface, 
“And those that dare not bluntly say, There is No God, content themselves (for a fair Step 
and Introduction) to deny there are Spirits or Witches.”  In other words, denying the 
existence of one type of supernatural being is the first step on that slippery slope toward 
atheism.  After all, as Glanvil notes, both ghosts and witches appear in the Bible.  Of 
course, Glanvil’s argument is echoing a minority opinion among scholars – the kind of 
reasoning that led to the Salem Witch Trials (1692) was becoming scarcer and scarcer 
over the course of the eighteenth century.  Among the laity, however, a belief that ghosts 
 8 
 
had a place within a Christian universe still persisted.  Owen Davies writes that it was a 
common notion that “their righteousness enhanced by their heavenly residence, ghosts 
sometimes returned to haunt the sinful and plague the consciences of moral 
transgressors” (4).  He found that “as late as 1728 the body of [a Dorset boy] was 
exhumed on the orders of the coroner after several witnesses said they had seen his 
ghost” – the ghost’s appearance an indication that he had been murdered (5).  In other 
words, the authorities were still likely to give supernatural testimony weight in legal 
matters.    Even more famously, only fifty years prior to Ferriar’s writing on apparitions, 
in January of 1762 you could read in any of the London newspapers, amid the shipping 
news and the list of prominent marriages, about investigations into the “strange noise that 
had been so frequently heard” in Cock-Lane (London Evening-Post).  These sounds – a 
violent scratching noise and a series of knocks – emanated from the vicinity of a young 
girl’s bed, and were, according to her and the family who lived there, communications 
from the room’s previous occupant, the now-deceased Fanny Lynes.  “Scratching Fanny” 
as the manifestation came to be called, was back to accuse her former lover of poisoning 
her.  She communicated through her knocks – one knock for yes, two for no – 
investigators asked her a series of questions; to quote from one newspaper account: “If 
she would be pleased if Mr. [Kent, her former lover] was hanged? One Knock” (London 
Evening-Post).  So strong was the public outcry based on this ghostly accusation that Mr. 
Kent was in danger of a murder trial.  A number of clergymen testified publicly that 
“Scratching Fanny” was a real ghost and that Kent was therefore a murderer.  The Lord 
Mayor of London appointed a commission to investigate and discovered the hoax, but the 
incident points to how widespread (even among the clergy) was this belief in ghosts.  
 9 
 
And this belief remained relatively unchanged through the early part of the nineteenth 
century.  In 1804, the “Hammersmith Ghost” apparently frightened two women to death, 
although the Times declared that the ghost was likely someone dressed in a white 
costume having a bit of a night lark (Jan. 6).  That same year, another ghost – this of a 
headless woman – apparently frightened a number of soldiers in St. James Park (Times, 
Jan. 13).  Ghost sightings continued to appear in the Times throughout the first half of the 
century.  Thus, as Ferriar and his ilk are writing about “mere superstitions” the popular 
thinking on ghosts aligns them more directly with mainstream Christianity.     
These examples demonstrate that ghost-seeing theorists, were, in fact, opposing 
Christian doctrine accepted by the populace, if not necessarily endorsed by theologians.  
These early physiological accounts of ghost-seeing were doubly disturbing, then: not only 
alienating one from one’s own body, but smacking of heresy and seeming to suggest that 
Christian faith amounts to a species of mental failing. 
Between the spate of theories explaining “spectral phenomena” produced in the 
first few decades of the nineteenth century and the formation of the Society for Psychical 
Research in 1882, a radical shift in the relationship between religious and scientific 
thought took place.  The antagonistic (though apologetic) role toward spiritual matters 
evinced early in the period gave way to a more conciliatory attitude later in the century.  
The formation of the SPR, whose members included eminent physicists, mathematicians, 
and psychologists, a future Prime Minister and a Nobel Laureate, signaled a moment 
when science entered religion’s service.  Formally, the SPR maintained an objective 
stance; its members, however, largely hoped to prove the existence of miracles, of ghosts, 
and ultimately of God, through scientific research.  As one member of the SPR said in his 
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eulogy for Henry Sedgwick, the SPR’s first president, “We caught together the distant 
hope that Science might in our own age make sufficient progress to open the spiritual 
gateway which she had been thought to close” (qtd in Haynes 8).  In the following 
chapters, I argue that the Victorian ghost story anticipated and influenced this shift in the 
relationship between religion and science. 
Far from laying belief in ghosts to rest, in attacking the ghost’s external existence, 
psychology provoked a defensive response that breathed new life (so to speak) into 
spirituality.  Fueled in part by this early scientific interest in ghosts, the Victorian period 
became the golden age of the ghost story.  Hack writers and leading novelists alike tried 
their hand at the genre, as an examination of the era’s periodicals attests.  Ghost stories 
introduced the stock figure of the “man of science,” the rationalistic, materialistic skeptic 
who is destined to receive a supernatural comeuppance by story’s end.  Within this 
conflict, writers began to develop a more nuanced understanding of the ghost’s central 
role in the often tense dialogue between science and religion. Fictional ghosts provided 
an access point for questions regarding the origins and nature of experience: Ebenezer 
Scrooge, for example, must decide if he is being visited by his former business partner or 
a particularly nasty stomach disorder.  The answer to this question, here and in ghost 
fiction across the period, points toward the shifting dynamic between spiritual and 
scientific epistemologies.  As I will demonstrate, Victorian ghost stories reveal an 
intellectual climate wherein writers such as Charles Dickens, Margaret Oliphant, and 
others reject the rigid binary in which the meaning of experience is dictated by either 
religious or scientific thought; instead, by drawing on the very psychological theories that 
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sought to dismiss the divine nature of the supernatural, these writers argue for a greater 
degree of human agency in determining experience’s spiritual value. 
Ghost stories thus represent a countercurrent in the trend toward increased 
secularism in the Victorian period.  By employing the theories and methodologies of the 
psychologist, ghost story writers reimagined the mind’s ability to access the divine.  This 
practice is evident, for example, in Dickens’s use of ghosts as agents of memory in his 
Christmas stories.  Drawing on Alexander Bain’s theory of psychological relativism, 
Dickens founds Scrooge’s and Redlaw’s redemption on their mental ability to traverse 
time.  Similarly, a belief in the power of observation and deduction informs both Arthur 
Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes stories and his spiritualist writings.  Just as Holmes is 
able to deduce a suspect’s life history by the part of his hair (or something along these 
lines), Doyle’s spiritualist works contend that careful study of physical phenomena will 
lead to revelations about the nature of the divine.  Like Doyle’s discerning detective, the 
protagonists of nineteenth-century ghost stories demonstrate that a new faith in the power 
of the mind reinvigorated Victorian religious faith.   
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Chapter 1 
Physiology, Pharmacology and the Ghost Stories of J. S. Le Fanu 
 
 
Joseph Sheridan Le Fanu recycled material throughout his career.  At his most 
ambitious he developed short stories into novels such as A Wyvern Mystery and The 
Fortunes of Colonel Torlogh O’Brien;2 at his least ambitious he made minor changes to 
existing works, slapped on new titles, and sent them on their merry way (as is the case 
with “The Watcher,” republished as “The Familiar,” and “The Haunted House in 
Westminster,” republished as “Mr. Justice Harbottle”).  Generous scholars have remarked 
on the “industrious re-articulation of his material” (Sullivan 13), others have perhaps 
more aptly labeled Le Fanu as a bibliographer’s nightmare, and one critic has wryly 
suggested that any lengthy study of his work will result in “déjà LeFanu” (Browne 5).  A 
positive result of Le Fanu’s rewriting habit is the insight it offers into the development of 
his major preoccupations and concerns as a writer.  For example, in turning his short 
story “A Passage in the Secret History of an Irish Countess” (1838) into the novel Uncle 
Silas (1864), Le Fanu made a number of significant changes.  An exchange of settings 
from Ireland to Derbyshire reflects Le Fanu’s desire to appeal to the more lucrative 
                                                 
2
 A Wyvern Mystery is based on the story “A Chapter in the History of a Tyrone Family,” which, 
incidentally, supplied the central plot (of a man who hides his mad wife in one part of his home while his 
new bride takes up residence in another) of Jane Eyre.  Le Fanu’s The Fortunes of Colonel Torlogh 
O’Brien is based on the story “An Adventure of Hardress Fitzgerald, a Royalist Captain.”  For a complete 
list of Le Fanu’s publication history, including stories republished under new names or expanded into 
novels, see Gary William Crawford, J. Sheridan Le Fanu: A Bio-Bibliography. 
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English market, a course he followed routinely after Richard Bentley became his 
publisher.  A major plot change – switching Silas Ruthyn’s innocent daughter Monica for 
the villainous Madame de la Rougierre as the novel’s climactic murder victim, is perhaps, 
as Ivan Melada suggests, a concession to middle-class Victorian mores (50).  Such a 
revision highlights Le Fanu’s identification with the Victorian literary aesthetic and his 
move away from the more gruesome, shocking gothic tales and local legends that 
captured his youthful fancy.  Another significant revision of the original story is, as one 
would expect in reading a novel based on a short story, the deepened and more nuanced 
characters of the novel’s chief villains, Silas Ruthyn and Madame de la Rougierre.  Both 
characters, deservedly among the best-known in Le Fanu’s canon, take on the vice (in 
addition to their already established habitual greed and murderous inclinations) of 
substance abuse.  Although “A Passage in the Secret History of an Irish Countess” makes 
an oblique reference to Madame de la Rougierre’s love of drink, Uncle Silas repeatedly 
and explicitly portrays her as an alcoholic.  Arthur, Silas’s counterpart in “A Passage in 
the Secret History of an Irish Countess,” is addicted only to gaming, while Silas becomes 
dependent on opium in his novel form.  So pointed is Le Fanu’s inclusion of this flaw in 
the two characters that both die as a direct result of substance abuse: Madame de la 
Rougierre is bludgeoned to death after drinking a narcotic-laced glass of wine intended 
for Maud, the novel’s heroine, while Silas deliberately takes a fatal dose of laudanum.  
The punishment of such excess is typical in Victorian literature, and thus may be 
construed as another of Le Fanu’s attempts to capitalize on the tastes of his readers; 
however, I would argue that pharmacological concerns are central to Le Fanu’s fiction.  
That Madame de la Rougierre and Silas transform from villains to addict-villains signals 
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Le Fanu’s strengthening interest in the subject over the course of his writing career.  
From the besotted spirit in his first published story, “The Ghost and the Bone-setter” 
(1838), to the green tea swilling clergyman in one of his last stories, “Green Tea” (1869), 
Le Fanu’s oeuvre displays a marked attention to the effects of stimulants on the mind.  
By tracing this preoccupation across Le Fanu’s two short story sequences, I hope to 
demonstrate that while substance abuse began as a rather straightforward moral and 
political issue, Le Fanu’s later work registers his growing unease with both religious and 
scientific explanations of the connection between mind and body. 
While Le Fanu wrote in a variety of genres, penning historical novels with Scott 
in mind, gothic novels that betray the influence of Radcliffe, and even trying his hand at 
satire,3 his continuing interest for scholars lies in the body of ghost stories he produced 
over his thirty-five year writing career.  Like Patricia Coughlin, I believe that “this body 
of work is not adequately described as a scattered series of slight, whimsical 
contributions to the genre of the Victorian ghost-story, but rather that it has a unity of 
purpose and meaning” (18).  Le Fanu’s two series of short stories, the sequence of early 
tales published in the Dublin University Magazine between 1838 and 1840 and 
posthumously as The Purcell Papers, and the sequence published in various journals 
between 1869 and 1872 and collected as In a Glass Darkly, employ a similar framing 
device.  The Purcell Papers are purported to be the collected anecdotes of Father Francis 
Purcell, the parish priest of Drumcoolagh, in the south of Ireland.  Likewise, In a Glass 
Darkly is represented as a series of “cases” presided over by Dr. Martin Hesselius, a 
                                                 
3
 Le Fanu objected to his fiction being labeled “sensational,” and asked the press to instead consider his 
work part of the “school of tragic English romance, which has been ennobled, and in great measure 
founded, by the genius of Sir Walter Scott” (“Preliminary Word” vii).  See Melada, p. 43, for a discussion 
of Radcliffe’s influence on Le Fanu.  
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noted metaphysician.  It has been argued that Le Fanu chose the voice of Purcell “in 
much the same way that Maria Edgeworth used Thady Quirk in Castle Rackrent.  The 
priest, like the family retainer, was a privileged person with access to the secrets of a 
castle superior to his own” (McCormack, Sheridan 55).  Regarding In a Glass Darkly, 
Robert Tracy suggests that Le Fanu employed Hesselius (a character in “Green Tea”) as 
an expedient means for unifying an otherwise random group of stories (xxix).  However, 
Le Fanu’s move from clergyman to man of science seems more pointed than these 
explanations suggest.  In fact, I would argue that Le Fanu’s two collections plot a 
trajectory common to the period: The Purcell Papers participates in a worldview 
informed by religion, while In a Glass Darkly takes its cues from the realm of science.  
The years between the writing of each group of stories saw a mania for scientific, rational 
explanations for all kinds of phenomena, including, and central to Le Fanu’s writing, 
theories for ghost-seeing.  While traditional Christian superstition often viewed ghost-
seeing as a “horror” visited upon the heads of sinners, in the hands of early psychologists 
ghosts became related to mental aberrations.  Substance abuse, a motif common to both 
story series, takes on different meanings when read through the lens of religious versus 
scientific thought, and Le Fanu’s fiction, after testing and rejecting the rigidity inherent in 
both modes of thought, ultimately leaves his characters – and his readers – adrift in a 
universe with no clear answers and no single system to explain the workings of the world.  
Unlike Dickens, who, I will argue in the next chapter, claims a greater ability for man to 
understand and emulate the divine based on psychological theory, Le Fanu does not 
attempt to reconcile science and religion.  Characters following the lights of either system 
reach a point beyond which those lights cannot shine, an unknowable darkness where all 
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meaning resides.  Le Fanu, the “father of the modern ghost story,” led his literary 
descendants down this path; his writing, by demolishing the systems through which the 
ghost was understood, opened the door into the darkness, allowing Dickens, Oliphant, 
Broughton, Conan Doyle, and countless others to venture forth.   
 
I.  Temperance and Le Fanu’s Early Ghost Stories 
 
  “ . . . abstamiousness is a fine thing, although it’s mighty dhry.” 
       “The Quare Gander” 
 
 
 Le Fanu, the son of an Irish Protestant clergyman, received his early education, 
along with his brother William, at home amidst his father’s large library, where he “spent 
much of his time in poring over many a quaint and curious volume” (Seventy Years 8).  
Gothic tales undoubtedly sparked his interest: in the 1838 story “A Drunkard’s Dream” 
he quotes Coleridge’s “Christabel” and refers to Polidori’s Vathek, and as Sullivan notes, 
the supernatural conceit of “The Ghost and the Bone-Setter” – a spirit who emerges from 
his portrait – may well have been borrowed from Walpole’s Castle of Otranto (11).  Yet 
equal to the influence of the gothic fiction Le Fanu encountered in his early reading were 
the legends and figures of the Irish peasantry among whom he was raised.  Take “The 
Ghost and the Bone-Setter” for example.  The story is based on the local superstition, 
“prevalent throughout the south of Ireland,” that the soul of the last buried body in the 
graveyard is responsible for supplying his or her fellows with water while they dwell in 
purgatory (“Ghost” 3).  Of course, no one would want a relative to be in this position in 
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the afterlife, hence Le Fanu witnessed a number of fights between funeral parties in his 
neighborhood.  His brother relates one memorable episode:  
Two funerals were approaching Abington Churchyard in  
opposite directions, one from Murroe, the other from Barr- 
ington’s Bridge.  The former was nearing the churchyard  
gate; on perceiving this the people in the other funeral took  
a short cut by running across a field, carrying the coffin  
with them, which they succeeded in throwing over the wall  
of the churchyard before the others were able to get in by  
the gate.  This was counted such sharp practice that they  
were at once attacked by the other party, and a battle royal  
ensued.      
(Seventy Years 38) 
 
In Le Fanu’s story, the ghost of “the ould squire” is in this unlucky position.  More than 
this, the story’s principal character, Terry Neil, is likely based on the Le Fanu’s 
coachman, “an amateur surgeon” who treated the local peasantry in the absence of a 
medical professional (Seventy Years 36).  Like the coachman, the fictional Terry Neil is 
 
mighty handy entirely for carpenther's work, and mendin' ould 
spudethrees, an' the likes i' that. An' so he tuck up with bone- 
setting, as was most nathural, for none of them could come up to  
him in mendin' the leg iv a stool or a table; an' sure, there never  
was a bone-setter got so much custom--man an' child, young an'  
ould--there never was such breakin' and mendin' of bones known  
in the memory of man.  
(“Ghost” 7)   
 
Nor is this the only instance of a real person making an appearance in Le Fanu’s fiction.  
In a letter to his mother, Le Fanu admits good-humouredly to being caught writing about 
a past acquaintance in an unflattering way.  He writes, “The possibility of this [discovery] 
had struck me when I introduced him but I scouted it, for I remember him when I was a 
child, an old man.  There can be no doubt that the story is a horrid libel on him and I live 
in daily expectation of a message” (qtd in McCormack, Sheridan 120).  This transmission 
 18 
 
of incidents and people from life into fiction suggests that Le Fanu felt a sense of 
connection and sympathy with the Irish peasantry with whom he lived in such close 
quarters, and helps explain the mixed politics of Le Fanu’s fiction. 
 Though Le Fanu was a member of the Anglo-Irish Protestant ascendancy, his 
fiction betrays a lively interest in and sympathy for the cause of the Catholic majority.  
W. J. McCormack, describing Le Fanu’s reading of “Shamus O’Brien” – a ballad 
celebrating peasant rebellion and Irish nationhood – at a meeting of the staunchly Tory 
Historical Society, for which Le Fanu served as treasurer and later president, writes, “For 
a conservative, it was an odd recitation, its dialect as much as its politics puzzling to the 
orthodox supporters of Wellington and Peel” (Sheridan 51).  Though Le Fanu firmly 
avowed his support for the Protestant cause, his fictional voice seemed to undercut this 
political stance.  As McCormack suggests, “It is as well that the delicate arithmetic of the 
committee was expressed in conservative and liberal terms.  By these he was clearly in 
the former camp, but had there been talk of nationalists, his place would be more difficult 
to define” (Sheridan 52).  Le Fanu’s nationalist sentiments found voice in the persona of 
Father Purcell.  Like Le Fanu, Purcell is a man of “refined” habits and “literary” tastes; 
like him, too, Purcell is a “curious and industrious collector of old local traditions” 
(“Ghost” 1).  However, Purcell, who “for nearly fifty years discharged the arduous duties 
of parish priest in the south of Ireland” is in an ideal position to both encounter and treat 
sympathetically the histories and legends of the Irish peasantry (“Ghost” 1).  Through this 
voice, Le Fanu is able to express a sentimental attachment to both landscape and people 
that would have seemed out of place in the eldest son of the dean of Emly. 
***** 
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Le Fanu was seventeen when the Tithe Wars began and his family became a 
target for local Catholic animosity.  While prior to 1831 the Le Fanus lived on “most 
friendly terms with the peasantry,” the next five years were marked by increasing 
hostility and occasional violence (Seventy Years 44).  In his account of this period, 
William Le Fanu notes that the Le Fanus’ relationship with their Catholic neighbors 
seemed to change overnight.  Casual friendliness was replaced with hostile glaring, and 
“none of [the family] went out alone, and [they] were always well armed” (63).  On one 
outing, William was attacked by rock throwers (65).  Perhaps more frightening because 
of the coldblooded planning involved was the attempted assassination of Charles Coote, 
rector of Doon, the Le Fanus’ nearest fellow clergyman and a family relation.  Traveling 
home from church one morning he paused to water his horse and was confronted with  
a thundering report, which nearly deafened him, and a cloud of  
smoke came from a little grove close by him.  The blunderbuss  
which had been aimed at him had burst: its shattered remains, a  
half-emptied bottle of whisky, and a quantity of blood were found  
in the grove.  
     (Seventy Years 67)  
 
Though Coote drew more of the peasantry’s ire through his very public clashes with the 
parish priest, it would have taken no great stretch for Le Fanu to imagine his father 
similarly threatened.  That William vividly recalls the whiskey bottle next to the exploded 
gun indicates how closely linked violence and drunkenness were in the minds of the Le 
Fanus.  Indeed, the two had long been seen as a troubling pair by the Protestant 
Ascendancy.   
Public drunkenness, and the violence that often followed it, was a source of 
disruption and a threat to the landholding Protestant Ascendancy, dependent on the 
peasant class for its income and status.  Alcohol consumption increased during the first 
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few decades of the nineteenth century at the same time that industrialization created the 
need for more regulated labor.  Brian Howard Harrison argues that “accelerated 
urbanization and the need for precision and regularity made existing levels of 
drunkenness less tolerable” (92).  Perhaps more significantly, drunkenness was seen as a 
threat to the existing social order.  As Anya Taylor notes, “alcohol introduces festivity 
and dissolves hierarchy” (6); however, in the context of the political and social unrest of 
Ireland in the 1830s, anything that hinted at a breakdown in class boundaries was a 
source of anxiety for the Protestant Ascendancy.  In fact, many among the Ascendancy 
believed that alcohol was helping fuel unrest and rebellion.  Elizabeth Malcolm, in her 
study of nineteenth-century Irish temperance movements, notes that many brewers and 
drink sellers were involved in nationalist organizations, and “it was widely believed that 
alehouses were used for United Irish meetings and for the storage of weapons” (53).  Not 
only was revenue from drinking thought to be aiding Irish rebellion, many believed that 
alcohol was used as a lure to draw followers to the nationalist cause.  In 1834, John Edgar 
argued that “there is a strong temptation for persons to unite themselves with political 
societies, on account of the spirit drinking which frequently takes place in the lodges of 
these societies” (qtd in Malcolm 57).   
The dual threats to income and class status prompted a number of responses from 
the Protestant Ascendancy.  For example, under the pseudonym “Martin Doyle,” William 
Hickey, dean of Tacumshane, wrote tracts addressed to the peasant class trying to 
persuade them that it was in their own self-interest to practice temperance.  To 
drunkenness he attributed three evils: poverty, violence, and ill-health.  Hickey drew on 
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superstition and exaggeration in his description of the last.  People should avoid heavy 
drinkers, Hickey argued, because  
though a man’s nose does not always show that there is a fire  
within, I may very seriously tell you that there are instances of  
persons being burned to death, without the application of fire or  
candle, from the constant use of ardent spirits.  If a man’s nose,  
however, be fiery red from drink, I should always apprehend  
that combustion might take place in his body. 
     (58) 
 
The focus of Hickey’s warning is not the danger of drinking oneself, it is the danger of 
being around others who drink.  Imagine how terrible those nationalist meetings will be, 
Hickey seems to suggest, when all of the whiskey drinkers around you start exploding.  
For those who may have missed Hickey’s political message, he goes on to write, “The 
Irish character is naturally kind and cheerful; and were it kept free from the excitement of 
politics and whiskey, would shine, as to its lower classes, beyond that of other nations” 
(64).  Here, Hickey links drinking to politics, betraying the same Protestant Ascendancy 
concerns noted above.  He also subtly discourages rebellion by pointing to the peasant 
class as having an already established national identity.  For his work, Hickey was highly 
praised in the Dublin University Magazine, itself a mouthpiece for the Protestant 
Ascendancy:  
We are well aware of the many adverse influences which must  
obstruct the efforts of a clergyman of the Church of England in  
diffusing, no matter how unpolemically, or how much soever in  
a spirit of peace and love, those scriptural truths which might act  
with a reclaiming and purifying influence on the minds of the  
benighted peasantry of Ireland. 
     (“Our Portrait” 376)   
 
Unpolemic indeed. 
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Unsurprisingly – given their economic and political motivation – the first 
Temperance Societies to appear in Ireland, in 1829, were “almost wholly Protestant in 
composition” (Malcolm 56).  Organized efforts to curb the drinking habits of the Irish 
Catholic peasantry could more effectively address the issues of economic turmoil and 
political unrest than any type of legislation.4  Malcolm notes that the American 
Temperance Society, which formed three years prior to those established in Ireland, 
“provided a model” for these Irish societies (67).  Specifically, “the A.T.S. aimed its 
propaganda . . . at the affluent moderate drinker.  If the leaders of society abstained from 
spirits and thus set an example to their subordinates, drinking would soon fall out of 
fashion” (Malcolm 61).   This sentiment is similar to that expressed in Le Fanu’s Purcell 
stories.  In his treatment of intemperance in The Purcell Papers, Le Fanu unites the 
Ango-Irish political mission with his nationalistic sympathies.   
The first Purcell story, “The Ghost and the Bone-setter,” modifies this 
Temperance message to better reflect Le Fanu’s mixed politics.  Of his father, Terry Neil 
Jr. proudly proclaims, “he was as honest and as sober a man, barrin’ he was a little bit too 
partial to the glass, as you’d find in a day’s walk” (6).  Terry Neil Sr. is thus portrayed as 
a heavy drinker, but Le Fanu’s tone is lighthearted and comical.  Far less comical is Le 
Fanu’s portrayal of the ghostly “ould Squire,” who died when he “bursted a bloodvessel 
pullin’ a cork out iv a bottle,” and whose spirit smells strongly of sulpher (8).  Not only 
has drink cost the squire his life, it has also, Le Fanu implies, damned his soul.  The 
aristocratic character, the character whose influence upon his fellows is demonstrated in 
the obligation they are under to “sit up” in the manor when the family is away (an oblique 
                                                 
4
 For a discussion of legislation aimed at reducing alcohol consumption in Ireland, see Malcolm, pp. 50-2, 
56. 
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reference to the absenteeism so detrimental to the Irish nationalistic cause, perhaps), 
receives the more heavy-handed treatment.  Ignoring the supernatural element for a 
moment, the story may be said to revolve around the confrontation between the upper- 
and lower-classes.  The old Squire invokes this class distinction when describing his 
current state: “‘Well’ says the sperit, ‘although I was as sober as most men – at laste as 
most gintlemen,’ says he; ‘an though at different periods a most extempory Christian, and 
most charitable and inhuman to the poor,’ says he; ‘for all that I’m not as asy where I am 
now,’ says he, ‘as I had a right to expect,’ says he” (21).  By aligning himself with “most 
gintlemen,” the old Squire unwittingly condemns his entire class along with himself 
when he notes his “extempory” Christianity and “inhuman” treatment of the poor.  The 
ironic misuse of language here creates a critique in keeping with Le Fanu’s sympathy 
toward the Irish peasantry and his disapproval of their absentee landlords.  That Terry 
Neil gives up alcohol and reforms based on this experience while the old Squire is 
banished through accidentally drinking holy water is further evidence of Le Fanu’s 
commitment to the political underpinnings of the Irish Temperance Movement: from the 
spirit of the old Squire to Terry Neil Sr. to Terry Neil Jr. a gradual reformation in terms 
of sobriety may be traced.  The squire is damned, but Terry Neil Sr. breaks free from the 
negative influence of the upper-class and reforms within his lifetime.  His son seems even 
more advanced as a model of industry and sobriety, and is described as a “well-spoken 
man” and an educator of the parish’s children by Father Purcell (5).  The moral manages 
to satisfy both Le Fanu’s Irish Ascendancy principles and his nationalistic sentiments. 
 To return to the supernatural element of the story, it must be noted how atypical 
of Le Fanu’s body of ghost fiction “The Ghost and the Bone-setter” is.  Generally 
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speaking, as V. S. Pritchett remarks, “Le Fanu’s ghosts are the most disquieting of all: the 
ghosts that can be justified, blobs of the unconscious that have floated up to the surface of 
the mind, and which are not irresponsible and perambulatory figments of family history, 
mooning and clanking about in fancy dress” (122).  But a “figment of family history” 
precisely describes the old Squire, who steps right out of his portrait and breaks bottles all 
over the house.  If Le Fanu’s later, better known ghosts (with which Pritchett is solely 
concerned) are fetched forth from the shadowy recesses of his characters’ guilt- and fear-
ridden psyches, how do we then account for this opening tale in the Le Fanu canon?  The 
psychological depth that marks his later work, and is a feature even of a few of the 
Purcell stories, is missing here, and indeed, would be wholly out of place in this quasi-
comic adventure.  What links Terry Neil to the old Squire is their mutual love for spirits: 
the story goes so far as to suggest that Terry’s sighting of one type of spirit is entirely due 
to imbibing too much of the other type.  The effect of this possibility reduces the plot to a 
simple case of one drunken fool dreaming of another drunken fool, yet it also taps into 
the superstitious belief that the Divine punished sins such as drunkenness with fearful 
hallucinations or visitations from spirits.  The story’s comic turn – Terry Neil wakes up 
clutching the leg of a chair rather than the squire’s (a plot devise that recurs toward the 
end of A Christmas Carol) – does double duty by reinforcing Le Fanu’s Temperance 
message.  
 “The Ghost and the Bone-setter” was published in January of 1838; by the end of 
the year a new force had come to dominate the Temperance mission in Ireland.  Father 
Theobald Mathew, ordained into the Capuchin order in 1814, founded the Abstinence 
Society in 1838, and “from the very beginning, [his] endeavors yielded striking success” 
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(Malcolm 111).  Mathew’s movement differed in a number of respects from the largely 
Protestant Temperance societies then active in Ireland.  He advocated teetotalism rather 
than abstinence only from strong liquor, and his appeal was directed further down the 
social ladder than were the appeals of the Protestant Temperance groups.  Malcolm 
summarizes the political significance between these two positions: “The anti-spirits 
campaign was conservative in its outlook . . . .  Teetotalism, on the other hand, appealed 
openly to Catholics and particularly to drunkards with what it claimed was a simple 
formula for their economic betterment.  Politically its sympathies inclined toward 
nationalism” (99).  Mathew’s famous “pledge” had strong overtones of Catholic 
ceremony, furthering his appeal to the peasantry.  W. H. Daniels, one of the earliest 
historians of temperance movements, writes that Mathew’s pledges “were held to be 
almost sacramental, and [his] temperance medals were actually worn as charms and 
amulets, like the holy relics which good Catholics delight to have upon their persons to 
keep all bad spirits away” (212).   
Le Fanu’s sympathies were already aligned with Mathew’s mission.  While 
Malcolm notes that the “Tory press was certainly hostile” in its treatment of Mathew and 
the Abstinence Society, the Le Fanus do not appear to have shared this sentiment (117).  
Joseph and William attended a few of Mathew’s “monster meetings,” – so called because 
of the enormous crowds they drew – and William’s account of Mathew is laudatory: he 
was “one of the simplest minded men [William] had ever known” and “his noble 
temperance work . . . soon was crowned with such marvelous and unparalleled success” 
(56).  “The Drunkard’s Dream” (1838), written after Le Fanu witnessed Father Mathew 
administering the pledge, clearly shows the Abstinence Society’s influence. 
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 The tale is one of only a couple in which Purcell is an active participant in the 
proceedings and provides eyewitness testimony.  In this case he is called to administer 
the last rites to one of his parishioners, Pat Connell, the “drunkard” of the story’s title.  
Notably, Connell and his family live in a small apartment building “without ventilation, 
reeking with all manner of offensive effluviæ, and lined by dingy, smoky, sickly and 
pent-up buildings” – a marked contrast to Purcell’s other parishioners, who, though often 
poor, are not depicted as living in such wretched squalor (“Drunkard” 208-9).  Le Fanu 
thus underscores the link between intemperance and indigence established in Temperance 
literature and made prominent in Father Mathew’s preaching.  Further, Purcell, after 
receiving his summons, anticipates that he will find Connell, a “presumptuous sinner . . . 
but too probably perishing under the consequences of some mad fit of intoxication” 
(“Drunkard” 208).  In this remark, Purcell unites the moral and physical repercussions of 
drunkenness: excessive drinking is both Connell’s sin and the likely cause of his death.  
This connection is one of the common arguments of Temperance literature.  Doyle, for 
example, in his lengthy musings on spontaneous combustion writes that it “is as awful 
[an instance] of divine visitation as can well be conceived” (58-9).  Doyle’s underlying 
assumption is that the sin of drunkenness receives direct, physical punishment at the 
hands of the divine.  Father Mathew was well-known for taking advantage of such 
superstitious beliefs to forward and enforce his abstinence message.  Queen Victoria, on 
granting Mathew a pension (which he declined), lamented: “It is quite true that he has 
done much by preaching temperance, but by the aid of superstition, which can hardly be 
patronised by the crown” (qtd. in Malcolm 141).  As Malcolm notes, Mathew did not 
directly advocate these superstitious beliefs, but he also did nothing to discountenance 
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them.  One observer of the abstinence movement wrote, “Beyond doubt, superstitious 
ideas are mixed up with [the pledge] – a large proportion of those who have taken it 
conceiving that a breach of their promise would entail some fearful visitation” (qtd. in 
Malcolm 121).  That, as Daniels notes, pledge takers wore their temperance medals like a 
holy relic to “keep all bad spirits away” suggests a dual use for the medal: to keep both 
drinkable “spirits” away, and to keep divine spirit visitors away.   
This idea, that a relapse into intemperance will result in a “fearful visitation,” 
forms the basis for the supernatural events of “The Drunkard’s Dream.”  After returning 
from the brink of death (or beyond, the story suggests), Connell confesses to Father 
Purcell his fearful vision of dining in Hell, and the temporary reprieve granted to him by 
the devil, a creature described as “taller than twelve men, and his face was very proud 
and terrible to look at” (“Drunkard” 224).   Purcell uses Connell’s fears for his future 
state to advocate reform: he tells Connell “our salvation depended not upon the word or 
deed of a moment, but upon the habits of a life, that, in fine, if he at once discarded his 
idle companions and evil habits, and firmly adhered to a sober, industrious, and religious 
course of life, the powers of darkness might claim his soul in vain . . .” (“Drunkard” 228).  
Purcell’s message is perhaps more Protestant than Catholic, but its association of sobriety 
and industry echo Father Mathew’s message.  The results of Connell’s new-found 
sobriety, too, could serve as a textbook example in support of the Abstinence message.  
Purcell notes, “I saw that man shake off idle and debauched companions . . . and revive 
his long discarded habits of industry and sobriety” (“Drunkard” 229).  Further, “with his 
better habits he recovered his former extensive and profitable employment” (“Drunkard” 
231).  Though Purcell, as a Catholic priest, should ostensibly be more attuned to his 
 28 
 
parishioners’ spiritual rather than material well-being, here the two are virtually 
synonymous.  Le Fanu’s emphasis coincides with Mathew’s.  Perhaps the strongest tie 
between “The Drunkard’s Dream” and Mathew’s preaching lies in Connell’s gruesome 
end.  Purcell had advocated the effects of the “habits of life” rather than any single act in 
determining salvation, however, it is a single act which sends Connell to a (presumably) 
fiery afterlife.  We are told 
 The unfortunate man had accidentally met an early friend just returned,  
after a long absence, and in a moment of excitement, forgetting every- 
thing in the warmth of his joy, he yielded to his urgent invitation to acc- 
ompany him into a public-house . . . .  Connell . . . had announced his 
determination to take nothing more than the strictest temperance would  
warrant . . . .  But oh! who can describe the inveterate tenacity with which  
a drunkard’s habits cling to him through life?  He may repent – he may  
reform – . . . but amid all this reformation and compunction, who can tell  
the moment in which the base and ruinous propensity may not recur,  
triumphing over resolution, remorse, shame, everything, and prostrating  
its victim once more in all that is destructive and revolting in that fatal  
vice?         
(“Drunkard” 232-3) 
 
Intoxicated, Connell returns home to his horrified wife; she reports seeing him leave the 
apartment in the company of a strange man; from here he tumbles down the stairs and 
breaks his neck, dying in exactly the spot he imagined he previously sunk down into Hell.  
Le Fanu’s repeated stress on the significance of Connell’s momentary lapse deliberately 
undermines Purcell’s more lenient message of redemption.  What Protestant Temperance 
adherents would easily forgive – extenuating circumstances which now and then lead to 
over-drinking – Mathew’s followers would treat as the breaking of a sacred vow.  That 
Connell was visited by an evil spirit following his debauch would be only a matter of 
course according to this more rigid cosmology.  Thus, while both “The Ghost and the 
Bone-setter” and “The Drunkard’s Dream” have temperance-related themes, the darker 
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tone and stricter moral of the latter demonstrates at least Le Fanu’s willingness to 
consider Mathew’s abstinence message.  If nothing more, the story indicates the distance 
Le Fanu was willing to travel in service of the Temperance cause. 
 Sullivan’s remark, that Le Fanu “did not attempt anything” like the Temperance-
tract quality of “The Drunkard’s Dream” again, needs slight amending on two fronts.  
First, Le Fanu dealt with exactly this theme again when he republished “The Drunkard’s 
Dream” as “The Vision of Tom Chuff” (1870) in All the Year Round.  Secondly, the 
Temperance theme, and specifically, this theme in relation to Father Mathew, recurs 
twice within the Purcell Papers.  Two comic pieces, “The Quare Gander” (1840) and 
“Billy Malowney’s Taste of Love and Glory” (1840), have plots that revolve around an 
instance of drunkenness; both tales also include rather disparaging remarks about Father 
Mathew.  To deal with the less interesting of the two first, Billy Malowney, a rather hot-
headed hero, drowns his anger at his sweetheart in a great deal of whiskey and, in his 
drunken state, enlists with the Welsh Confusileers to fight against “Bonyparty.”  The 
tale’s narrator describes his behavior at a wake: “he paid no attention the rest of the 
evening to any soart of diversion but the whisky alone; an’ every glass he’d drink it’s 
what he’d be wishing the devil had the women . . . .  wid the goodness iv the sperits, an’ 
the badness of his temper . . . he grew all as one as you might say almost, saving your 
presence, bastely drunk!” (“Billy” 261-2).  Here is a situation typical of the concerns first 
raised by the Protestant Temperance societies: excessive drinking at a wake, the descent 
into a “beast-like” state indicative of loss of control, loss of reason.  The repercussions 
for Malowney are slight, however.  His desire to marry Molly Donovan is delayed by a 
number of years, but his time spent fighting the French earns him the respect of his 
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village, and rumors of Napoleon’s fear of his battle-prowess make him into a legendary 
figure of sorts.  Le Fanu has clearly pulled back from his earlier severity in relation to 
temperance.  In concluding this tale with a description of Malowney’s marriage to Molly, 
the narrator says, “An’ begorra I’d be afeared to tell ye, because you would not believe 
me, since that blessid man Father Mathew put an end to all sorts of sociality, the Lord 
reward him, how many gallons iv pottieen whisky5 was dhrank upon that most solemn 
and tindher occasion” (“Billy” 288).  Mathew would not, perhaps, enjoy the “reward” this 
narrator feels he deserves in return for putting an end to sociality, but the comment was 
certainly appreciated by the Protestant readers of the Dublin University Magazine.  It 
stands, however, as a record of how widespread Mathew’s influence was: the narrator is 
perhaps one of the estimated seven million who took the pledge.  The story as a whole 
implies that wild adventures such as Billy Malowney’s are at a distance; the breakdown 
of order represented in Malowney’s drunkenness is echoed in the story’s wartime setting.  
Such debauchery is thus relegated to the past.  The narrator still enjoys his reminiscence 
of past occasions for drinking, but the very fact that he is able to cheerfully tell this tale to 
his parish priest indicates that the moral laxity inherent in his narrative is not a cause for 
present concern.  Such a position is clearly a concession to the effectiveness of Mathew’s 
work.  
     “The Quare Gander,” like “The Drunkard’s Dream” connects a supernatural 
visitation to excessive drinking; however, it does so in a way that criticizes and 
undermines this superstitious belief.  This, one of the final stories framed by Father 
Purcell’s perspective, moves away from the more rigid relationship Le Fanu had earlier 
                                                 
5
 “Pottieen” or potteen whisky is the drink of choice among Le Fanu’s Irish peasantry.  The drink carried 
specific political connotations.  Those who drank it, in effect, were proclaiming loyalty to the Irish 
nationalist cause.  See Malcolm, pp. 33-4, for a fuller discussion. 
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established between sin and divine punishment.  The tale, of a goose believed to be 
possessed by the protagonist’s father, who then appears to speak when the protagonist is 
accidentally locked in a basket with it, maintains a deceptively light tone throughout.  Yet 
unlike Le Fanu’s other supernatural tales, here the possibility of a divine (or hellish) 
source for a spiritual experience is wholly denied.  Terence Mooney’s farmhands think 
the ghost of Mooney’s father is communicating with them because, as the storyteller 
relates, “[Mooney] and Jer Garvan finished a quart [of whiskey] betune them” and fell 
asleep in the wrong place (“Quare” 240). Mooney’s transgression still leads to a spirit-
visit of sorts, but it is entirely of his own creating.  The voice the farmhands hear is 
Mooney’s own, a fitting metaphor for the theme of being haunted by one’s conscience, 
which Le Fanu moves toward in his later ghost fiction.  Mooney punishes himself 
(unwittingly) for his excess; crime and punishment are both accomplished through 
Mooney’s agency – he is a closed system.  The tale, then, though comic in nature, 
contains the most cynical understanding of the relationship between God and man in Le 
Fanu’s early work, and in it, we see Le Fanu already moving away from the easy answers 
and the cause and effect relationship between drinking and ghost seeing promoted by 
Christian dogma. 
 
II.  Some “Strange Disturbances” Between Two Systems 
 
The 1853 story “An Account of Some Strange Disturbances in Aungier Street,” 
published in the Dublin University Magazine, marks a shift in Le Fanu’s attitude toward 
ghost-seeing.  Here for the first time he includes references to scientific theories 
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regarding “spectral phenomena,” and here, too, we first glimpse the influence of 
Swedenborgianism that becomes prominent in In a Glass Darkly.  Le Fanu has moved 
beyond Father Purcell, but he has not yet created Dr. Hesselius; as a transitional piece, 
“Strange Disturbances” depicts the beginnings Le Fanu’s distrust of institutionally 
sanctioned explanations for spiritual experiences. 
 Le Fanu divides the story’s narrative between its two protagonists, Dick and his 
cousin, Tom Ludlow, and in doing so, gestures toward the dual (and dueling) 
explanations for ghost-seeing: the material, scientific view and the spiritual, religious 
view.  Dick, our initial narrator, is a medical student at the time of the story’s events; the 
reader is led to assume that he has gone on to success in his field.  Given his choice of 
studies, he is more or less committed to the materialist view, yet notes that he has an 
“excitable or nervous temperament” (“Strange” 19) and a “superstitious weakness” 
regarding the sinister quality of the Aungier Street house where the two men take up 
residence at the narrative’s start (“Strange” 21).  This combination of traits allows him to 
both apply scientific theories to his experiences, and to question the efficacy of science’s 
theoretical solutions.  Upon first becoming troubled with nightly visions of a portrait 
“mysteriously glued to the window-panes . . . of an old man, in a crimson flowered silk 
dressing-gown,” Dick approaches Tom for help (“Strange” 21-22).  He says,  
I had—I can’t say exactly why, but it may have been from  
the exquisite anguish and profound impressions of unearthly  
horror, with which this strange phantasmagoria was assoc- 
iated—an insurmountable antipathy to describing the exact  
nature of my nightly troubles to my friend and comrade.   
Generally, however, I told him that I was haunted by abom- 
inable dreams; and, true to the imputed materialism of  
medicine, we put our heads together to dispel my horrors,  
not by exorcism, but by a tonic.  
(“Strange” 22) 
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Dick’s dislike of discussing the vision – due, he thinks, to the “anguish” and “horror” the 
portrait inspires – testifies to his discomfort with non-material symptoms of bodily 
distress.  Feelings are rather amorphous, but sleep is a verifiable phenomenon that can be 
tinkered with through medical intervention. 
 Just as Dick’s materialism is tempered by his superstitious sentiments, so is his 
ghost-seeing experience lessened in intensity by his distance from the ghost of Judge 
Horrocks.  The Judge’s manifestations before Dick come in the form of the portrait 
outside his bedroom window and the giant rat on the stairs who is the “evil being in 
masquerade, and rambling through the house upon some infernal night lark” (“Strange” 
27).  The actual ghost of Judge Horrocks is reserved for Tom, who is as extreme in his 
initial skepticism (and materialism) as he is in his eventual conversion to belief.  When 
Dick and Tom first move into the Aungier Street house, Tom “most affectedly ridiculed” 
Dick’s fear of one particular bedroom.  Though Tom’s first sighting of Judge Horrocks 
crossing his room is so frightening he finds himself paralyzed for hours, by the next 
morning he “was trying to persuade [him]self that the whole thing was an illusion” 
(“Strange” 29).  So invested is he in his rational understanding of ghosts that within a few 
days, he says, “I grew more confident, and began to fancy that I believed in the theories 
of spectral illusions, with which I had at first vainly tried to impose upon my convictions” 
(“Strange” 29).  These responses to ghost-seeing underscore the strength of Tom’s 
skepticism both in that he is initially able to tell himself he is deluded despite the strong 
(and paralyzing) evidence of his senses, and in that his skeptical stance ultimately 
triumphs over his “convictions.”  Like Dick, Tom has judged the experience wrongly, 
ignoring what he feels to be true in order to remain faithful to his materialistic credo.  It is 
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perhaps because of his distrust of system-guided human judgment that Le Fanu chose 
Judge Horrocks, the fallible, corrupt, “hanging judge” as his specter: Tom and Dick are 
truly haunted by and because of bad judgment.  More specifically, this bad judgment is 
entirely the product of Tom’s and Dick’s adherence to the scientific system’s 
understanding of spiritual phenomena, at the expense of a deeper truth both men initially 
understand. 
 The extremity of Tom’s skepticism is matched by the totality of his belief by the 
end of his experience.  As Dick says, “The sceptic [sic] was . . . destined to receive a 
lesson” (“Strange” 21).  This is the common theme of ghost fiction by mid-century, and 
again points to Le Fanu’s shifting focus.  Ghosts in The Purcell Papers are accepted as a 
matter of course, a fitting result of excess.  The man of science, the enlightened rationalist 
who receives a comeuppance at the hands of a spirit, today is a stock figure of ghost 
fiction, but was only just beginning to appear when Le Fanu wrote “Strange 
Disturbances.”  Tom ends his experience at the Aungier Street house a changed man, 
going so far as to give up medicine to enter the Church.  It is a move which would have 
pleased Father Purcell; Le Fanu does not seem as sure.  Tom’s career change indicates 
that he has rejected one system in favor of another, but his conviction that a “true” 
explanation for ghost-seeing can be found in religion is never endorsed by the story.  The 
superabundance of “explanations” for Judge Horrocks’s appearances, along with a 
catalogue of his victims – some guilty, like the drunkard who seemingly fell down the 
stairs and broke his neck (a la “The Drunkard’s Dream”), and some perfectly innocent, 
like the number of children terrorized by the spirit.  Nowhere in the story is the simple 
cause and effect relationship between sin and spiritual punishment which features so 
 35 
 
prominently in The Purcell Papers.  Tom, sure in his new belief in the Christian system, 
is dead before Dick tells the story, “a sacrifice to contagion, contracted in the noble 
discharge of his duties” (19).  The reader is left with only Dick’s voice to make sense of 
the story, and Dick, half believing in the “something greater” the ghost represents, but 
still anchored in his materialistic rejection of spiritual matters, has no real answer to offer. 
 There are a great number of drinking references in “Strange Disturbances,” giving 
the impression that in this revisionary tale Le Fanu wanted to study the relationship 
between ghost-seeing and drinking from every conceivable angle.  Alcohol plays a key 
role in both Dick’s and Tom’s adventures with Judge Horrocks.  In Dick’s case, alcohol, 
specifically whiskey punch, is used as another form of tonic.  He says, “as the best mode 
of keeping the ‘Black spirits and white,/ Blue spirits and grey,’ with which I was 
environed, at bay, I had adopted the practice recommended by the wisdom of my 
ancestors, and ‘kept my spirits up by pouring spirits down’” (“Strange” 24).  This notion 
marks a radical reversal on Le Fanu’s part.  In The Purcell Papers, alcohol is the catalyst 
for spirit-seeing; here, Dick drinks to try to escape such a vision.  Le Fanu thus abolishes 
the cause and effect relationship he had established previously, signaling that ghost-
seeing and excessive drinking are no longer linked as a simple moral issue. 
 Dick’s notion is to dull his senses; underlying this idea is the materialistic belief 
that the vision of Judge Horrocks is a product of his senses.  Over three successive nights, 
Dick has the opportunity (whether he would like it or not) to test this theory.  On the first 
night, the Judge’s rat form flops down the stairs from the attic before Dick drinks his 
punch.  The supernatural occurrence here is unconnected with consumption of alcohol.  
On the second night, “the morale of the garrison was . . . excellent” given Dick’s punch 
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intake; his consequent ghostly experience is with his china hutch, which he attacks with a 
poker when he mistakes an inverted pair of teacups for staring eyes (“Strange” 25).  Here 
is a ghost-seeing experience akin to that in “The Quare Gander”: spirit drinking has led to 
spirit seeing, but the sight is entirely manmade.  As a test of Dick’s theory regarding 
dulling the senses to supernatural visions, the experience is inconclusive.  Dick rushes out 
to confront the ghost because he hears its footfall on the stairs, just as he had on the 
previous night; his sense of the spirit’s presence is unaltered.  However, his senses are 
confused enough to mistake the hutch for a supernatural creature in the darkness, partially 
supporting his belief in the whiskey’s efficacy.  Finally, on the third night, Dick’s 
reliance on alcohol becomes both mental and physical.  He says “I sate down and stared 
at the square label on the solemn and reserved-looking black bottle, until “FLANAGAN 
& CO.’S BEST OLD MALT WHISKY’ grew into a sort of subdued accompaniment to 
all the fantastic and horrible speculations which chased one another through my brain” 
(“Strange” 26).  Likewise, Dick restores his nerves with strong punch.  It is on this night 
that Dick finally visually encounters the rat who has successively disturbed his evenings 
with its nightly rambles on the stairs.  The fact that Dick had been disturbed whether or 
not he consumed alcohol effectively undermines his theory that dulling the senses will 
shut out supernatural visitations.  Le Fanu seems to indicate that the forces behind 
ghostly appearances are stronger than the human capability of altering sensory 
perception.  Dick’s three-time adventure defies both traditional superstition and 
physiological theories for ghost-seeing. 
 In defying and denying the “answers” offered by religion and science, Le Fanu 
points toward ghost-seeing as an experience that lies outside of any system’s 
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explanations, an understanding more fully articulated in Tom’s account of his experience 
with Judge Horrocks.  Like Dick, Tom has three supernatural encounters.  The first, 
described above, is unrelated to alcohol; however, prior to Tom’s second sighting of 
Judge Horrocks, he notes cheering himself up by listening to a “loud drunken quarrel in 
the back lane” outside his bedroom window (“Strange” 30).  Just as Dick raised his spirits 
through drinking, so has Tom raised his through the idea of drunkenness – a sort of proof 
that the mind’s power is equal to the body’s.  The drunken quarrel he hears going on in 
the street is a reminder of his mundane, normal surroundings; it is proof to him of the 
impossibility of a second supernatural occurrence.  However, like his conviction that the 
world is bound by natural, material laws, Tom’s understanding of his surroundings is 
flawed.  The materialist view, just like Tom’s sense of being surrounded by the mundane, 
lulls Tom into feelings of complacency.  As he begins to drift off to sleep, the subject of 
drunkenness again arises.  Tom hears a man singing “Murphy Delany”: “’Twas Murphy 
Delany, so funny and frisky, / Stept into a shebeen shop6 to get his skin full; / He reeled 
out again pretty well lined with whiskey, / As fresh as a shamrock, as blind as a bull” 
(“Strange” 30).  Tom surmises that the singer’s state “resembled that of his hero,” which 
effectively adds a second layer to the drunkenness of the scene.  As the singer’s voice 
fades into the distance, Tom continues to think of the song, imaginatively following 
Murphy Delany on his drunken adventures.  The song ends with its hero hanged, and the 
repetition of the phrase “dead, dead, dead” is the cue for Judge Horrocks’s visit.  This 
sequence of events creates a contrast between the reasoning behind spirit visits in The 
Purcell Papers and Le Fanu’s new understanding of spirit visits as exemplified in 
                                                 
6
 An establishment that sells alcohol illegally, which again is a mark of political affiliation with the cause of 
Irish nationalism. 
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“Strange Disturbances.”  In the song both Tom and the drunkard in the street below sing, 
drunkenness is punished with death, establishing the same sense of cause and effect 
featured in The Purcell Papers.  This song’s presence creates tension between its 
portrayal of justice and the seeming lack of justice in the story’s events.  While Murphy 
Delany is punished for vice, his counterpart, the drunken singer, escapes unscathed.  It is 
Tom, whose only sin is the contemplation of a song about drunkenness, who receives a 
horrifying spectral visitor.  In other words, “Strange Disturbances” undermines any sense 
of logical cause and effect based in the Christian system.  It, too, disturbs the logic of 
materialism.  Tom’s encounter with the spirit is neither attributable to inebriation (as 
some physiologists argued), or something he can defend against through drinking (as 
Dick attempts to do).  Alcoholic spirits and supernatural spirits are both present in the 
scene, and nothing logical links them together. 
 “An Account of Some Strange Disturbances in Aungier Street” is disturbing 
because of its lack of answers.  The ghost of Judge Horrocks appears – exists – for no 
discernable reason; drinking neither brings about divine punishment, or protects the mind 
from ghostly encounters.  Le Fanu undercuts both Christian and scientific systems, an 
approach that will become more marked in the stories that comprise In a Glass Darkly.   
 
 
III. Questioning Spirits in Le Fanu’s Later Ghost Stories 
 
 “ . . . I tried to comfort myself by repeating again and again the assurance, ‘the  
 thing is purely disease, a well-known physical affection . . .’” 
      “Green Tea” 
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 Le Fanu’s interest in psychology is evident to some extent in The Purcell Papers.  
“The Drunkard’s Dream,” for example, begins with Father Purcell’s philosophical 
reflection on the mysteries of dreams.  He writes 
It does appear that a mental phenomenon so extraordinary cannot  
be wholly without its use.  We know, indeed, that in the olden  
times it has been made the organ of communication between the  
Diety and His creatures; and when, as I have seen, a dream  
produces upon a mind, to all appearances  hopelessly reprobate  
and depraved, an effect so powerful and so lasting as to break  
down the inveterate habits, and reform the life of an abandoned  
sinner, we see in the result, in the reformation of morals which  
appeared incorrigible, in the reclamation of a human soul which  
seemed to be irretrievably lost, something more than could be  
produced by a mere chimera of the slum-bering fancy, something  
more than could arise from the capricious images of a terrified 
imagination; but once presented, we behold in all these things,  
and in their tremendous and mysterious results, the operation of  
the hand of God.  
( “Drunkard” 202-3) 
 
Already in this early story, Le Fanu is speculating about the mind’s “extraordinary” 
abilities, particularly in relation to spiritual matters.  Purcell connects a mental operation 
with a moral conversion, seeing the “hand of God” at work in the products of the 
imagination.  That the imagination is “terrified” suggests that for Le Fanu, terror has a 
salubrious effect on moral life.  Just as the superstitious fear of a spirit-visit served as a 
check to Father Mathew’s pledge-takers, so might a terrifying experience, imaginary or 
not, work to scare a person straight, so to speak.  As evidence for the existence of God-
inspired dreams, Purcell cites biblical authority and his own experience; mental 
phenomena undergo an ontological shift in In a Glass Darkly, where Dr. Hesselius 
invests them with physiological origins. 
 In the title to his 1872 collection of supernatural tales, Le Fanu neatly captures the 
paradox that is the essence of the ghost story: a ghost-seeing experience is essentially a 
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claim to see beyond life, beyond death, into the unknown.  In effect, it purports to have 
an answer to the question.  But in slightly altering 1 Corintheans: “For now we see 
through a glass, darkly”, to “in a glass darkly,” Le Fanu seems to deny the experience’s 
worth.  It does not grant us the momentary power to see beyond, to see through death into 
afterlife as easily as looking through a window, and instead posits that the ghost story’s 
glass is not transparent but reflective.  As Robert Tracy writes, “A clergyman’s son, we 
can be sure he did not misquote scripture lightly.  The glass of his title is not a window-
pane through which we glimpse dim intimations of a spiritual world, or of divine truth.  It 
is a mirror in which we glimpse our own darker nature” (xv).  The ghost stories in this 
collection, Le Fanu’s title suggests, only reveal the image of our own fears and 
insecurities.  I would suggest that Tracy is only partially right: the title does mark Le 
Fanu’s focus on the self, but in story after story, a sense of the divine is pervasive.  Le 
Fanu does not, then, deny the connection between the supernatural and the divine; 
instead, his title points to man’s increasing inability to comprehend this connection.  
McCormack argues,  
In, replacing through, appears to deny even this degree of limited 
penetration . . . . The aspirant Christian now finds his attention  
trapped, or obscured, or obstructed, within what might have been  
thought the medium of successful vision.  The misquotation, at  
this level, is quite at one with the religious misgivings of  
Matthew Arnold’s ‘Dover Beach,’ and with the Victorian crisis  
of faith generally.  
(Dissolute 141)  
 
In a Glass Darkly presents a marked shift from The Purcell Papers in terms of the 
religious convictions of the stories’ protagonists, in keeping, as McCormack notes, with 
the more general erosion of faith across the nineteenth century.  Specifically, the 
inclusion of Dr. Hesselius as the stories’ framer places the origin of the “crisis of faith” in 
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the nascent field of psychology.  Just as Father Purcell, “simply by his presence . . . 
emphasizes the spiritual aspect of the stories,” so does Hesselius’s presence emphasize 
the pseudo-medical explanations for ghost-seeing (Harris 11).  While Le Fanu’s interest 
in pharmacology remains strong in these later stories, his temperance themes take second 
place to explorations of these pseudo-medical explanations’ connection between 
imbibing and seeing spirits.  While The Purcell Papers presents a straightforward 
Christian cosmology, and while “Strange Disturbances” balances a rejection of this 
cosmology with a similar rejection of materialistic theories for ghost seeing, In a Glass 
Darkly almost nostalgically looks back at the faith of Le Fanu’s earlier stories even as it 
suggests that man’s growing materialism and the inadequacy of organized religion make 
accessing and understanding the spiritual impossible. 
 There is much to suggest that Le Fanu himself suffered a crisis of faith prior to 
writing the stories of In a Glass Darkly.  The sudden death of Le Fanu’s wife, his 
“darling Susie,” in May of 1858 undermined his spiritual life; indeed, the very tenor of 
his existence changed.  William writes, “from this time he entirely forsook general 
society, and was seldom seen except by his near relations and a few familiar friends” 
(Seventy Years 151).  Le Fanu the recluse replaced Le Fanu the public speaker, the 
former president of the Historical Society.     
 In fact, Le Fanu’s trust in both medical and spiritual wisdom seems to have been 
shaken by Susan’s death.  In a journal entry composed hours after his wife’s passing, Le 
Fanu writes, “I will not trouble myself with the faithless thought that the errors of art or 
the misapprehensions of the beloved patient hastened her death . . . .  God be praised – I 
can rest upon this as upon a rock – I need trouble myself no more about doctors – or their 
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measures or what might have been – It was the will of my heavenly Father that she 
should die exactly when and as she did – and in that certainty ends all speculation” 
(Lozès 157-60).  The tone of this claim is indicative more of his doubts than his 
assurance in the justification of his loss.  That he states his convictions so positively 
points to the internal questions he is struggling with.  Did Susan’s doctors treat her 
correctly?  Was she divinely fated to pass at this time?  The mistrust of authoritative 
wisdom evident in “Strange Disturbances” could only gain new fuel from Le Fanu’s 
sudden encounter with death.  His close interactions with the medical professionals who 
treated – but could not save – Susan, and his readings in the psychological treatises 
dealing with ghost-seeing7 provided him with ample material to create In a Glass 
Darkly’s framer, Martin Hesselius. 
 While Father Purcell is a sympathetic narrator whose feelings in many ways 
echoed Le Fanu’s own, Hesselius is entirely unlikeable, and his character is subtly 
ridiculed and reviled throughout the text.  Le Fanu characterizes Hesselius as a “German 
physician,” a nod to both Swedenborg and the German psychologists whose influence 
shaped British treatises on the mind and on ghost-seeing.  Hesselius claims for himself 
powers beyond those of a normal medical practitioner.  He describes himself as a  
medical philosopher . . . elaborating theories by the aid of cases 
sought out by himself, and by him watched and scrutinized with  
more time at hand, and consequently infinitely more minuteness  
than the ordinary practitioner can afford, [who] falls insensibly  
into habits of observation, which accompany him everywhere,  
and are exercised, as some people would say, impertinently, upon  
every subject that presents itself with the least likelihood of  
rewarding inquiry.  
                                                 
7
 According to Ivan Melada, even after Le Fanu became a bit of a recluse, “on the few occasions when Le 
Fanu left his house, it was to make nightly visits to old bookstores in search of books about ghosts and 
demons” (22).  In these visits to bookstores, Le Fanu would have undoubtedly come across treatises on 
ghost-seeing such as those written by Ferrier, Newnham, Hibbert, and Brewster. 
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(“Green Tea” 8)   
 
Not only has Hesselius set himself apart from his medical colleagues, he has also 
distanced himself from humanity.  He dehumanizes his patients, referring to them as 
“cases,” and all who come in contact with him are reduced to potential “subjects.”  
Unlike Father Purcell, whose sympathy with the characters who populate his tales brings 
both him and the reader closer to them, Hesselius’s treatment of his subjects and cases 
invites the reader to similarly regard these characters clinically, as aberrations, as 
curiosities.  His vision is at once alienating and alienated – a dark view of humanity 
which isolates individuals based on their neuroses.  Hesselius’s vision catalogues and 
categorizes; all who come in contact with him are given a mental file folder where the 
“facts” about them are neatly logged away.  In his characterization of Hesselius, Le Fanu 
critiques the presumption of the field of psychology in general.  Like his real-life 
counterparts, Hesselius claims to be able to divine the inner workings of the mind based 
on observable data.  When he first meets the Reverend Jennings in “Green Tea,” he says, 
“I penetrated his thoughts without his being aware of it, and was careful to say nothing 
which could betray to his sensitive vigilance my suspicions regarding his position.” (9).  
Hesselius’s language is that of the conqueror describing his power over his subject, which 
gives additional meaning to his previous use of the term “subject.”  People are both his 
study and, through his “penetrating” gaze, under his control.  
 What keeps Hesselius’s view of humanity as so many case-studies from being the 
view of Le Fanu are the various reactions of Hesselius’s subjects to him.  Throughout the 
stories that comprise In a Glass Darkly, protagonists attempt to break free of Hesselius’s 
cataloging effort by reaching out for sympathy, for understanding that provokes a human 
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connection rather than produces additional data for their files.  Jennings confesses his 
terrible secret – being haunted by a blasphemous demon monkey – hoping to be reassured 
that all will yet be well, hoping that connecting with another human being will help him 
break out of his internal mental struggle.  Likewise, Captain Barton, in “The Familiar,” 
tries to describe his haunting experience and the guilt that underlies it to a doctor with the 
same need for sympathy inherent in Jennings’ confession.  While Jennings’ and Barton’s 
words fail to move their respective doctors, they do work to align the reader’s sympathies 
with them, and in doing so, they further underscore the coldness and ineffectiveness of 
Hesselius and his ilk. 
 By creating a problematic relationship between doctor and patient, and by 
recruiting his readers’ sympathies on the side of the patient, Le Fanu highlights the 
failings of the new psychological/physiognomic approach to medicine.  Chiefly this 
failing is manifested in Doctor Hesselius’s inability to comprehend the totality of human 
experience.  While he repeatedly claims to believe in the supernatural, he treats his 
patients’ encounters with it not as spiritual experiences but as evidence of a deranged 
sensorium.  This is a marked contrast to Father Purcell’s understanding of such 
experiences – Purcell, of course, sees in the dreams and superstitious portents of his 
parishioners the active hand of God guiding his flock.  In the case of Reverend Jennings’ 
experience with his demon monkey, Hesselius remarks, “I told him that he must regard 
his illness strictly as one dependent on physical, though subtle physical, causes” (“Green 
Tea” 33).  His theory is that the human body possesses a “circulation arterial and venous 
in its mechanism, through the nerves of this system, thus considered, the brain is the 
heart.  The fluid, which is propagated hence through one class of nerves, returns in an 
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altered state through another, and the nature of that fluid is spiritual, though not 
immaterial, any more than . . . light or electricity are so” (“Green Tea” 39).  The pseudo-
medical terminology Hesselius spouts here parodies early psychologists.  Just as 
Newnham, for example, reduced aspects of personality to the products of interactions 
between the brain and bodily organs, so has Hesselius given spirituality a physical origin.  
Experiences that are supernatural in nature are produced, according to Hesselius, by a 
disturbance in the body’s spiritual fluid.  Such a theory, by extension, reduces all 
religious experience to a type of illness.  While Father Purcell took the supernatural out 
of man’s control by marking it as a lesson direct from God with a clearcut moral 
attached, Hesselius removes God from the equation, relegating the supernatural to a 
symptom treatable through healthy living.   
Le Fanu’s dissatisfaction with this connection between body and spirit is 
manifested through the impotence of Hesselius’s prescriptive cures.  Jennings’ suicide – 
what most psychologists would consider a rather strong indication of the inefficacy of 
their treatment – is by Hesselius almost blithely shrugged off.  In fact, he claims, 
Jennings was not really troubled by a supernatural vision at all: “[his] case was in the 
distinctive manner a complication, and the complaint under which he really succumbed, 
was hereditary suicidal mania” (“Green Tea” 39).  In other words, Jennings was always 
suicidal; the demon monkey business that took place before his death was simply a 
coincidence.  An easy prognosis, given that the only person who could gainsay it is dead.  
But to further distance himself from the odor of failure, Hesselius concludes the “case” 
by noting: “Poor Mr. Jennings I cannot call a patient of mine, for I had not even begun to 
treat his case, and he had not yet given me, I am convinced, his full and unreserved 
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confidence.  If the patient do not array himself on the side of the disease, his cure is 
certain” (40).  Such a statement cannot fail to rouse the readers’ incredulity.  What, 
possibly, could Jennings have been holding back, given that this respectable clergyman 
had already admitted to a belief that he was perpetually haunted by a small, sinister, foul-
mouthed monkey?  It seems only too clear that Jennings overcame a considerable fear of 
judgment to tell his story because he was convinced that his confession was his only 
chance for help.  Further, Hesselius attributes to Jennings a desire to die, a desire to 
remain incurable.  Hesselius distances himself from blame by locating it entirely on his 
patient’s shoulders, but more problematic that this is his remark that “cure is certain.”  
Elsewhere Hesselius states, “There is another class of affections which are truly termed . . 
. spectral illusions.  These latter I look upon as being no less simply curable than a cold in 
the head or a trifling dyspepsia” (“Green Tea” 38).  Hesselius here reduces mental illness 
to a simple physical affliction (although medicine has yet to cure the cold either), a 
“trifling” affliction, even.  This statement gets at the center of the debate over the makeup 
of the mind.  Was it, as physiologists argued, a purely physical part of the body, like any 
other organ, treatable in the same way that the stomach or liver is treatable?  Or – to take 
the theological perspective – was the mind the seat of the soul, the immaterial spirit for 
which the body served as a casing?  
Ultimately, this relationship between mind and body is tested through Le Fanu’s 
many instances of substance use in In a Glass Darkly.  In The Purcell Papers, drinking 
was a moral issue: to break your abstinence pledge or to imbibe too freely was to call 
down spirits, not as hallucinations produced by an alcohol-induced derangement of the 
senses, but as heavenly guides toward the path of virtue or hellish avengers punishing 
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transgressors.  In a Glass Darkly never endorses this position, but it is far more critical of 
psychological theories for ghost-seeing that linked such visions to pharmacological 
products.  The physiologists discussed in the Introduction each credited substances such 
as alcohol and opium with the ability to produce ghosts.  Ferriar notes that “[spectral] 
impressions have no doubt been produced, or strengthened by narcotic potions” (96); 
Hibbert remarks upon the dangers of inhaling nitrous oxide (anesthesia) or “febrile 
miasma” (bad air), both of which are capable of “affecting the quality of our mental 
feelings . . . . until the mind gradually becomes unconscious of actual impressions, and 
the recollected images of our thought, vivified to the height of sensations, appear, as it 
were, to take their place” (15-16); and Newnham notes, “We must here also notice the 
effects produced upon [the brain] by various substances; and particularly by alcoholic 
fluids, tea, and coffee . . . . when the quantity [of alcohol] taken has been larger, reason is 
suspended – it is absolutely drowned: in some instances, perfect insanity is produced” 
(94-5).  Not only do these theories ignore the possibility of spirits external to the body, in 
granting substances such as tea and alcohol so much power over the mind – even to the 
extent of causing insanity – they reduce the mind to a near-impotent organ, subject to 
even minor changes in the body.  Self-control, a moral sense – these are meaningless if 
the slightest chemical imbalance could cause one to become something else altogether. 
Of the five stories published in In a Glass Darkly, four include protagonists 
whose lives are centered on or greatly changed by their use of an illicit or chemically-
altering substance; the exception, “The Familiar,” with its protagonist who turns first to a 
doctor and next to a clergyman for guidance, but finds no help from either, clearly shares 
similar concerns with the other tales.  “Carmilla,” Le Fanu’s famous vampire story, is 
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truly the oddball of the collection, and given that its supernaturalism deals with mythical 
creatures rather than the mortal confrontation with the spirit world, I will not discuss it 
here.  The remaining three stories contain a drugstore’s-worth of pharmacological 
products, from the bowls of punch favored by Judge Harbottle in “Mr. Justice Harbottle,” 
to Reverend Jennings’ green tea in “Green Tea,” to a whole host of poisons, teas, and 
alcoholic beverages administered to Richard Beckett in “The Room in the Dragon 
Volant.”  
“Mr. Justice Harbottle” in many ways resembles the type of tale found in The 
Purcell Papers.  The story provides the back-story for the hanging judge who haunts 
Dick and Tom in “Strange Disturbances.”  Judge Harbottle’s life is similar to Pat 
Connell’s in “The Drunkard’s Dream.”  He lives a life of excess, as his “mulberry-
coloured face” and “big, carbuncled8 nose” testify (“Harbottle” 88).  For his sins, he is 
dragged before a spirit-court and sentenced to death.  The story’s logic would certainly 
meet with Father Purcell’s approval, but a new focus – a critique of psychological 
theories for ghost seeing – is generated by the tension between the story’s content and 
Hesselius’s opening remarks on it.  Surprisingly, Hesselius accepts the existence of the 
supernatural in the story.  He writes, 
  [Harbottle’s experience] was one of the best declared cases of  
and opening of the interior sense, which I have met with.  It was  
affected too, by the phenomenon, which occurs so frequently as  
to indicate a law of these eccentric conditions . . . the contagious  
character of this sort of intrusion of the spirit-world upon the proper 
domain of matter.  So soon as the spirit-action has established itself  
in the case of one patient, its developed energy begins to radiate,  
more or less effectually, upon others. . . .  After appearances are  
the result of the law explained in Vol. II Section 17 to 49 [of  
Hesselius’s Essay on the Interior Sense]. . . .  We see the operation  
                                                 
8
 According to the OED, a carbuncle is “a red spot or pimple on the nose or face caused by habits of 
intemperance.”  
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of this principle perfectly displayed, in certain cases of lunacy,  
of epilepsy, of catalepsy, and of mania . . . . 
     (“Harbottle” 83-4) 
 
Hesselius’s concern here is with understanding the mechanics of a spiritual experience; 
Harbottle’s case is interesting because it illustrates a “law” pertaining to the spirit world 
Hesselius has devised himself.  By discussing Harbottle’s experience in these terms, 
Hesselius is able to place it in the same category as epilepsy or mania – as just another 
disease of the mind.  Surely this is a case of “murdering to dissect.”  In his scientific 
evaluation of Harbottle’s spiritual experience, Hesselius has completely missed the point.  
Greater truths about sin and its consequences, about the justness of the universe, elude 
Hesselius because of his scientific mindset.  Hesselius’s commentary on “Mr. Justice 
Harbottle” lends weight to the collection’s title.  The scientific worldview Hesselius 
epitomizes can only ever point inward, never through to those truths not bound by laws 
and not subject to measurements and clinical study. 
 Reverend Jennings is similarly trapped in a limited worldview in “Green Tea.”  
The irony here, of course, is that Jennings is a clergyman, supposedly more able to accept 
the mysteries of the divine.  What Le Fanu creates in Jennings is perhaps a representative 
of Victorian man.  Disillusioned with what he perceives to be the limitations of 
Christianity, Jennings begins to research “the religious metaphysics of the ancients” 
(“Green Tea” 21).  But at the same time that Jennings recognizes the inadequacies of 
Christianity, he blindly adheres to the scientific system.  After his first terrifying 
encounter with the demon monkey, he states,  
I tried to comfort myself by repeating again and again the  
assurance, “the thing is purely disease, a well-known phy- 
sical affection, as distinctly as small-pox or neuralgia.   
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Doctors are all agreed on that, philosophy demonstrates it.   
I must not be a fool.  I’ve been sitting up too late, and I  
daresay my digestion is quite wrong, and with God’s help,  
I shall be all right, and this is but a symptom of nervous  
dyspepsia. 
(“Green Tea” 26)  
 
Jennings seeks not only answers but comfort in the wisdom of medicine – it is a 
substitute for religious conviction.  It is also a trap, a blind alley that prevents Jennings 
from coming to a true understanding of his spiritual experience.  In deciding that the 
entire experience is the fault of green tea consumption, Jennings precipitates his own 
demise.  He attempts to cure a physical malady with a physical change, leaving himself 
wide open to the effects of the spiritual. 
 “The Room in the Dragon Volant” contains no real supernatural element (all are 
explained away in the story as the tricks of a gang of thieves), yet its focus on the effects 
of pharmacological products on the mind provides perhaps the best metaphor for Le 
Fanu’s understanding of the failures of science and religion.  The story’s protagonist, 
Richard Beckett, continually succumbs to the effects of alcohol and strong coffee 
administered to him by the thieves that are plotting against him.  It is unsurprising then, 
that he is put in mortal peril by a cup of black coffee followed by a “miniature glass—a 
fairy glass—of noyeau,” both spiked with a poison that sends him into a state of 
paralysis.  The thieves who have taken him plan to bury him alive – by the time the 
poison wears off, Richard will be deep underground and will die in the grave.  If by any 
chance his body were to be exhumed, the poison, having run its course, would not be 
detectable in his body.  This “perfect” – albeit farfetched – murder provides Le Fanu with 
a situation in which he can focus on his pharmacological concerns.  Under the influence 
of the poison administered to him, Richard loses all control of his body.  He is paralyzed 
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from head to foot.  However, he still retains the complete and perfect use of his mind and 
his senses.  He has ample time to dwell on the horror of his situation, and the vision and 
hearing necessary to understand exactly what is happening to him.  Richard’s physical 
reaction to the drug points to the separation of mind and body in Le Fanu’s work.  The 
mind in this story is not just any other organ, subject to the same material laws that 
govern the stomach.  While Richard’s entire body is frozen by the drug, his mind is still 
free.  This distinction between mind and body also symbolizes Le Fanu’s concern with 
material understandings of the world.  The material – the physical body – is trapped, 
literally paralyzed, and likely to go to the grave that way, while the spiritual – the mind – 
is free, not bound by the laws that govern the material body.  So is man trapped in only 
dwelling in material possibilities. 
 Le Fanu’s many supernatural tales are concerned with the limitations man must 
deal with when operating within a system of thought – either religious or scientific – and 
his focus on pharmacological issues demonstrates a shift in his understanding of the place 
of such systems in dealing with spiritual experiences.  Ultimately, Le Fanu is unable to 
place faith in science or religion; both are inadequate to explain the mysteries and deeper 
meanings his fiction explores.  What is most frightening about Le Fanu’s ghost stories is 
the dead end where he leaves his readers, without answers and without the tools to find 
them, and his suggestion, particularly throughout In a Glass Darkly, that man’s new 
focus on the scientific system will only lead him further and further from real knowledge.  
Le Fanu’s vision, though disillusioned, aided those ghost story writers that followed in 
his footsteps.  By disassociating spiritual experiences from the religious and scientific 
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systems that sought to define them, Le Fanu challenged his contemporaries to try to find 
ways in which the spiritual could be understood.         
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 2 
Time, Psychology, and Dickens’s Spirits of Christmas 
 
 
In an era obsessed with spiritualism and all things occult it is unsurprising that 
Dickens had a number of his own ghostly encounters.  Like so many of his 
contemporaries, he attended a séance, and was greatly amused by a “Psycho-grapher, 
which writes at the dictation of spirits.  It delivered itself . . . of this extraordinarily lucid 
message: x. y. z! upon which it was gravely explained by the true believers that ‘the 
spirits were out of temper about something’” (Letters, March 7, 1854).  Unlike Elizabeth 
Barrett Browning, who expressed great wonder over the “spirit hands” which touched her 
during a séance,9 Dickens’s only source of amazement was at the credulity of his host.  
Dickens also lived for a time in a haunted house, as he notes in the semi-autobiographical 
opening chapter of The Haunted House:10  
In . . . an old Italian palace, which bore the reputation of being  
very badly haunted indeed, and which had recently been twice  
abandoned on that account, I lived eight months, most tranquilly  
and pleasantly: notwithstanding that the house had a score of  
mysterious bedrooms, which were never used, and possessed,  
in one large room in which I sat reading, times out of number at  
all hours, and next to which I slept, a haunted chamber of the first 
pretensions.”      (11) 
                                                 
9
 For an account of the séance Browning attended, conducted by the medium Daniel Dunglas, see Taplin, 
Gardner.  The Life of Elizabeth Barrett Browning.  New Haven: Yale UP, 1957, pp. 293-296. 
 
10
 As Peter Ackroyd argues in his introduction to The Haunted House. 
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The “old Italian palace” refers to the Palazzo Peschiere in Genoa, where Dickens 
composed his second Christmas book, The Chimes.  His dismissive attitude toward the 
house’s reputation is evident not only in the act of reading “at all hours” in the haunted 
chamber, but also in his description of the palace in Pictures from Italy: “There is not in 
Italy, they say (and I believe them), a lovelier residence than the Palazzo Peschiere . . . . 
surrounded by beautiful gardens of its own, adorned with statues, vases, fountains, 
marble basins, terraces, walks of orange-trees and lemon-trees, groves of roses and 
camellias” (54).  Ghostly goings-on could not be further from his thoughts when 
reminiscing about the residence.  Even the “score of mysterious bedrooms” Dickens 
describes in The Haunted House he graciously offers in a letter to friends considering a 
visit – an act which suggests he confidently believed their rest in these rooms would be 
undisturbed (Letters Aug. 9, 1844).  All in all, life in the haunted palace seems not to 
have struck any deep chord in Dickens.  Finally, in a third ghostly encounter, Dickens 
investigated reports of a haunting near Gad’s Hill.  He writes to Wilkie Collins: 
  Rumours were brought into the house on Saturday night, that  
there was a ‘ghost’ up at Larkin’s monument . . . . Time, nine  
o’clock. Village talk and credulity, amazing. I . . . shouldered  
my double-barrelled gun, well loaded with shot. ‘Now observe,’  
says I to the domestics, ‘if anybody is playing tricks and has got  
a head, I’ll blow it off.’ Immense impression. New groom evidently 
convinced that he has entered the service of a bloodthirsty demon.  
We ascend to the monument. Stop at the gate. Moon is rising.  
Heavy shadows. ‘Now, look out!’ (from the bloodthirsty demon,  
in a loud, distinct voice). ‘If the ghost is here and I see him, so  
help me God I’ll fire at him!’ Suddenly, as we enter the field, a  
most extraordinary noise responds terrific noise human noise  
and yet superhuman noise . . . . Noise repeated portentous, derisive,  
dull, dismal, damnable. We advance toward the sound. Something  
white comes lumbering through the darkness. An asthmatic  
sheep!      (Letters Oct. 24, 1860) 
 
 55 
 
In these three episodes, Dickens’s satiric stance toward his time’s other-worldly 
beliefs is everywhere apparent.  To him, the ghost-craze and the popularity of the 
Spiritualist Movement represented a shallow, meaningless echo of true Christian faith.  
After a fictitious encounter with a self-important medium, Dickens’s narrator in “The 
Mortals in the House” notes, “I can no more reconcile the mere banging of doors, ringing 
of bells, creaking of boards, and suchlike insignificances, with the majestic beauty and 
pervading analogy of all the divine rules that I am permitted to understand, than I had 
been able, a little while before, to yoke the spiritual intercourse of my fellow-traveller to 
the chariot of the rising sun” (Haunted House 9).  The biblical allusion is hard to miss: 
Spiritualists, like the medium on the train who is given the weighty message “A bird in 
the hand is worth two in the Bosh” (5) are in no way able to connect to the import of the 
“rising sun” – Christ and the true teachings of Christianity.  Like his famous protagonist 
in A Christmas Carol, Dickens’s attitude toward ghosts seems to be of the “Bah! 
Humbug!” variety. 
Dickens’s impatience with his contemporaries’ preoccupation with the 
supernatural seems out of character given his numerous literary forays into the realm of 
ghosts and goblins.  He not only contributed ghost stories such as “To be Taken with a 
Grain of Salt” and “The Signal-Man” to his periodicals, he also solicited similar 
supernatural tales from fellow writers such as Collins and Elizabeth Gaskell.  Further, 
Dickens’s irreverent tone when describing his real-life ghostly encounters is a marked 
contrast to the seriousness with which he treats his most famous ghosts, the four spirits of 
A Christmas Carol and the Ghost in The Haunted Man.11   
                                                 
11
 Though its full title is The Haunted Man and the Ghost’s Bargain, for the sake of brevity, I will refer to it 
as The Haunted Man throughout. 
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Though Dickens evinces much skepticism about the existence of ghosts, he 
refuses to dismiss them in his fiction using current psychological theories for ghost-
seeing.  In the second of two supernatural tales that make up “To be Read at Dusk” one 
storyteller relates an incident that occurred to his master:  
“I have just now seen,” Mr. James repeated, looking full at  
me, that I might see how collected he was, “the phantom of  
my brother John.  I was sitting up in bed, unable to sleep,  
when it came into my room, in a white dress, and regarding  
me earnestly, passed up to the end of the room, glanced at  
some papers on my writing-desk, turned, and, still looking  
earnestly at me as it passed the bed, went out at the door.   
Now, I am not in the least mad, and am not in the least dis- 
posed to invest that phantom with any external existence out  
of myself.  I think it is a warning to me that I am ill; and I  
think I had better be bled.”    (243) 
 
James’s matter-of-fact assertion that he needs to be bled draws on the work of Samuel 
Hibbert, who theorized that ghost-seeing was a form of hallucination caused by 
circulatory problems.  In his 1824 Sketches of the Philosophy of Apparitions Hibbert 
elaborates on “certain states of the sanguineous system, in which a remarkable connexion 
between such states and an undue vividness of mental feelings appears to be established” 
(10).  For example, too much or too little blood, or missing one’s regularly scheduled 
blood-letting, could result in a taxation of the mind which in turn could cause spectral 
illusions to appear.  Catherine Crowe, in The Night Side of Nature remarks, “The books 
of Dr. Ferriar, Dr. Hibbert, and Dr. Thatcher . . . are all written to support one exclusive 
theory, and they only give such cases as serve to sustain it . . . . whatever instance cannot 
be covered by this theory, they reject as false, or treat as a case of extraordinary 
coincidence” (18).  Dickens seems equally unimpressed with Hibbert’s theory.  James, 
after seeing his brother’s apparition, is called to attend him on his deathbed.  His dying 
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brother’s last words to him are: “James, you have seen me before, to-night – and you 
know it!” (244).  If James had relied on Hibbert’s psychological explanation for his 
vision, he would have missed a last earthly meeting with his cherished brother.  The 
significance of the vision – reassurance that though physical bonds may dissolve in death, 
spiritual bonds are eternal – would be lost to him. 
 In a similar manner, Ebenezer Scrooge is forced to choose between explaining 
away his ghost-sighting with a psychological theory or accepting both its reality and the 
greater spiritual meaning its existence implies.  When the ghost of Jacob Marley appears 
before Scrooge, Scrooge is initially skeptical: 
“Why do you doubt your senses?” 
“Because,” said Scrooge, “a little thing affects them.  A slight  
disorder of the stomach makes them cheats.  You may be an  
undigested bit of beef, a blot of mustard, a crumb of cheese, a  
fragment of an underdone potato.  There’s more of gravy than  
of grave about you, whatever you are!”  (59) 
 
Scrooge’s explanation is based on a popular theory proposed by W. Newnham in his 
Essay on Superstition (1830).  Newnham argues, “the brain stands so closely related to 
other organs of the body, that it possesses the capacity of suffering with them whenever 
they are in a state of irritation; and also, of reflecting upon them its own morbid actions, 
which they in their turn oftentimes assume, and then become secondary irritants to the 
brain” (75).  Thus any bodily illness, like indigestion, for example, can cause a “cerebral 
disorder” which in turn might produce spectral illusions (119).  Scrooge’s iteration of this 
theory renders it both comical and wholly inadequate to deal with the ghostly presence 
before him. 
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While Dickens undermines psychological theories for ghost-seeing in his fiction, 
he never fully endorses ghosts as realities in his fiction either.  Both James and Scrooge 
had been preoccupied earlier in the day with thoughts of the person whose ghost they 
later see.  James is worrying about his brother’s health, having just been told that he is 
very ill.  Scrooge is forcibly reminded of Jacob Marley’s death when asked by the 
charitable gentleman if they are addressing Scrooge or Marley: “Mr. Marley has been 
dead these seven years. . . . He died seven years ago, this very night” (50).  Thus, it is 
conceivable that both characters are mentally projecting what is on their minds.  A 
reading of Scrooge’s ghosts as mental projection is further supported when Scrooge finds 
himself not entreating the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, but addressing his bedpost 
(126).  Dickens’s ghosts, then, tread on middle-ground – possibly they are mental 
projections, but if so, they are not simply aberrations, indications of the mind’s 
susceptibility to the whims of the body.  Rather, if ghosts are mental projections, they are 
indicative of the mind’s connection to the soul; as these two examples illustrate, a higher 
power interested in the betterment of each character seems to be directing the spirit 
encounters. 
In summing up Dickens’s complicated relationship with ghosts, Peter Ackroyd 
argues that he had “a real sense of the numinous” despite his disappointing experiences 
(704).  Likewise John Forster, Dickens’s friend and early biographer, writes, “such was 
his interest generally in things supernatural, that, but for the strong restraining power of 
his common sense, he might have fallen into the follies of spiritualism.”  Dickens was in 
the position of one who wanted to believe but was disappointed in the smoke-and-mirrors 
treatment the spirit world received at the hands of the Spiritualists.  He believed that 
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ghost-seeing had the potential to be a tool for salvation, just as Ebenezer Scrooge is 
ultimately redeemed through the intervention of his spirit visitants.  However, to Dickens, 
a ghost’s power lay not in its confirmation and description of the afterlife (the absorbing 
interest of the Spiritualists), but in its ability to arrest the psyche, to make man question 
his sanity, and in doing so, to reflect on the self.  For Dickens, the ghost acted as a 
psychological other in an age sorely lacking in introspection.  In this chapter, I will argue 
that Dickens engages in the debate over Victorian man’s troubled relationship with time 
in two of his Christmas books: A Christmas Carol and The Haunted Man.  In both works, 
Dickens combines a unique perception of Christmas time with a theory that ghosts offer 
man a way to mentally traverse space and time, helping him gain the psychological 
relativism necessary to his moral and spiritual growth.   
 
I. Time and the Victorian Mind 
 
To refer to the Victorian period as lacking in introspection is not, of course, to lay 
claim to any special insight into the hearts and minds of nineteenth-century man; rather, 
the generalization refers to the Victorians’ own fear for themselves.  Walter Houghton 
opens The Victorian Frame of Mind by describing the period as one that felt itself to be a 
time of transition.  Matthew Arnold proclaimed that he and his contemporaries were 
“Wandering between two worlds, one dead / The other powerless to be born, / With 
nowhere yet to rest [our] head[s]” (85-87).  Arnold’s idea that there was no rest to be had 
pervaded the age.  In his 1875 essay “Life at High Pressure,” William R. Greg wrote that 
the Victorians were living “without leisure and without pause – a life of haste – above all 
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a life of excitement, such as haste inevitably involves” (263).  Greg points to the way of 
life his contemporaries saw themselves transitioning toward: the Victorian period was 
becoming remarkable for its rapid pace.  He writes, “the most salient characteristic of life 
in this latter portion of the nineteenth century is its SPEED – what we may call its hurry, 
the rate at which we move, the high-pressure at which we work” (263).  The speed of 
transportation, of communication, of business transactions, the speed with which one 
could rise to the top, and the speed with which one could tumble down again – to many 
the times were overwhelming.  There were serious moral implications to this style of life, 
as Greg notes: “[the life of haste is] a life filled so full, even if it be full of interest and 
toil, that we have no time to reflect where we have been and whither we intend to go; 
what we have done and what we plan to do, still less what is the value, and the purpose, 
and the price of what we have seen, and done, and visited” (268).  Greg implies that the 
life of haste, the life of the modern British gentleman, lacked the space (and time) for 
mental reflection.  The “value” that is lost is man’s mental and spiritual development: if 
no thought is given to the meaning of experience, nothing can be learned from it.  Man 
stagnates, remaining fixed in character rather than improving through experience.  Such a 
life, Greg says, “can scarcely be deemed an adequate or worthy life” (268).  In Greg’s 
account, Victorian man’s relationship to time is expressly connected to his psychological 
makeup.  He writes, “few of us have ever estimated adequately the degree in which an 
atmosphere of excitement, especially when we enter it young and continue in it 
habitually, is fatal to the higher and deeper life” (269, italics original here and 
throughout).  Greg theorizes that a generation, the “young,” is rising up without any 
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introspective powers – dangerous in that this lack keeps the young from knowing 
themselves (the “deeper” life), and that it retards their moral sense (the “higher” life).  
Tied to this sense of Victorian man is the idea that the life of haste was most 
closely associated with the goings-on of the public sphere, where such haste was directed 
toward material gain.  In his discussion of Victorian perceptions of time, N. N. Feltes 
argues that the period saw a “change to a consciousness of time as commodity” (248).  
This shift in thinking is traceable to the Industrial Revolution, which emphasized the 
speed of labor rather than the finished product of cottage industry.  Hans Meyerhoff 
notes, “Time was an indispensable instrument for the production of goods in an ever 
expanding market.  Thus time itself came to be looked on as a precious commodity, 
because it alone made possible the production of all other commodities.  We still say: 
Time is money.  It is equated with money because the commodities produced in time 
mean money” (106).  Thus, Victorian man in his life of haste has lost time to reflect, and 
further, he has replaced a general sense of time with the narrow view that time is money. 
Dickens’s own preoccupation with time and man’s relationship to it has been 
noted by a number of scholars.  James E. Marlow premises a book-length study on the 
hypothesis that Dickens’s “work may be read as a dialogue with his readers about the 
topics that were at the forefront of the Victorian imagination: time and one’s conscious 
address to it” (14).  Brigid Lowe Crawford, in her study of Dombey and Son and the first 
“Uncommercial Traveller” article, notes, “Both are products of a particular sense of 
history and attitude to remembrance that can be observed elsewhere in the culture of the 
period” (187).  N. N. Feltes examines Dickens’s relationship to the time-as-commodity 
attitude in the wake of the Ten Hours movement of the 1830s and 1840s.  Finally, S. J. 
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Schad argues that Dickens’s novels’ “articulation of time is so marked by rhetoric that the 
novels’ very understanding of time and history is, to a considerable extent, fashioned in 
its likeness” (423). 
As the number of approaches to the study of Dickens and time suggests, 
Dickens’s concepts of time, history, and man’s connection to each is complex.  He does 
not simply assert that reflecting on the past will raise the moral consciousness of the 
present.  As we shall see in The Haunted Man, fixating on the past is as harmful to moral 
development as ignoring it altogether.  In fact, Dickens’s ire seems directed at the 
unrealistic sentimentalizing he saw taking place at the national level in relation to the 
past.  Characteristic of this sentimental attitude is the “red-faced gentleman” of The 
Chimes.  After meeting Trotty Veck, he declares, “‘Who can take any interest in a fellow 
like this,’ meaning Trotty; ‘in such degenerate times as these?  Look at him!  What an 
object!  The good old times, the grand old times, the great old times!  Those were the 
times for a bold peasantry, and all that sort of thing’” (168).  Specifically, the red-faced 
gentleman’s response is a parody12 of the Young England movement, which promoted a 
system of class relations based on an idealized version of feudalism.  Conservatives 
sympathized with the movement; Greg claims that the members are “the more amiable 
portion of our aristocracy” (“England as it is” 180).  Indeed, many of the Tories who 
espoused the movement had quite a romanticized view of themselves.  Ruskin, raised to 
venerate rank and class, calls on the nobility to  
be lords indeed, and give us laws – dukes indeed, and give  
                                                 
12
 Dickens’s parody was originally much stronger, and his Young England gentleman played a larger role.  
He revised the character, exchanging the “Young England gentleman” for “a real good old city Tory” based 
on Forster’s disapproval (Forster).  Much of the Young England gentleman’s speech is retained in the 
character of the red-faced gentleman, however.  Michael Slater appends the original scene in The Christmas 
Books Volume I, pp. 249-252. 
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us guiding – princes indeed, and give us beginning of truer  
dynasty. . . . how many yet of you there . . . who still retain  
the ancient and eternal purpose of knighthood, to subdue the  
wicked, and aid the weak?  To them, be they few or many,  
we English people call for help to the wretchedness, and for  
rule over the baseness, of multitudes of desolate and deceived.  
(qtd. in Houghton 327) 
 
Ruskin’s plea clearly marks the aristocracy as chivalric heroes in the mold of an Ivanhoe, 
and to heighten the contrast between aristocrat and common man, he labels the multitude 
“base,” “wretched,” “desolate,” and “deceived.”  The lower classes become a rabble 
unworthy of the nobility’s help, a relationship similar to the Christian idea that man is 
unworthy of the forgiveness of God.  As Houghton notes, “Tory paternalism found its 
natural expression in the heroic image” (327).   
Dickens was underwhelmed by this brand of paternalism.  Sir Joseph Bowley tells 
Trotty, “Your only business, my good fellow . . . your only business in life is with me.  
You needn’t trouble yourself to think about anything.  I will think for you; I know what is 
good for you; I am your perpetual parent.  Such is the dispensation of an all-wise 
Providence!” (182).  For this thinking, Sir Joseph calls himself the “Poor Man’s Friend.”  
Paternalism in Dickens’s description is translated into self-congratulation over empty 
rhetoric.  Instead of emphasizing how the nobility could help the “multitude of desolate 
and deceived,” the example of Sir Joseph points to how the multitude can benefit the 
nobility: “be respectful, exercise your self-denial, bring up your family on next to 
nothing, pay your rent as regularly as the clock strikes” (182).  The Young England 
attitude allows the aristocracy to ignore the needs and concerns of the lower classes both 
through the easy dismissal exhibited by the red-faced gentleman and the “let us do the 
thinking for them” mentality of Sir Joseph.  The Young Englanders are thus at fault for 
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willful ignorance of the present in their glorification of a non-existent past.  This 
ignorance is harmful at the national level, leading to the neglect of the poor, and, in 
Dickens’s estimation, it is harmful on the personal level as well.  The red-faced 
gentleman  
extolled the good old times, the grand old times, the great old  
times.  No matter what anybody else said, he still went turning  
round and round in one set form of words concerning them; as  
a poor squirrel turns and turns in its revolving cage; touching  
the mechanism, and trick of which, it has probably quite as  
distinct perceptions, as ever this red-faced gentleman had of his  
deceased Millennium.    (169) 
 
The gentleman is reduced to the mental equivalent of a rodent, trapped in the cage of his 
own lack of perception. 
 Dickens’s dislike of nostalgia may partly account for his dismissive attitude 
toward ghosts.  After all, ghosts are, by logical necessity, of the past – their lives are past, 
the times in which they lived are past.  Their presence is a reminder of “the good old 
days.”  More specifically, ghosts in the nineteenth century’s popular imagination are 
often linked to the same feudal past the Young England movement idealized.  In E. 
Nesbit’s “Man-Size in Marble” for example, the supernatural visitants are literally 
“knight[s] in full plate armour” (187).  Popular accounts of hauntings often featured 
medieval figures, like the famed princes in the Tower of London or the Grey Lady of 
Stirling Castle.  And just as the red-faced gentleman of The Chimes is drawn 
imaginatively to incidentals of long ago fashion – “You don’t call these, times, do you?  I 
don’t.  Look into Strutt’s Costumes, and see what a Porter used to be, in any of the good 
old English reigns” – a highlight of “authentic” accounts and ghost stories alike is the 
special attention given to the dress of bygone eras (168).  One of Catherine Crowe’s 
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ghost-seers identifies her apparition by its “complete Russian costume” (270), while the 
frightened general in Sir Walter Scott’s “The Tapestried Chamber” recognizes the 
portrait of his revenant because both wear “an old-fashioned gown which . . . ladies call a 
sacque; that is, a sort of robe, completely loose in the body, but gathered into broad plaits 
upon the neck and shoulders, which fall down to the ground, and terminate in a species of 
train” (8).  Scott’s attention to the details of dress heightens the tension between past and 
present in his story, but further, it adds a romantic charm to the narrative.  The ghost as a 
site of nostalgia, where Victorians could dwell on simpler times, might partially account 
for the popularity of ghost stories during the period.  
 In another sense, popular notions of ghost hearkened back to a time of aristocratic 
privilege because of their close association with the aristocracy’s inheritance in the 
present.  Scott’s tale provides one such example: Lord Woodville inherits not only an 
“ancient feudal fortress” (2), but almost as a matter of course he also inherits the ghost of 
a “wretched ancestress . . .  of whose crimes a black and fearful catalogue is recorded in a 
family history in [his] charter-chest” (11-12).  Both castle and ghost are signs of Lord 
Woodville’s pedigree.  Dickens satirizes this connection between ghosts and the 
aristocracy in Bleak House, where Mrs. Rouncewell, the housekeeper who scarcely 
believes a world exists outside of Chesney Wold, “considers that a family [like the 
Dedlocks] of such antiquity and importance has a right to a ghost.  She regards a ghost as 
one of the privileges of the upper classes; a genteel distinction to which common people 
have no claim” (83).  So firm is her conviction, she won’t even share the story of the 
Dedlock ghost with commoners like Mr. Guppy and Tony Jobling when they tour the 
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house.  Ghosts in nineteenth-century fiction, then, are a type of class distinction, another 
category whereby to separate the have’s and the have-not’s. 
 Given Dickens’s association of ghosts with the privileged past of the upper class, 
it is unsurprising that his use of them would differ from the general trend.  In his ghost 
stories, spirits are often disconnected from “the good old days.”  The specter in “To be 
Taken with a Grain of Salt” is wholly attached to the present; rather than seeing the 
remains of one long dead and gone, the narrator is haunted by an apparition of a man still 
very much alive.  In “The Signal-Man,” the lonely signal-man is visited by the ghost he 
will become in the future.  Likewise, the spirits in A Christmas Carol, though they are of 
a different sort than the typical ghost, encompass all time, representing past, present and 
yet to come.  Dickens’s unconventional use of ghosts points to a different concept of their 
function in literature; instead of the site of nostalgic daydreams, ghosts, particularly in A 
Christmas Carol and The Haunted Man, serve as a connection between the physical body 
and the part of the mind divorced from time and space, a part Catherine Crowe labels the 
“constructive imagination,” significant because it is man’s link to the divine. 
In turning to Dickens’s Christmas stories, I shall first argue that he situates 
Christmas as an atemporal space, aligning it with his particular brand of ghost.  After 
establishing this link between Christmas and ghosts, I shall demonstrate through a close 
reading of A Christmas Carol and The Haunted Man that Dickens uses the Christmas 
ghost as a means to explore Victorian psychology, particularly connections between the 
psyche and time.   
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II. Space, Time, and Christmas Time 
 
Dickens opens his 1853 Christmas story for Household Words with an analogy of life and 
time.  The main character of “Nobody’s Story” lives  
on the bank of a mighty river, broad and deep, which was  
always silently rolling on to a vast undiscovered ocean.  It  
had rolled on, ever since the world began.  It had changed its  
course sometimes, and turned into new channels, leaving its  
old ways dry and barren; but it had ever been upon the flow,  
and ever was to flow until Time should be no more.  Against  
its strong unfathomable stream, nothing made head.  No living  
creature, no flower, no leaf, no particle of animate or inanimate  
existence, ever strayed back from the undiscovered ocean.  The  
tide of the river set resistlessly towards it; and the tide never  
stopped, any more than the earth stops in its circling round the  
sun.        (62) 
 
The relentlessness of time, the constant, irreversible affect it has on life emphasized in 
this passage is a typical articulation of Dickens’s view, and he includes similar analogies 
in novels such as Little Dorritt and David Copperfield, as well as in a number of his 
shorter works.  Brigid Lowe Crawford highlights this concept of time in an 
Uncommercial Traveller article, “The Shipwreck.”  Here time is compared to an ocean 
which offers readers an “orderly, teleological universe in which details range themselves 
in regular and predictable sequence” (187).  But while this is Dickens’s general notion of 
time, I would argue that he makes an exception in the case of Christmas time.  In The 
Haunted Man old Philip proclaims,  
going round the building every year, as I’m a-doing now, and  
freshening up the bare rooms with these branches and berries  
[of holly], freshens up my bare old brain.  One year brings back  
another, and that year another, and those others numbers!  At last,  
it seems to me as if the birth-time of our Lord was the birth-time  
of all I have ever had affection for, or mourned for, or delighted  
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in, -- and they’re a pretty many, for I’m eighty-seven! (385) 
 
Christmas is thus a portal through which man can move backwards, skipping from one 
year to the previous one, and in doing so, as Philip does, he may traverse the course of his 
entire life.  It is a way of “making head” against the flow of the river of time.  Dickens 
ties the act of moving imaginatively back through time with the yearly hanging of holly.  
Philip, even at eighty-seven, remembers Christmas when his height was “a little way 
above the level of his knee” and his mother told him holly berries were “food for birds” 
(383).  He says, “The pretty little fellow thought – that’s me, you understand – that birds’ 
eyes were so bright, perhaps, because the berries they lived on in winter were so bright” 
(383).  He recalls sitting with his wife, “among ‘em all, boys and girls, little children and 
babies, many a year, when the berries like these were not shining half so bright all around 
us, as their bright faces” (384).  The continuous presence of the holly points to an 
important sameness from one Christmas to the next – though loved ones are born and 
loved ones die, the traditions surrounding Christmas are unchanged.  It is this sameness, 
achieved through tradition, which allows Phillip to access his past life.  Similarly, the 
semi-autobiographical narrator in Dickens’s 1850 essay “A Christmas Tree” uses the 
trappings of tradition – in this case, the Christmas tree – to step back into his childhood.  
He writes, “Straight, in the middle of the room . . . a shadowy tree arises; and, looking up 
into the dreamy brightness of its top – for I observe in this tree the singular property that 
it appears to grow downward towards the earth – I look into my youngest Christmas 
recollections!” (4).  Dickens emphasizes the eternal quality in Christmas through his 
attention to tradition. 
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 In a recent article, Andrew Smith argues that the emphasis on the material objects 
associated with Christmas tradition in A Christmas Carol highlight an irresolvable 
problem in Scrooge’s “redemption.”  He writes, “Scrooge’s benign, seasonally 
redistributive capitalism” as demonstrated through the purchase of turkeys and presents 
“implies a change at the social periphery . . . which does not touch the central 
mechanisms of economic power” (40).  In other words, Scrooge’s actions are premised 
on the values of a system which is itself problematic.  Smith continues, “Scrooge may 
have gone from unhappy miser to jovial capitalist but this hardly transforms the system, 
but rather invites one to accept it as potentially benign” (45).  Thus the material objects 
associated with Christmas, such as the pile of foodstuffs upon which the Ghost of 
Christmas Present makes his throne, point not to the unique bounty and spirit of giving 
emphasized at Christmas time, but instead highlight “a link between bounty and the 
‘degradation’ that it produces” (Smith 50).  The system by which some gain wealth 
forces others into poverty.  While I do not disagree with Smith’s argument that A 
Christmas Carol unconsciously demonstrates its inability to move beyond the terms of 
the capitalist system, I believe Dickens’s focus on Christmas’s material goods – holly, 
wreaths, “immense twelfth-cakes” (86), a pudding like a “speckled cannon-ball, so hard 
and firm, blazing in half of half-a-quartern of ignited brandy” (96) – operates on a level 
outside of economic considerations.  Indeed, Mrs. Cratchit’s pudding, though a material 
object, itself points to the Cratchits’ poverty.  Dickens’s point in dwelling on it is to 
emphasize not its value in economic terms, but its value in spiritual terms: “Everybody 
had something to say about it, but nobody said or thought it was at all a small pudding for 
a large family.  It would have been flat heresy to do so” (96).  The pudding serves to 
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bring the family together, to remind them of their blessings, and they regard it in light of 
a religious experience (thus the “heresy” of speaking negatively about it).  To return 
briefly to “A Christmas Tree,” the narrator writes, “A moment’s pause, O vanishing tree, 
of which the lower boughs are dark to me as yet, and let me look once more . . . . If Age 
be hiding for me in the unseen portion of thy downward growth, O may I, with a grey 
head, turn a child’s heart to that figure yet, and a child’s trustfulness and confidence” 
(18).  The tree allows the narrator not only to glance back, but to contemplate his future.  
Geoffrey Rowell writes of this scene “Dickens uses the Christmas Tree as a kind of 
medieval memory system tracing the associations of Christmas down the branches of the 
tree.”  More than this, the objects of Christmas tradition serve as talismans; their power 
lies in the promise they hold to keep open man’s imaginative access to time past, present, 
and future.  
 Ghosts are also a Christmas tradition Dickens makes use of in his construction of 
Christmas time.  Though a belief persists that Dickens made ghosts a regular part of the 
festival of Christmas through A Christmas Carol, in filling his Christmas stories with 
ghosts, Dickens is drawing on a longstanding connection between the two.  As David 
Parker notes, “The first publication firmly linking ghost stories with Christmas appeared 
circa 1730.  Round about our Coal Fire is a curious Grub Street production, subtitled 
‘Christmas Entertainments’” (105).  In this text, the anonymous author records a number 
of supernatural tales, which he says make up “one of the great Amusements, when the 
Country folks begin to repose themselves” (qtd. in Parker 105).  Thus as early as the first 
decades of the eighteenth century, it was customary, at least in rural areas, to tell ghost 
stories at Christmas.  The 1839 Christmas number for Bentley’s Miscellany (under 
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William Harrison Ainsworth’s editorship, Dickens having resigned the post in March of 
that year) elaborates on this rural tradition.  In W. Jerdan’s “The Dead Man’s Race, A 
Christmas Story,” we are told:  
Some years ago a happy party were assembled at the hos- 
pitable mansion of a ‘fine old English gentleman’ keeping  
their Christmas holiday as it should be kept, round a huge  
Yule log, with wine and waissail, and jest and song . . . .  
Game succeeded game . . . till all were abandoned through  
pure fatigue . . . when story-telling became the order of the  
evening.      (142) 
 
The opening highlights a number of Christmas traditions associated with the country 
estate; in addition to food, drink, and games the visitors, family and servants are all 
careful to observe “grade and rank” throughout the evening (142).  Storytelling at 
Christmas is a formalized event: we are told the host called for “tale or song or something 
for the general amusement, all round in succession, hinting at salt and water for defaulters 
to the festive contributions.  What with the wish to please, and the fear to offend, one 
followed another without interruption in the prescribed task” (142).  Ghost stories and 
supernatural tales make up a portion of this general storytelling tradition.  Because of this 
association between Christmas and ghostly tales, the Christmas party became a 
convenient frame for literary ghost stories.  Jerdan’s story is one such example.  After the 
opening description of the festivities, the rest of the narrative is given to the story of the 
“dead man’s race.” 
 In another Christmas number of the Miscellany, this for 1840, the story “The 
Picture Bedroom” by “Dalton” uses a similar frame to introduce a ghost story.  In this 
case the opening narrative is given a setting more urban, middle class and centered on 
family.  Auditors include members of the professional classes – a young military 
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gentleman, a lawyer, a doctor – and enough children to completely bury the storyteller 
when they climb upon him in their excitement.  The carefully preserved social order of 
the country house is unimportant in this more intimate setting, and the formalities 
surrounding the tradition of storytelling are also more relaxed.  Instead of the lordly 
injunction that each tell a tale or face a penalty, we have “‘A ghost story! a ghost story!’ 
burst from a dozen pairs of lips, and ran like wild fire through the party” (349).  The 
differences in class, setting, and type of gathering in the two frames point to the ubiquity 
of storytelling, and particularly ghost story telling, in the years preceding A Christmas 
Carol. 
 While these examples point to the longstanding tradition of which A Christmas 
Carol is a part, they also highlight the unique changes Dickens made to his version of the 
Christmas ghost story.  David Parker says of Round about our Coal Fire, “The 
anonymous author . . . was evidently less interested in the festival [of Christmas] than in 
apparitions, witches, ghosts, fairies, and the like” (105).  This lack of interest in 
Christmas itself is evident in Jerdan’s and Dalton’s stories as well.  Both Christmas-party 
frames are used for mere convenience: readers would quickly recognize a holiday 
gathering as an appropriate context for the telling of a ghost story, whatever its content.  
Not only do both stories lack any direct association with Christmas, both lack a moral 
which might put them in tune with the season.  “The Dead Man’s Race” in particular 
records such a random event – a man being chased across a lonely moor by a dead man in 
a coffin, apparently on wheels – that readers would be hard-pressed to draw any sense out 
of it at all.13  Dickens’s association of ghosts with Christmas is unique in that he 
                                                 
13
 Given the country-house setting Jerdan chooses, the story might be intended as an example of a quaint 
rural superstition. 
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specifically relates his ghosts to the season.  In Pickwick Papers, for example, Gabriel 
Grub is dragged off by goblins on Christmas Eve; the same happens to Scrooge in A 
Christmas Carol.  Redlaw, while not forced anywhere by his revenant, also has his 
ghostly confrontation on Christmas Eve.  Each story also provides a moral suited for the 
season: compassion, charity and kindness are stressed in all three.  Further, as I will 
demonstrate in my readings of A Christmas Carol and The Haunted Man, ghosts serve as 
a particular type of Christmas talisman; unlike holly or Christmas trees, ghosts are active 
embodiments of the mental power to move through time and space, to look up and down 
the mighty river.     
In A Christmas Carol, the Ghost of Christmas Present asks Scrooge if he ever 
“walked forth with the younger members of my family; meaning (for I am very young) 
my elder brothers born in these later years” – brothers of whom he has “more than 
eighteen hundred” (87).  The Ghost of Christmas Present’s query again marks the 
sameness of Christmas time over the years – all of the Christmases are kin – but more to 
the point, each Christmas is brother to the next.  Dickens could have just as easily made 
one Christmas father to the next, as New Year’s Day is the “infant heir” of the old year in 
The Chimes.  By connecting each Christmas fraternally, Dickens removes Christmas 
from the progress of generation to generation: Christmases are all of the same generation.  
If time is indeed a mighty river, carrying all life inexorably onward to the infinite ocean, 
then each Christmas is an inlet near the riverbank, protected from the tidal pull; a leaf – 
or a life – in that still water is able to look upriver and downriver before moving on again, 
and it may stop in these pools at regular intervals along the whole course of the river.  To 
Dickens, this is one of the most significant aspects of Christmas. 
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While Dickens begins many of his novels by emphasizing their specific historical 
moment – the “best of times . . . worst of times” of A Tale of Two Cities, the “modern 
times of ours” of Our Mutual Friend – true to his conception of Christmas, he 
emphasizes the ahistorical nature of time in both A Christmas Carol and The Haunted 
Man.  To be sure, both works are set near the time in which they were composed;14 
references to workhouses, the Sunday Observance Bill, and Peckham Fair mark these as 
products of the period.  These are superficial trappings, however.  In each story, Dickens 
emphasizes still-time, the space outside the flow of the river.  In A Christmas Carol, this 
effect is achieved first by Dickens’s invocation of the fairy tale genre.  After the opening 
digression on Marley and door-nails, the narrative begins, “Once upon a time – of all the 
good days in the year, on Christmas Eve – old Scrooge sat busy in his counting-house” 
(47).  The sentence, in effect, marks three distinct notions of time: the timelessness of the 
fairy tale, the time-out-of-time of Christmas, and the more of less specific historical 
moment evoked by the reference to the counting-house.  What the mixing of these three 
times in the opening of the narration achieves is a succinct declaration of Dickens’s 
conceit.  Like a fairy tale, A Christmas Carol will provide a timeless moral; this moral 
can only be learned through recognition of the significance of Christmas time; and this 
moral has an immediate application for the times, particularly for businessmen in the 
public sphere, emblemized by the counting-house. 
Dickens creates a similar spot of still-time nested within historical time in the 
opening of The Haunted Man.  He first situates Redlaw in a “retired part of an ancient 
                                                 
14
 As David Parker argues, the reference to Peckham Fair in The Haunted Man, which “grew to be a 
nuisance, as fairs generally do, and was abolished in 1827” (“Peckham and Dulwich”), can be seen as “a 
deliberate invitation to readers to imagine the action of the book taking place before 1827, or not much 
later” (18).  
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endowment for students, once a brave edifice planted in an open place, but now the 
obsolete whim of forgotten architects; smoke-age-and-weather-darkened, squeezed on 
every side by the overgrowing of the great city” (374).  It is a place that time has passed 
by.  The modern city has grown up around it, but is has remained unchanged, an isolated 
island in a stream of progress.  Dickens next points to the tension between the time 
passing outside Redlaw’s dwelling and time standing still within it.  He begins a series of 
sentences each beginning with the word “when” – thirty-two in all – which moves the 
narrative from the bustling outside world to the still life inside.  The “outside” sentences 
are full of movement: “When the wind was blowing, shrill and shrewd, with the going 
down of the blurred sun” and “When people in the streets bent down their heads and ran 
before the weather” (375).  Contrasted to these is the state of Redlaw highlighted by the 
“inside” sentences: “When he sat . . . gazing at the fire.  When, as it rose and fell, the 
shadows went and came.  When he took no heed of them, with his bodily eyes; but let 
them come or let them go, looked fixedly at the fire” (377).  Through his repetitive use 
“when” Dickens establishes time as the organizing principle around which outer and 
inner scenes revolve, yet time is qualitatively different in the two spaces.  The rapid 
movement of people and even the environment around Redlaw only heightens the sense 
of his stillness before the fire. 
In both A Christmas Carol and The Haunted Man, Dickens combines the 
talismanic power of ghosts with the atemporality of Christmas in order to posit a solution 
to the time anxieties of his era.  
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III. The Psychology of Time in A Christmas Carol and The Haunted Man 
 
In Victorian Relativity, Christopher Herbert argues that Einstein’s work on 
relativity is an outgrowth of nineteenth-century philosophy.  He writes: “The relativity 
movement, even in its most abstract and technically scientific manifestations, has been 
driven by the imagining of a newly emancipated order of thought amid a context of 
growing and (its distinctive characteristic) ever more insidious repression, and it has 
always been inseparable from ‘moral relativism’” (8).  While Herbert traces this history 
chiefly through Victorian moral philosophers and scientific minds such as J. S. Mill, 
Herbert Spenser, and Karl Pearson, the antagonism between “insidious repression” and 
moral relativism is evident in the time-as-money public sphere with which Dickens 
concerns himself in A Christmas Carol.  Discussing Dombey and Son, Crawford writes, 
“The chief object of satire in the novel is hubristic unconsciousness of the relativity of 
every perspective, of every account of the shape of history” (203).  The Victorian man of 
business, of which Dombey and Scrooge both serve as examples, is concerned only with 
gain, and sees the world only as so much raw material out of which useful (and 
profitable) products may be made.  In an oft-quoted passage, Dickens sums up Dombey’s 
outlook:  
The earth was made for Dombey and Son to trade in, and the  
sun and moon were made to give them light.  Rivers and seas  
were formed to float their ships . . . . stars and planets circled in  
their orbits, to preserve inviolate a system of which they were  
the centre.  Common abbreviations took new meaning in his eyes,  
and had sole reference to them.  A. D. had no concern with anno  
Domini, but stood for Anno Dombei – and Son.  (50) 
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The absolutism of Dombey’s perception leaves no room for the relevance of history – to 
Dombey the past can be read in the ledgers recording his firm’s business transactions.  
The time-is-money mentality of the public sphere thus represses and excludes every other 
type of thought.  Herbert notes that Victorian writing on relativity posits “an ideal regime 
of values.  This ideal regime forms the inverse image of all systems of autocracy and 
absolutism.  Its presiding values are reciprocity; interconnectedness; the privileging of 
diversity, dissent, and creativity; and the systematic demystification of established 
structures of authority” (9).  In Herbert’s list we can see many of the lessons absolutist 
businessmen like Dombey and Scrooge come to learn: Lee Erickson argues that in a 
“primitive Keynesian” way, Scrooge learns the value of reciprocity (51); Harry Stone 
argues that the moral of A Christmas Carol is “All society is connected” (50).  Certainly 
the novel privileges creativity: Scrooge in the beginning of the narrative “had as little of 
what is called fancy about him as any man in the City of London” (54); however, in the 
end of the novel, we give him high marks for addressing his bedpost as if it were a 
sentient being.  My chief concern, however, is with the “systematic demystification of 
established structures of authority” – specifically, with the public sphere’s absolutist view 
of time.  In setting up Christmas as an atemporal space, Dickens has already begun the 
demystification process; in addressing Scrooge’s conscious relationship to Christmas, he 
posits a solution to its inherent threat. 
 The absolutist view of time is dangerous not only in that it discounts all other 
ways of thinking, it is also the mechanism whereby Greg’s “young” lose touch with the 
higher and deeper life.  In relativistic terms, Herbert expresses Greg’s anxiety: “not to 
enter into two-way relations with another thing is simply not to exist.  All things, in order 
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to have identities of their own, are enmeshed in a perpetual traffic of communication with 
other things” (9).  In not contemplating the world around them, Victorian men of business 
cease to have identities of their own – it is Greg’s inadequate, unworthy life.  Dickens 
exemplifies this lack of identity early in A Christmas Carol.  He writes, “The firm was 
known as Scrooge and Marley.  Sometimes people new to the business called Scrooge 
Scrooge, and sometimes Marley, but he answered to both names: it was all the same to 
him” (46).  Scrooge’s identity is lost in his preoccupying interest in his business – its 
name takes precedence over his.  He is so out of touch with his personal identity that even 
his name is irrelevant to him.  The firm of Scrooge and Marley has literally consumed 
him.  Psychologist Alexander Bain, in his 1855 treatise The Senses and the Intellect, 
explains this lack of identity differently.  In defining the intellect, Bain writes, “The first 
and most fundamental property is the Consciousness of Difference, or Discrimination” 
(325); “every mental experience is necessarily twofold . . . everything known to us is 
known in connexion with . . . the opposite or negation of itself . . . when we pass from 
one member of a contrast to the other . . . both members must be present” (565).  In light 
of this theory, Scrooge’s refrain “Bah! Humbug!” takes on new meaning.  Each time he is 
confronted with an idea outside his time-is-money mentality, he rejects it with this 
offhand remark.  When Fred presents him with the logic “What right have you to be 
dismal? what reason have you to be morose?  You’re rich enough,” Dickens writes, 
“Scrooge having no better answer ready on the spur of the moment said ‘Bah!’ again; and 
followed it up with ‘Humbug’” (48).   In this way, Scrooge remains unconscious of 
difference, and can thus be said to be entirely lacking in “mental experience.”  In the 
spiritual journey Scrooge undertakes, he will be forced to examine difference; this 
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ultimately helps him develop the tools of self-awareness necessary for his moral 
conversion.      
Dickens explicitly links Scrooge’s moral conversion to his re-estimation of the 
significance of time, marking A Christmas Carol as a direct address to the concerns about 
the psychological damage done to Victorians living in the high-speed world of 
commerce.  Dickens takes pains to depict Scrooge as the stereotypical businessman who 
emphatically believes that time is money.  When Fred confronts his uncle with a “Merry 
Christmas,” Scrooge returns: “Out upon merry Christmas!  What’s Christmas time to you 
but a time for paying bills without money; a time for finding yourself a year older, but not 
an hour richer; a time for balancing your books and having every item in ‘em through a 
round dozen of months presented dead against you?” (48).  Scrooge cannot conceive of 
another way to think of Christmas time but through the measure of profit – and in Fred’s 
case – loss.  Likewise, when Bob Cratchit observes that a day off for Christmas is only a 
once-a-year occurrence, Scrooge replies, “A poor excuse for picking a man’s pocket 
every twenty-fifth of December!” (53).  Scrooge measures each day in terms of its 
monetary value.  A day not spent earning money is to him a day wasted.  Scrooge’s 
association of time with economic gain makes him unappreciative of past time or future 
time.  When Scrooge is told that the Ghost of Christmas Past is the ghost not of “Long 
Past,” but of “[his] past” the narrator writes, “Perhaps, Scrooge could not have told 
anybody why, if anybody could have asked him; but he had a special desire to see the 
Spirit in his cap; and begged him to be covered” (69).  Scrooge’s first thought, when 
confronted with his past, is to try to cover it, to bury it.  It is something he has no use for, 
and as this passage suggests, something he finds disquieting.  The Ghost’s reply indicates 
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that Scrooge’s desire is habitual to him: “‘What!’ exclaimed the Ghost, ‘would you so 
soon put out, with worldly hands the light I give?  Is it not enough that you are one of 
those whose passions made this cap, and force me through whole trains of years to wear 
it low upon my brow!’” (69).  Scrooge has a history of ignoring the past and is part of a 
group whose “worldly hands,” i.e. material interests, have reduced the role of the past, 
the light of which represents the moral good learned from experience, in favor of 
concentration on present monetary gain.  This lost value is precisely what the Christmas 
spirits teach Scrooge. 
The rules for Scrooge’s engagement with the spirits are established in temporal 
terms.  Marley tells Scrooge, “Expect the first to-morrow, when the bell tolls one. . . . 
Expect the second on the next night at the same hour.  The third upon the next night when 
the last stroke of twelve has ceased to vibrate” (63).  The three-day timeline not only 
recalls Christian symbolism associating three days with resurrection and redemption, it 
also creates the dissonance between Scrooge’s perception of time as money and its 
passage over the course of his spiritual journey.  When Scrooge awakens after his 
encounter with Marley’s ghost he finds that instead of morning, it appears to be night 
again.  Scrooge is at first afraid that, like a scene out of Byron’s “Darkness,” night has 
taken over the world: 
“Why, it isn’t possible,” said Scrooge, “that I can have slept  
through a whole day and far into another night.  It isn’t possible  
that anything has happened to the sun, and this is twelve at  
noon!” 
The idea being an alarming one, he scrambled out of bed, and  
groped his way to the window . . . . All he could make out was,  
that . . . there was no noise of people running to and fro, and  
making a great stir, as there unquestionably would have been if  
night had beaten off bright day, and taken possession of the world.   
This was a great relief, because “three days after sight of this First  
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of Exchange pay to Mr. Ebenezer Scrooge or his order” and so  
forth, would have become a mere United States security if there  
were no days to count by.       
(66) 
 
Scrooge’s concern here, even in the face of a possible apocalypse, is with the loss of a 
system for measuring when bills are due.  Contrasted to this is Scrooge’s perception of 
the loss of a day when he awakens after his experience with the Ghost of Christmas Past.  
Dickens writes, “Awaking in the middle of a prodigiously tough snore, and sitting up in 
bed to get his thoughts together, Scrooge had no occasion to be told that the bell was 
again upon the stroke of One.  He felt that he was restored to consciousness in the right 
nick of time, for the especial purpose of holding a conference with the second messenger 
despatched to him” (85).  In this case, Scrooge is completely unconcerned about what 
appears to be the loss of another day; instead, his feelings toward time are more passive.  
He feels himself “restored” at the “right time” as if he recognizes a higher will guiding 
his course.  And while Scrooge in the opening sequence watches the clock jealously lest 
he lose a minute of the labor Cratchit owes him – “With an ill-will Scrooge . . . tacitly 
admitted the fact [that the work-day was over] to the expectant clerk” – Scrooge post-
ghostly encounter no longer needs the clock to know the hour (53).  His sense of time has 
become less quantitative and more qualitative. 
 Each scene Scrooge visits with his spirit guides helps him empathize with others; 
each also forces him to see time in other than monetary terms.  The first scene Scrooge 
visits with the Ghost of Christmas Past is one that shows him the sympathetic child he 
used to be, but more precisely, it shows him a child still able to participate in other modes 
of time, before time became to him a way to measure gain.  He sees himself reading, and 
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as he watches, fictional being after fictional being spring to life around him: “‘It’s dear 
old honest Ali Baba!  Yes, yes, I know!  One Christmas time, when yonder solitary child 
was left here all alone, he did come, for the first time, just like that.  Poor boy!  And 
Valentine,’ said Scrooge, ‘and his wild brother, Orson; there they go!’” (72).  Here is a 
Scrooge who is happy to “spend” time in such unproductive ways as reading fiction, and 
further, here is a Scrooge able to participate imaginatively in other times and others’ 
lives.  So strong is this imaginative capacity that Scrooge is able to call the characters 
forth into visible form – he sees them as clearly as he sees the ghost of Jacob Marley and 
the three Christmas spirits.  Catherine Crowe points to a connection between the 
imagination and ghost-seeing: “By imagination I do not simply mean to convey the 
common notion implied by that much abused word, which is only fancy, but the 
constructive imagination, which is a much higher function, and which, inasmuch as man 
in made in the likeness of God, bears a distant relation to that sublime power by which 
the Creator projects, creates and upholds his universe” (276).  Crowe suggest that even 
the imaginative act of ghost-seeing brings us more in line with the divine and puts us in 
touch with our spiritual selves.  This is the ability Scrooge needs to regain.  Further, 
Scrooge’s childhood ability to participate in these fictional lives marks his past 
relativism.  As a child he is able to accommodate worldviews he does not share, unlike 
the dismissive “Bah! Humbug!” absolutism of his adult self. 
 In furthering Scrooge’s education in the proper uses of time, the Ghost of 
Christmas Past shows him scenes where he chose rightly how to spend time, and scenes 
where he chose wrongly.  The Ghost takes Scrooge to the warehouse where he served his 
apprenticeship; there old Fezziwig tells his two apprentices, “‘Yo ho, my boys . . . . No 
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more work tonight.  Christmas Eve, Dick.  Christmas, Ebenezer!’” (75).  Fezziwig does 
not begrudge his employees’ time off, but encourages them in their play.  He is Dickens’s 
idealized model of a businessman.  Throughout the whole of the “domestic ball” which 
follows, “Scrooge had acted like a man out of his wits.  His heart and soul were in the 
scene, and with his former self.  He corroborated everything, remembered everything, 
enjoyed everything, and underwent the strangest agitation” (78).  Forcing Scrooge to 
view his past revives in him his understanding of the joy to be had in pursuits other than 
business.  This is an understanding Scrooge lacked in his earlier encounter with Fred, and 
in gaining it his emotional and moral senses are rekindled. 
 The next scene shows Scrooge with his fiancé, Belle, who in releasing him from 
their engagement says, “You may – the memory of what is past half makes me hope you 
will – have pain in this.  A very, very brief time, and you will dismiss the recollection of 
it, gladly, as an unprofitable dream, from which it happened well that you awoke” (80-
81).  The truth of Belle’s words is forced upon the present-day Scrooge who for many 
years has ceased to think of her existence.  In burying this memory as “unprofitable” 
Scrooge made the choice to concentrate on time as money rather than time as teacher and 
moral guide.  Ironically, Belle’s criticism of Scrooge in this scene – that his avarice has 
blinded him to all other human feelings and concerns – is precisely the lesson the spirits 
seek to teach him.  The key to his redemption was already always available to Scrooge, 
but only if he understood and practiced his mental ability to move freely in time and 
space. 
 That the Ghost of Christmas Present shows Scrooge so many domestic scenes – 
the dinner at the Cratchits, the miner and his family singing carols, the sailors with their 
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“homeward hopes,” Fred’s Christmas party – indicates his particular lesson regarding 
Scrooge’s reorientation in time.  The Ghost helps Scrooge understand difference, in 
Bain’s sense of the word; Scrooge can better understand what his life is not by viewing 
its opposite and seeing what others’ lives are.  It is only by having this opposite always 
before him mentally that he can gain knowledge of himself.  Scrooge must contemplate 
present time – including the present time that others occupy – in order to be morally 
guided by it.  It is another step towards abolishing Scrooge’s absolutist mentality in favor 
of relativistic thinking.  As a confirmed bachelor, domestic scenes are largely unknown to 
Scrooge.  This in itself is troubling in terms of Victorian ideology.  Generally, the 
domestic sphere was thought to act as a panacea to the ills of the world of commerce; in 
his home, surrounded by wife and children, the Victorian man of business could find 
redemption for the sins he committed in the greedy, sordid public sphere.  The home, 
with the angelic wife at its center, provided a “time out” to Greg’s fast-paced, morally 
bankrupt life at high pressure.  In “Of Queen’s Gardens” Ruskin writes  
The man, in his rough work in open world, must encounter  
all peril and trial: to him, therefore, must be the failure, the  
offense, the inevitable error: often he must be wounded, or  
subdued; often misled; and always hardened. But he guards  
the woman from all this; within his house, as ruled by her,  
unless she herself has sought it, need enter no danger, no  
temptation, no cause of error or offense. This is the true  
nature of home—it is the place of Peace; the shelter, not  
only from all injury, but from all terror, doubt, and  
division. 
      
 Indeed, Dickens himself often made use of this formula – witness Wemmick’s 
conversion from the dry, hard “post-office” mouthed man only interested in portable 
property to the genial, considerate son and lover when he transitions from the office to his 
Walworth property (Great Expectations 210).  Scrooge, and Redlaw as well, must do 
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without this haven.  Dickens’s solution is to have each man learn to rely on inner 
resources.  Scrooge’s ability to visit his own past and to imaginatively participate in 
others’ presents (as he does when he plays Christmas games at his nephew’s party) gives 
him access to domestic spaces wherein he can find redemption. 
 The Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come demonstrates to Scrooge what is lost in only 
thinking of the present and in valuing time as a measure of monetary gain.  Long before 
Scrooge does, the reader realizes that all of the signs the Ghost reveals point grimly to his 
death.  Scrooge’s mental block on the idea of his own death indicate that this is a future 
he has not contemplated; like Dombey he sees himself as a part of a business that will go 
on forever.  When the Ghost takes Scrooge to the Royal Exchange, Scrooge “looked 
about in that very place for his own image; but another man stood in his accustomed 
corner, and though the clock pointed to his usual time of day for being there, he saw no 
likeness of himself among the multitudes that poured in through the Porch” (113).  This 
Scrooge understands as meaning that his future self has undergone a moral conversion – 
between this idea and the sense of himself as part of an endless business world there is no 
room for the possibility of death.  Scrooge’s lack of forethought is specifically a Christian 
failing: in not contemplating the afterlife, Scrooge simultaneously fails to think of the 
consequences of his present actions.  Because there is nothing outside the world of 
commerce in Scrooge’s thinking, there is no need to regulate his behavior other than by 
the measure of what will yield the most profit, or incur the least cost. 
 Scrooge, measuring everything in monetary terms, is given a glimpse of what his 
life ends up being worth in these same terms.  The material effects surrounding his dead 
body, itself reduced to a material object, are reckoned in sixpence and crown pieces in a 
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second-hand shop.  The men of business in whose esteem Scrooge “had made a point 
always of standing well . . . in a business point of view, that is” will only consider 
attending his funeral if something – in this case, lunch – is to be gained (112).  When in 
horror it dawns on Scrooge that he is the dead man being treated so callously, he begs the 
Ghost to show him “any person in the town, who feels emotion caused by this man’s 
death” (119).  All that he gets is the relief felt by a poor couple who gain a reprieve for 
their debt through his death.  “We may sleep to-night with light hearts, Caroline!” says 
the husband to his wife (120).  The grotesqueness of each of these scenes serves only to 
highlight Scrooge’s own way of thinking: if he sees in his future only a continuation of 
his time-is-money mentality, the future will treat with him on those terms. 
 That Scrooge learns his lesson concerning the importance of contemplating time 
is clear in the end of the novel.  He tells the Ghost of Christmas Yet to Come, “I will 
honor Christmas in my heart, and try to keep it all the year.  I will live in the Past, the 
Present, and the Future” (126).  Gone is the Scrooge who has no use for past time and 
future time and only sees present time as it relates to his business dealings; now Scrooge 
recognizes the importance of mentally traversing time and space, of keeping before him 
difference as represented by others’ lives and ways of thinking; he has become a true 
relativist.  Scrooge is now unconcerned about losing the monetary worth of a day: “I 
don’t know what day of the month it is . . . . I don’t know how long I’ve been among the 
Spirits.  I don’t know anything.  I’m quite a baby.  Never mind.  I don’t care” (128).  The 
irony of his statement is that it was when he was the absolutist businessman that he truly 
knew nothing, and lacked the ability for conscious thought.  Now, his reference to 
himself as a baby indicates an open-mindedness that will eschew the “Bah! Humbug!” 
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refrain.  In gaining the ability to see difference, Scrooge gains a new self-awareness.  He 
encounters the alms collectors he had mistreated in the opening of the narrative, and this 
time, when asked, “Mr. Scrooge?” he replies, “Yes . . . that is my name, and I fear it may 
not be pleasant to you” (130).  Scrooge has a sense of self-identity, and the ability to 
recognize his failings from another’s point of view.  Further, Scrooge proves that he sees 
the value in spending time in other ways than in conducting business by spending 
Christmas Day with his nephew, Fred.  This represents Scrooge actually choosing to 
repeat time, as he has already mentally participated in Fred’s Christmas party.  Thus, 
Scrooge’s physical attendance represents his desire to be part of a community, to be part 
of a domestic circle.  The value of both has been made clear to him.  He hopes to catch 
Bob Cratchit coming in late to work only to play a prank on him; this is the behavior of a 
Fezziwig, not the man Scrooge used to be.  He recognizes that those who laugh at him for 
his conversion are “blind anyway” – blind in the way he once was (134).  Scrooge’s 
lesson in time-consciousness has made him a new man. 
In A Christmas Carol, Dickens creates in Christmas an atemporal space where 
Scrooge is able to reorient himself in relation to time.  Indeed, that the events of the story 
occur over three nights and simultaneously “all in one night” points to Christmas’s 
timelessness.  Within the out-of-time boundaries of Christmas, Scrooge learns to think in 
relative terms, keeping before him the lessons of the past, the variety of lives in the 
present, and the possibilities the future holds.  Specifically, this reorientation to time 
serves to combat the economic absolutism endemic to the period.  In reexamining this 
theme in The Haunted Man, Dickens moves beyond a critique of the time-is-money 
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mentality to offer a broader vision of the psychological complexities inherent in the 
connection between time and the psyche.    
 
 In The Haunted Man, Dickens again addresses the Victorian period’s troubled 
relationship to time, but from a position almost the inverse to that of his first Christmas 
book.  If Scrooge prior to his moral conversion is like a piece of detritus skimming along 
the surface of the great river of time and not caring to try to stop to look forward or back, 
Redlaw is one who has long been sunk in the river, snagged on a rock, and unable to look 
anywhere but behind him, into his past.  Indeed, the narrator describes him as 
“indefinably grim, although well-knit and well-proportioned; his grizzled hair hanging, 
like tangled seaweed, about his face, -- as if he had been, through his whole life, a lonely 
mark for the chafing and beating of the great deep of humanity” (373).  To extend 
Dickens’s metaphor, Redlaw has become waterlogged.  One effect of this focus on a 
mind haunted by its past is the further articulation of Dickens’s dislike of nostalgia.  
While Redlaw is not nostalgic himself – his oft-repeated reference to his “sorrow and 
[his] wrong” serves as a reminder that his reminiscences are not of the pleasant variety – 
his mental focus, like the Young England movement’s and The Chimes’ red-faced 
gentleman’s, has been on the past to the exclusion of the present.  Redlaw says to the 
Ghost, “If, living here alone, I have made too much of all that was and might have been, 
and too little of what is, the evil, I believe, has fallen on me, and not on others” (395).  In 
dwelling on the wrong done him by the best friend who, though engaged to Redlaw’s 
sister, eloped with his own fiancé instead, and on thoughts of how different life might 
have been if this had not occurred (“what might have been”), Redlaw is blinded to the 
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realities of the present.  He is like the red-faced gentleman who dismisses Trotty Veck in 
favor of the “bold peasantry” of a bygone era.  However, unlike the mentally enfeebled 
red-faced gentleman, Redlaw has the self-awareness to recognize that his fixation on the 
past has been an “evil” to him.  This marks a psychological complexity largely missing in 
Dickens’s earlier works on the time-mind connection. 
 While others have seen Redlaw’s depth of character as attributable to the 
autobiographical nature of The Haunted Man, or as a failed attempt at a study of the 
subconscious, these reading overlook Dickens’s engagement with issues of psychological 
relativism.15  In his discussion of the Christmas books, James Reed writes, “what we 
understand of [Scrooge] is evoked largely by purely external characteristics.  By 1848, 
with The Haunted Man, we find a significant development of method.  Though Dickens 
is still inventing fairy tales with happy endings, he is now looking more profoundly and 
more sombrely into the nature of the haunted mind” (167).  In A Christmas Carol, 
Dickens develops the psychological relativism of his protagonist through a supernatural 
journey to the past, present, and future.  Like the four ghosts or the fictional characters 
who visit the younger Scrooge at school, time in the novel is given an external existence, 
the value of which Scrooge learns to internalize when he exclaims that he will “honor 
Christmas in [his] heart” and “will live in the Past, the Present, and the Future” (126).  In 
The Haunted Man, Redlaw must learn the external value of time from better 
understanding its internal working in himself and those around him.  The two hypotheses 
                                                 
15
 In “Remembrance of Wrongs Past in The Haunted Man” Scott Moncrieff argues that “Redlaw seems to 
stand in for Dickens himself,” and proceeds to map onto the story various events of Dickens’s life (536).  
Jerry Herron argues that although Dickens’s “interest in The Haunted Man focuses on pathologically 
disrupted memory . . . . Unfortunately, he did not have at his disposal a specialized psychological 
vocabulary” (47). 
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Redlaw forwards in his conversation with the Ghost – that dwelling on the past has been 
an evil to him, and that it has not harmed others – Dickens tests within the context of the 
absolutist versus relativistic thinking of the time. 
 Redlaw has much in common with his predecessor Ebenezer Scrooge.  Both men 
are lonely bachelors, both were neglected children, both had engagements broken, both 
have lost a dearly loved sister, and both have risen to great success in the world; however, 
the paths of their respective successes diverge sharply.  Scrooge is the epitome of the 
Victorian man of business; his absolutist mentality takes the shape of seeing life only in 
relation to commercial enterprises and seeing time only as a measure of money.  Redlaw 
on the other hand is “as the world knew, far and wide, a learned man in chemistry” (374).  
Redlaw has as little to do with commerce as Scrooge’s nephew, Fred, yet despite this, he 
displays the absolutist mentality symptomatic of the times.  Regarding the concept of 
man’s relationship to time, Redlaw says, “These revolutions of years, which we 
commemorate . . . what do they recall!  Are there any minds in which they do not re-
awaken some sorry, or some trouble?” (394).  Likewise, after listening to Phillip 
Swidger’s catalogue of Christmas memories, filled as it is with scenes of beauty, and 
happinesses as well as sorrows, Redlaw notes, “What is the remembrance of that old man 
who was here to-night?  A tissue of sorrow and trouble” (394).  Focused on the pain of 
his own past, Redlaw can only see the same in the lives around him.  This narrow view is 
elevated into a dangerous absolutism when compounded with Redlaw’s confidence in his 
scientific mind.  The Ghost, who mocks Redlaw with his own secret thoughts, feelings, 
and desires, insinuates “with its evil smile” that Redlaw is “a [man] of higher cultivation 
and profounder thought” than his fellow beings (394).  Given the Ghost’s insight into 
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Redlaw’s mind and Redlaw’s acceptance of him as the “evil spirit of myself,” Dickens 
implies that it is Redlaw who feels this sense of mental superiority (394).  Thus, when the 
Ghost proclaims, “Your wisdom has discovered that the memory of sorrow, wrong, and 
trouble is the lot of all mankind, and that mankind would be happier, in its other 
memories, without it” the reader is meant to understand that this is not the insidious 
temptation of some external evil but the self-confidence of the scientific mind, 
epitomized by Redlaw (396).  He fully believes that he has, in his wisdom, discovered a 
great truth about the human condition.  In the Ghost’s directive to “Go! Be [mankind’s] 
benefactor” and in Redlaw’s attempt to carry this order out, the text recalls another 
chemist and would-be benefactor of humanity (396).  Victor Frankenstein also desires to 
“pour a torrent of light into our dark world” (932) and sees as man’s highest calling being 
“hailed as the benefactor of your species; your name adored” (1028).  In creating life, 
Frankenstein oversteps the natural order and challenges the preeminence of God; 
likewise, Redlaw works in opposition to the Christ figure, Milly Swidger, sewing discord 
and animosity among the poor while she spreads charity and love.  Through this 
characterization of Redlaw, Dickens critiques the dismissal of the moral and spiritual 
worth of time from the perspective of the man of science rather than the man of business. 
 In critiquing the absolutist dismissal of spirituality in the figure of the scientific 
thinker, Dickens is able to more directly address psychological theories regarding ghost-
seeing.  While in texts such as “To be Read at Dusk” and A Christmas Carol the 
possibility that the “ghosts” are mental projections is only hinted at obliquely, in The 
Haunted Man, this possibility is more forcibly suggested.  As I have noted above, the 
Ghost’s conversation is observed by Redlaw to be the echo of his inmost thoughts.  
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Further, the Ghost is an “awful likeness” of Redlaw, suggesting that is it an external 
projection of the self (389).  Finally, at the end of the story, the narrator remarks, “Some 
people have said since, that [Redlaw] only thought what has been herein set down; others, 
that he read it in the fire, one winter night about the twilight time; others, that the Ghost 
was but the representation of his own gloomy thoughts, and Milly the embodiment of his 
better wisdom.  I say nothing” (472).  Through these allusions to the Ghost’s psychic 
rather than spiritual origin, Dickens invites his readers to view the text as a psychological 
study rather than a supernatural tale.  As such, he aligns The Haunted Man with the 
stories reported by Hibbert and his ilk, where ghosts are linked to mental disturbances 
and diseases of the senses.  However, for Dickens, the psychic origin of the Ghost does 
not preclude the spiritual worth of Redlaw’s encounter.  In fact, just as the mental origin 
of the Ghost in The Haunted Man is made more explicit than in A Christmas Carol, so, 
too, is the spiritual conversion.  It could be argued that Scrooge’s transformation is more 
moral than spiritual as its Christian context is only vaguely referred to: Scrooge becomes 
a “good” man, who knows how to “keep Christmas well” (134).  Redlaw’s 
transformation, on the other hand, is explicitly a spiritual, Christian awakening.  He 
exclaims, “O Thou . . . who through the teaching of pure love, has graciously restored me 
to the memory which was the memory of Christ upon the cross, and of all the good who 
perished in His cause, receive my thanks” (470).  In Redlaw’s direct address to God, 
Dickens firmly marks ghost-seeing as a link to the divine, and fleshes out Catherine 
Crowe’s notion of the constructive imagination.  Redlaw’s path to repentance and 
spiritual growth is through his dealings with the Ghost; the Ghost’s psychic origin is 
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irrelevant to Redlaw’s conversion.  Thus Dickens refutes the scientific orthodoxy that 
would exclude all but the material from human nature. 
 In striking the Ghost’s bargain, Redlaw learns – to his horror – what the 
absolutism of the scientific mind actually entails.  Prior to his dealings with the Ghost, 
Redlaw is self-absorbed to the extent that William must physically prod him to ensure 
that he at least takes a minimal interest in conversation (379).  He is so focused on his 
past that the present is largely a blur, and so quick to attribute his feelings to others that 
he categorizes Phillip’s happy reminiscences as a “tissue of sorrow.”  For all this, 
however, Redlaw is still a compassionate, kind man.  He is eager to help a student when 
he hears of that student’s illness, and he says of himself, “I have never been a hater of my 
kind, - never morose, indifferent, or hard, to anything around me” (395).  In accepting the 
Ghost’s offer, Redlaw becomes all of these things.  Led astray first by the belief that he 
understands human nature and knows how to improve on it, Redlaw undergoes a 
transformation in which he loses his memory of past sorrows and “the intertwisted chain 
of feelings and associations, each in its turn dependent on, and nourished by, the banished 
recollections” but retains his “knowledge [and the] result of study” (395).  In other words, 
Redlaw becomes the purely scientific mind: his mental faculties are left intact but he is 
stripped of his emotional life.  As the purely scientific mind, Redlaw is only able to see 
the material aspects of the world around him.  On his ill-fated mission to share his “gift” 
with others, he experiences three moments that demonstrate what is lost through 
scientific absolutism: 
The first occasion was when they were crossing an old church- 
yard, and Redlaw stopped among the graves, utterly at a loss  
how to connect them with any tender, softening, or consoling  
thought.  The second was, when the breaking forth of the moon  
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induced him to look up at the Heavens, where he saw her in her  
glory, surrounded by a host of stars he still knew by the names  
and histories which human science has appended to them; but  
where he saw nothing else he had been wont to see, felt nothing  
he had been wont to feel, in looking up there, on a bright night.   
The third was when he stopped to listen to a plaintive strain of  
music, but could only hear a tune, made manifest to him by the  
dry mechanism of the instruments and his own ears, with no  
address to any mystery within him, without a whisper in it of the 
past, or of the future . . . .  
(437) 
 
In each of these moments Redlaw is only able to recognize the physical, material 
attributes of his attention’s focus; his senses register sights and sounds but with no 
corresponding inner sense of their spiritual worth.  Like Scrooge, who had never 
contemplated his own death and was thus unprepared to meet it, Redlaw gazes at the 
cemetery but has lost all understanding of an afterlife.  Like Dombey, for whom the stars 
exist to guide his trading vessels, Redlaw looks at the night sky and sees only a catalogue 
of scientific names – a poor measure of the divine glory of the heavens.  Music, too, is 
reduced to a kind of machinery; the notes stir nothing deeper in Redlaw because his 
exclusive focus on the material allows for nothing deeper to exist.  The world of the 
scientific absolutist – the Hibberts and the Ferriars who see only material causes and 
material reactions – is a cold and frightening place. 
 What Redlaw fails to understand both before his ghostly encounter and while he 
embodies pure scientific materialism is time’s effect on the psyche, specifically in terms 
of man’s moral and spiritual development.  This lesson, which Scrooge learns through a 
three-day journey to the past, present, and future, Redlaw learns through studying the 
personalities of those around him.  On his journey to relieve the sufferings of the poor by 
erasing their troubled memories he encounters a young prostitute of whom “he had a 
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perception that she was one of many, and that he saw the type of thousands, when he saw 
her, drooping at his feet” (433).  The prostitute, representing this type, seems to be the 
perfect candidate for memory modification; however, when Redlaw questions her 
regarding her past sorrows, he was “much disquieted, to note that in her awakened 
recollection of this wrong, the first trace of her old humanity and frozen tenderness 
appeared to show itself” (433-4).  Redlaw witnesses time’s salutary effect on the higher 
and deeper life through this and other encounters.  The moral of the story, oft repeated 
and even engraved on a painting in one scene lest the reader miss it is “Lord!  Keep my 
memory green!” (472).  The saying alludes not only to the importance of keeping the past 
fresh by reliving it, but also to the notion that mentally traversing time and space is the 
path to mental and spiritual growth.  Philip, who easily moves across his eighty-seven 
years through reflecting on green holly, is described in vegetative terms: he is the “trunk 
of the tree” from which the Swidger family has grown, and just as he literally gave his 
family life, so does he figuratively keep them alive in his memory (379).  Redlaw, when 
he is frozen in time – in his past – is a destroyer of green life: “As he fell a-musing in his 
chair alone, the healthy holly withered on the wall, and dropped – dead branches” (389).  
In learning to keep his memory green, Redlaw learns to honor his past rather than rue it, 
to apply the lessons of it to his present, and to keep alive his hopes for the future. 
 Both Redlaw’s and Scrooge’s lessons in the significance of time are facilitated by 
their interaction with ghosts, highlighting Dickens’s use of ghosts as psychic talismans.  
However, in suggesting that Redlaw’s Ghost is a projection of his mental struggles and in 
shifting the presence of the past, present and future into the inner lives of his characters, 
Dickens moves his study of the time-mind connection out of the realm of fairy tales 
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toward a sort of psychological realism.  This suggests that Dickens did not see his 
solution to Victorian man’s disregard for time in fairy tale terms – it is not a cure-all kiss 
from a random prince – romantic and impractical; rather, he saw the need for a 
reorientation to time, and the use of Christmas time and tradition to achieve it, as a 
plausible course of action.  The irony is that Dickens’s Christmas books, particularly A 
Christmas Carol, became themselves a Christmas tradition, capable of opening to their 
readers the vista of years long past and those yet to come.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
The Anatomy of Desire: Madness, Mesmerism, and the Specters of Female Sexuality 
 
  
 While Rhoda Broughton and Margaret Oliphant were never in any sense rivals, 
they were, in regards to their literary sensibilities and in the depictions of their heroines, 
polar opposites. Broughton, a leading member of the sensational school of fiction 
following the 1867 publication of Cometh Up as a Flower, was so well known for her 
passionate heroines and racy plots that her body of work helped establish Bret Harte’s 
satiric “recipe” for sensation fiction: “Take two large human hearts, and break one 
against the other, stir frequently with a long ‘spoon,’ serve at white heat, with a sauce 
composed of molten-lava kisses, and garnish freely with wild oats” (qtd in E. Arnold 
276).  Thus while fellow sensationalist Mary Elizabeth Braddon pronounced Broughton 
“a genius and a prose poet” (Black 44), the more conservative Oliphant, in her review of 
Cometh Up as a Flower, declared, “It is a shame to women so to write; and it is a shame 
to the women who read and accept as a true representation of themselves and their ways 
the equivocal talk and fleshly inclinations herein attributed to them.”  The two novelists’ 
residencies in Oxford for a time overlapped (Broughton moved there in 1877 on the 
advice of Matthew Arnold and Oliphant took up residence there while her sons attended 
the university), and their receptions there say much about the opposing camps from 
which they wrote.  Broughton was famously snubbed upon her entrance into Oxford 
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society – Lewis Carroll went so far as to refuse a friend’s dinner invitation because “I 
cannot bring myself to meet Miss Rhoda Broughton, of whose novels I greatly 
disapprove” (Arnold 267).  Oliphant, on the other hand, was warmly received, and wryly 
remarked, “I rather think I was set up as the proper novelist in opposition to Miss 
Broughton” (Sadleir 94).  But while Margaret Oliphant and Rhoda Broughton represent 
in many respects the opposite sides of the conservative/liberal spectrum regarding the 
“woman question,” in their shared concern over portrayals of women in the sciences we 
see how universal were such apprehensions. 
The connection between mind and body was for women complicated by Victorian 
theories regarding the imperatives of female sexual function.  In a variety of ways, these 
theories separated the category “woman” from general discussions of human psychology; 
a woman’s psychological makeup largely stemmed from her reproductive organs, argued 
sociologists, psychologists, and medical professionals, thus everything from her 
intelligence to her inclinations was tied to her sexuality.  Ghost stories by women writers 
of the period register this focus on female sexuality.  In works by Broughton and 
Oliphant, the ghost figures as a double, reflecting the psyche of the character who 
witnesses it, and through this psychic personification, the ghost calls into question 
theories of mind and body – in this, these stories are no different from those by these 
authors’ male contemporaries.  More specifically, these stories focus on gendered 
psychological theories: female protagonists’ supernatural experiences help them discredit 
their male contemporaries’ psycho-sexual theories and invest them with the agency 
necessary for spiritual growth independent of their (supposed) physical limitations.  
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Rather than making use of scientific theories of mind to reclaim their spirituality, 
Oliphant and Broughton use the spiritual to reclaim their minds. 
 
I. Theories of Mind and Body 
  
             Psycho-sexual theories regarding women were largely used in social discussions 
about the equality of the sexes.  A brief discussion of the relative mental powers of men 
and women in Descent of Man (1871) became in the hands of Spencer and other 
sociologists a fully developed theory linking women’s inferiority to their reproductive 
organs.  In Descent, Darwin writes, “The chief distinction in the intellectual powers of 
the two sexes is shewn by man attaining to a higher eminence, in whatever he takes up, 
than women can attain – whether requiring deep thought, reason, or imagination, or 
merely the use of the senses and hands” (2:326-7).  Spencer unites this idea with another 
taken from Descent regarding the notion of “arrested development.”  According to 
Darwin, arrests of development are responsible for “various monstrosities” such as the 
“microcephalous idiots” whose “skulls are smaller, and the convolutions of the brain are 
less complex than in normal men” (1:121).  Spencer uses this idea of arrested 
development as an explanation for female inferiority.  In The Study of Sociology (1873), 
he writes 
whereas in man individual evolution continues  until the physio- 
logical cost of self-maintenance very nearly balances what  
nutrition supplies, in women an arrest of individual develop- 
ment takes place while there is yet a considerable margin of  
nutrition, otherwise there could be no offspring.                
(373-374) 
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Instead of fully maturing, according to Spencer’s theory, women reserve a portion of 
their developmental energy for the use of future offspring.  The evidence for such a 
theory is perfect in its simplicity: from the arrested development of women comes “the 
chief contrasts in bodily form: the masculine figure being distinguished from the 
feminine by the greater relative sizes of the parts which carry on external actions and 
entail physiological cost” (Spencer 374).  Thus, as plainly as women are in general 
physically smaller than men, so are they less developed, and this lack of development 
applies to the brain as well as the body: 
This rather earlier cessation of individual evolution . . . has  
two results on the mind.  The mental manifestations have  
somewhat less of general power and massiveness; and beyond  
this there is a perceptible falling short in those two faculties,  
intellectual and emotional, which are the latest products of  
human evolution – the power of abstract reasoning and that  
most abstract of the emotions, the sentiment of justice – the  
sentiment which regulates conduct irrespective of personal  
attachments and the likes or dislikes felt for individuals.   
(Spencer 374)  
 
Spencer’s theory seems to directly refute Mill and others who argued for greater 
educational opportunities for women and believed that such opportunities would fit 
women to be as active in the public arena as similarly educated men.  With his multiple 
invocations of “evolution,” – a word which sounded with a fatal ring for many Victorians 
– Spencer dismisses equality through better education as a biological impossibility.  
Further, while Darwin writes generally of mental inferiority in “deep thought, reason, or 
imagination” Spencer focuses his argument on abstract reasoning and the understanding 
of justice.  Such pointed attention to these two types of mental exertion echoed the 
sentiments of many who opposed women’s suffrage on the basis that they were too 
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emotional to vote fairly or understand the complex needs of society.  As Spencer notes, 
women’s inability to move beyond their sympathetic feelings “makes women err still 
more than men do in seeking what seems an immediate public good without thought of 
distant public evils” (380).  By appareling this opinion in the cloth of biology, Spencer 
provided a supporting argument to anti-suffragists well into the twentieth century.16 
Indeed, anthropologist James McGrigor Allan vituperates, “could all the male intellect in 
the world be suddenly paralysed or annihilated, there is not sufficient development of the 
abstract principles of justice, morality, truth, or of causality and inventive power in the 
female sex, to hold the mechanism of society together for one week” (ccx). 
 While both Darwin and Spencer tempered their arguments regarding female 
mental inferiority with the belief that a slowly evolving society would gradually diminish 
the differences between the male and female intellect, others saw women’s inferiority as 
more fixed.   In an 1874 speech delivered to the Anthropological Institute of Great Britain 
and Ireland, W. L. Distant, supporting his argument with verbatim passages taken from 
The Study of Sociology, confidently asserted, “It cannot . . . be denied that there are 
physiological conditions which must for ever tend against the possibility of women as a 
rule arriving at an equal, much less acquiring a superior, position to men in the mental 
struggle” (84).  Not only does Distant’s argument point to women’s mental inferiority as 
a condition that will exist “for ever,” he implies in his last clause that there is some sort 
of competition, a “struggle” between men and women over mental ability.  Rather than 
members of the same species evolving alongside one another, Distant paints women as a 
separate species competing with men for the resources necessary for survival. 
                                                 
16
 See, for example, Almroth Wright’s The Unexpurgated Case Against Woman Suffrage, particularly pp. 
vi, 35-38. 
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 These two themes – the fixity of women’s mental inferiority, and the fear that the 
quest for equality would lead to competition between the sexes – are picked up again in 
Patrick Geddes’ and J. Arthur Thomson’s The Evolution of Sex (1889).  In this 
“extremely influential, but now forgotten, study of sex-differentiation” (Conway 142), 
Geddes and Thomson argued that women’s supposedly inferior position throughout 
history in actuality demonstrated the “complex and sympathetic co-operation between the 
differentiated sexes in and around which all progress past or future must depend” (288).  
In other words, women’s subordinate position to men helped maintain peaceful relations 
between the sexes and ensured the success of the human race.  Like Spencer, Geddes and 
Thomson saw women’s mental abilities as a result of their sexual function.  They write, 
“The more active males, with a consequently wider range of experience, may have bigger 
brains and more intelligence; but the females, especially as mothers, have indubitably a 
larger and more habitual share of the altruistic emotions” (290).  Geddes’ and Thomson’s 
biological theory is just another articulation of the age-old stereotype of the rational man 
and the emotional woman.  While enfranchisement posed one threat to this perfect 
symbiosis between man and woman, industrialization was potentially an even greater 
evil.  Regarding the question of achieving equality between the sexes, Geddes and 
Thomson write:  
. . . it consistently appeared that all things would be settled as  
soon as women were sufficiently plunged into the competitive  
industrial struggle for their own daily bread.  While, as the  
complexly ruinous results of this inter-sexual competition for  
subsistence upon both sexes and upon family life have begun  
to become manifest, the more recent economic panacea of  
redistribution of wealth has naturally been invoked, and we have  
merely somehow to raise women’s wages. 
 (287) 
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Like Distant, Geddes and Thomson see any move toward equal sexual relations as “inter-
sexual competition.”  Woman becomes the enemy of man and the destroyer of family 
life.  Fortunately, this potentially bleak prognostication has little chance of coming true: 
“to obliterate [the distinctions between male and female] it would be necessary to have all 
evolution over again on a new basis.  What was decided among the prehistoric Protozoa 
cannot be annulled by Act of Parliament” (Geddes and Thomson 286).  Women may 
attempt to enter the workforce, Parliament may even grant them the right to vote, but 
nothing can change the fact that “man thinks more, woman feels more” (Geddes and 
Thomson 291).  Biology is destiny; in Distant’s words, it is “for ever.” 
 Women who chose occupations outside of their domestic duties were traitors to 
the race, aiming at its downfall through their selfish neglect of their proper biological 
function.  Certainly this idea, the main thrust of Distant’s and Geddes’and Thomson’s 
theories, sparked anger, hurt, and resentment among the small but vocal group of 
professional women.  However, the broader argument, that women were intellectually 
inferior to men based on the irrefutable laws of nature, was potentially far more 
damaging to women’s advancement.  The theory, quite obviously, had holes in it – holes 
in the shapes of George Eliot, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and other extraordinary 
women whose superior intelligence was recognized by both sexes.  The very 
achievements that made these women notable also marked them as notorious under the 
rubric of Victorian psycho-sexual theory.   
In Mind and Body (1870), physician and psychologist Henry Maudsley closely 
parallels many of Spencer’s theories regarding female sexual development.  He writes 
It has been affirmed by some philosophers that there is no  
essential difference between the mind of a woman and that  
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of a man; and that if a girl were subjected to the same edu- 
cation as a boy, she would resemble him in tastes, feelings,  
pursuits, and powers.  To my mind it would not be one whit  
more absurd to affirm that the antlers of the stag, the human  
beard, and the cock’s comb, are effects of education; or that,  
by putting a girl to the same education as a boy, the female  
generative organs might be transformed into male organs.    
(35)           
 
Clearly this reiteratures the idea that in respect to intelligence, men and women are 
essentially different, separated by the effects of biology rather than the dissimilarities of 
their educations.  Also like Spencer, Maudsley links mental abilities to the sexual organs: 
to bring woman to the same mental condition as man would require “transforming” her 
sexual organs to man’s.  Maudsley takes his argument a step further in discussing those 
women who do exhibit a high level of intelligence: 
While woman preserves her sex, she will necessarily be feebler  
than man, and, having her special bodily and mental characters,  
will have to a certain extent her own sphere of activity; where  
she has become thoroughly masculine in nature, or hermaphrodite  
in mind – when, in fact, she has pretty well divested herself of  
her sex – then she may take his ground, and do his work; but she  
will have lost her feminine attractions, and probably also her  
chief feminine functions.   
       (35) 
 
Maudsley labels women who engage in intellectual pursuits, who move beyond their 
“own sphere of activity” – the business of keeping house and raising children – as 
aberrations of the female sex, marking their superior intelligence as a fault in such a way 
as was most calculated to insult the women so labeled and discourage other women from 
following the same path.  Not only is intelligence an unhealthy sign of masculinity in a 
woman, it likely signals her loss of femininity both in appearance and in function.  
Maudsley claims that women who pursue intellectual activities or activities outside the 
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domestic sphere are making a choice to give up their sexual function; such women will 
no longer be capable of motherhood, or will be ill-equipped for such a role.  Such a 
theory obviously carries with it the moral directive not to pursue “masculine” activities, 
or try to better oneself through intellectual engagements.  For a woman to remain a true 
woman, for her to possess the ability to be a good mother, she must be “necessarily 
feebler” than man.  Margaret Oliphant’s passing conversation with an acquaintance 
points to the seeds of self-doubt sewn by Maudsley’s argument.  She writes of meeting 
“Mary Hewitt, a mild, kind delightful woman, who frightened me very much, I 
remember, by telling me of many babies whom she had lost through some defective valve 
in the heart, which she said was somehow connected with too much mental work on the 
part of the mother, – a foolish thing, I should think, yet the same thing occurred twice to 
myself” (Autobiography 78).  Oliphant, who lost her first two children early in their 
infancy, has now to question whether she is to blame for their deaths because of her work 
as a novelist.  Maudsley’s theory effectively divides a woman’s mind from her body – the 
two seem at cross-purposes.  To follow one’s intellectual proclivities is to deprive the 
body of necessary energy; to maintain the body’s store of energy, one must repress the 
abilities of the mind. 
 The female reproductive organs were thought responsible for women’s “feeble 
mindedness” in general, but other theories linked these organs with women’s emotional 
state and psychological makeup.  Chiefly, these theories focused on the three “epochs” of 
a woman’s sexual development: puberty, menstruation and sexual activity, and 
motherhood.  Before puberty, women are credited with not only equaling their male 
counterparts’ rate of development, but exceeding it.  Spencer notes that “girls come 
 106 
 
earlier to maturity than boys” (374).  He is drawing on the accepted wisdom of the time.  
At the June 15, 1869 meeting of the Anthropological Society of London, for example, 
James McGrigor Allan made a similar claim and used it as the basis for discrediting 
women’s intellectual abilities at adulthood: 
  I deduce from this fact [girls’ more rapid development] a con- 
clusion quite opposed to that of mental equality of the sexes.  
In the animal and vegetable kingdoms we find this invariable  
law— rapidity of growth inversely proportionate to the degree  
of perfection at maturity. The higher the animal or plant in the  
scale of being, the more slowly does it reach its utmost capacity  
of development. Girls are physically and mentally more precocious  
than boys. The human female arrives sooner than the male at mat- 
urity, and furnishes one of the strongest arguments against the  
alleged equality of the sexes. The quicker appreciation of girls is  
the instinct, or intuitive faculty in operation; while the slower  
boy is an example of the latent reasoning power not yet devel- 
oped. Compare them in after-life, when the boy has become a  
young man full of intelligence, and the girl has been educated  
into a young lady reading novels, working crochet, and going  
into hysterics at the sight of a mouse or a spider. 
        (cxcvii) 
 
Allen’s conclusion that women demonstrate their inferiority based on the habits of novel 
reading and piece work seem appallingly unscientific and shallow today, yet the majority 
of respondents at the Anthropological Society’s meeting found little to argue with in 
Allen’s assertions.  The onset of puberty in a woman was considered the point at which 
her more animal nature became dominant; after puberty she could exert herself to no 
greater intellectual pursuit than reading novels.  The onset of puberty also altered a 
woman’s psychological makeup, according to Maudsley.  He writes: 
The great mental revolution which occurs at puberty may go  
beyond its physiological limits, in some instances, and become 
pathological.  The vague feelings, blind longings, and obscure  
impulses, which then arise in the mind attest the awakening of  
an impulse which knows not at first its aim or the means of its 
gratification; a kind of vague and yearning melancholy is  
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engendered, which leads to an abandonment to poetry of a  
gloomy Byronic kind . . . . 
     (75) 
Maudsley characterizes women’s first response to menstruation as confusing: it brings on 
feelings that are “vague,” “blind,” and “obscure.”  The sense of distance between mind 
and body advanced by the theory of arrested development – the idea that a woman’s mind 
and body are in conflict over a limited resource – is here given a new dimension, 
specifically relating the mind/body disconnect to the development of sexual feeling.  
Maudsley indicates that women are not capable of comprehending the “awakening 
impulse” of sexuality, a nod toward the common belief that women were more or less 
asexual.  The body, then, is not only a claimant for a limited amount of available energy 
also desired by the mind, it is a potential source of terror: from it arise unknowable, 
mysterious urges that leave women in perpetual melancholy. 
 
II. Liminal Spaces and Oliphant’s “The Library Window” 
 
The young narrator of Oliphant’s “The Library Window” is in precisely the state 
of mind described by Maudsley.  As Simon Cooke (245-6) and Tamar Heller (28) note, 
she is at the point of puberty in the story, caught in the liminal space between childhood 
and adulthood.  A number of textual clues point to this: her placement under the 
guardianship of her aunt, labels such as “honey” (the constant address of her aunt), and 
“bairn” (12, 23), as Lady Carnbee dubs her, and a description of her “little head” (27)  
point toward her child-like state, while Mr. Pitmilly’s labeling her as “Missy” (20) and 
“young lady” (37, 39), Lady Carnbee’s belief that “the young lassie” would “cock up her 
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bonnet at the sight of a young lord” (31), and the baker’s boy’s appreciation of her as a 
“braw ane” (38) all point to her as a young woman.  More tellingly, the narrator has been 
sent to her Aunt Mary’s home in St. Rule’s (significantly named) because of a vaguely 
defined illness.  She explains, “Whenever we had anything the matter with us in these 
days, we were sent to St. Rule’s to get up our strength.  And this was my case at the time 
of which I am going to speak” (4).  That there is something “the matter” with her, then, 
must be taken for granted.  But in her lack of symptoms and in her own unconcern with 
her state of health, we may assume, as Cooke does, that her illness is along the lines of 
“the onset of nervous or hysterical disturbances” (246) – that her poor health is an 
emotional state as much as it is a physical weakness, indicative of the sort of alteration, 
the “mental revolution” Maudsley describes occurring at puberty.  Also indicative of her 
still-developing adult sensibilities are her responses to ideas of flirtation and sexual 
attraction.  The only man she has contact with for most of the story, Mr. Pitmilly, is “old” 
(5), “white haired” (6), and “always a friend” (32) – in other words, non-sexualized, and 
not sexually threatening to the narrator.  However, her interactions with him also point to 
her awakening sense of opposite-sex relations.  She says, “Mr. Pitmilly had a way of 
laughing as he spoke, which did not please me; but it was true that he was not perhaps 
desirous of pleasing me” (5-6).  In this thought we see the narrator’s confused sense of 
the type of homage men pay to women – their desire to “please” through tone and word 
as part of the discourse between the sexes.  Not knowing whether Mr. Pitmilly cares to 
please her points toward her own uncertainty regarding her developmental status – if she 
is a woman, he would make an effort to please her, if she is a child, she would be 
disregarded.  The narrator’s response to Lady Carnbee’s accusation that she is 
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daydreaming about “some man,” is equally telling: “‘I am thinking of no man,’” she 
responds, “half crying. ‘It is very unkind and dreadful of you to say so, Lady Carnbee.  I 
never thought of—any man, in all my life!’ [she] cried in a passion of indignation” (24).  
Her denial points both towards sexual innocence – the thought of a man is “dreadful,” – 
and, in its strength, in the “passion” of her “indignation,” Oliphant hints that the narrator 
“protests too much.” 
 Both Cooke and Heller agree that “The Library Window” reflects the psycho-
sexual theories of the mid to late Victorian period.  Heller writes that the story “recalls 
the cluster of late nineteenth-century discourses – scientific, medical, and literary – that 
argued that women’s bodies inextricably imprisoned their minds and that they could not 
develop one without damaging the other” (25), while Cooke notes that “the tale contains 
several features that suggest the presence of . . . psychological theories as a shaping 
influence” and singles out Maudsley as a primary influence (244).  However, to argue 
that Oliphant is simply presenting a case study of hysteria, as Cooke does, a tale of “a 
young woman who undergoes a mental collapse and is ultimately driven mad,” is to miss 
the spiritual import of the text (243).  Likewise, Heller stresses the ghost’s symbolic 
status (as a representative of “literary authority”) to the exclusion of its status as a ghost 
(24).  Rather than madness, I will argue that the narrator achieves a kind of spiritual 
enlightenment at the end of the story; rather than read the ghost as a symbolic presence, I 
will argue that its reality in the story reconciles the narrator with her mental abilities and 
with herself. 
 Although the story begins with the narrator already arrived in St. Rule’s, and 
already suffering from the mental revolution of puberty, her early history, only hinted at 
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in the narrative, provides a refutation to Maudsley’s theory that puberty sinks young girls 
into gloomy poetry-reading melancholy.  The narrator sums up her childhood by noting 
“Everybody had said, since ever I learned to speak, that I was fantastic and fanciful and 
dreamy, and all the other words with which a girl who may happen to like poetry, and to 
be fond of thinking is so often made uncomfortable” (4-5).  Cooke ties the narrator’s 
“dreaminess” throughout the story to the onset of puberty, arguing that her “melancholy 
introspection is particularly expressed in terms of dreaminess which was routinely 
associated with hysterical apathy” (247).  But by the narrator’s own admission, 
“dreaminess” was a natural part of her disposition, a characteristic noticeable in her from 
her earliest years.  It is connected, not to the onset of puberty, but to her intellectualism, 
her fondness for thinking, as she puts it.  The narrator has been made uncomfortable all 
her life for her pronounced intellect, placing her in the same position as those adult 
women who were said to have neglected biological function in pursuit of their selfish 
desire for learning.  Thus Oliphant’s young narrator is not a fictionalized version of 
Maudsley’s theories regarding pubescent girls precisely because the symptoms he saw as 
developing through puberty are in the narrator preexisting.  Oliphant calls into question 
the notion that biology drives Maudsley’s theory of pubescent melancholia.  What seems 
to cause the narrator’s unhappiness is her sense of being different, a sense she has gained 
from the language used to describe her, the terms used disapprovingly by friends and 
family to mark her as abnormal.  Social conditions have put the narrator at odds with 
herself. 
 The “dreaminess” that characterizes the narrator reflects another facet of 
Maudsley’s developmental theory – it is another symptom of the female malady – but 
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Oliphant’s portrayal of female dreaminess renders it a positive, constructive behavior.  
Cooke writes that “Paralyzed by inertia, literally bored stiff by the comings and goings of 
the old people around her, [the narrator] is the model of female languor, of mental illness 
apparently expressing itself in the incapacity of the body” (246).  This description leaves 
much of the narrator’s mental landscape unexplored.  True, she does seem bored by her 
surroundings, noting “To tell the truth, there never was very much going on inside.  The 
house belonged to my aunt, to whom (she says, Thank God!) nothing ever happens . . . . 
she was old, and very quiet.  Her life went on in a routine never broken.  She got up at the 
same hour every day, and did the same things in the same rotation, day by day the same” 
(3).  Aunt Mary, it seems, is just as much a figure of inertia as her niece – she is resistant 
to change and thankful for its absence.  It is likewise true that the narrator exhibits some 
“incapacity of the body.”  She tells the reader, “I did very little work, I fear—now and 
then a few stitches when the spirit moved me, or when I had got well afloat in a dream, 
and was more tempted to follow it out than to read my book, as sometimes happened” 
(4).  The narrator is a far cry from the model of female industry idealized in the period’s 
conduct literature.  Oliphant contrasts this stillness of body with the narrator’s life prior 
to her arrival in St. Rule’s.  According to the narrator, “My mother would not have let me 
do it, I know.  She would have remembered dozens of things that were to do.  She would 
have sent me up-stairs to fetch something which I am quite sure she did not want, or 
down-stairs to carry some quite unnecessary message to the housemaid.  She liked to 
keep me running about” (4).  By linking such busywork with the narrator’s mother’s 
sense of propriety, Oliphant also connects it to those discomfort-producing phrases 
uttered by the adults in the narrator’s pre-St. Rule’s life.  Both are used as a check to the 
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narrator’s intellectual engagements.  Thus, just as Oliphant is critical of the atmosphere 
of hostility toward female intellectualism created by the labels applied to the narrator, so 
is she critical of the notion – shared by Maudsley and the narrator’s mother – that 
“dreaminess” and idleness are moral or psychological failings. 
 In fact, the narrator’s dreaminess is anything but idle.  The kind of languor Cooke 
comprehends in her lack of physical activity is belied by the mental work in which she is 
engaged.  “Dreaminess” suggests a fair amount of passivity – the mind in a dream is 
inactive, a hostage to the strange workings of the subconscious.  This in part does 
describe the narrator’s mental state.  She sometimes feels herself “well afloat in a dream” 
and senses the conversation around her “as if the air had blown it to me” (4).  But using 
the raw material of airborne conversation, the narrator engages in acts of creation.  Of the 
voices she hears coming from the street below, she says, “sometimes they said to each 
other something that was amusing, and often something that suggested a whole story” 
(10).  The narrator, then, is not passively letting conversation wash over her, she is 
speculating on meaning, mentally authoring fiction to accompany the snippets of 
conversation she hears.  This form of story creation coincides with her speculations 
regarding the library window.  Heller notes that “. . . if we see the ghost as her own 
creation, she writes on the ‘opaque’ space of the library wall” (26).  This is likewise true 
without the ghost necessarily being a fiction.  If the narrator is merely observing him in 
the same manner she overhears conversation, she is then still engaged in a meaning-
making act.  When she first shifts her attention to the window, she says she looked into it 
and  
  could see the grey space and air a little deeper, and a sort of  
vision, very dim, of a wall, and something against it . . . .  I  
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looked more intently, and made sure it was a piece of furniture,  
either a writing-table or perhaps a large bookcase.  No doubt it  
must be the last, since this was part of the old library.  I never  
visited the old College Library, but I had seen such places before,  
and I could well imagine it to myself.  
       (11-12)   
 
In this description, the narrator moves from passive awareness to close, active 
observation through her intensified gaze.  She “interprets” with finer and finer distinction 
the meaning of the dark object she sees within the room, based on logical deductions 
drawn from the combination of her sense perception and previous experience.  Finally, in 
a creative leap, she moves from the perceived dark shape to an entire “well imagined” 
room.  This mental progression – from dark shape, to furniture, to bookcase, to library 
room – points toward the narrator’s blend of empirical and creative thought. 
 The blend is one Oliphant employs in her religious speculations.  Again and again 
throughout her life Oliphant questioned the divine purpose behind the deaths of her 
grown children:17 Maggie, who died at age 10, Cyril (“Tiddy”) who died at 33, and 
Frances (“Cecco”), her youngest, who died at 34.  She wanted more than anything to 
fathom some idea of their heavenly existences, trying “to follow [Maggie] in imagination, 
to think of her delight and surprise when from the fever, wandering and languor of her 
bed she came suddenly into the company of angels and the presence of the Lord” 
(Autobiography 39).  She imagines Tiddy in the embrace of God, writing, “Thou wilt 
cradle him in thy arms.  Thou wilt comfort him as one whom his mother comforteth” 
(Autobiography 84).  After Cecco’s death, she wonders, “Does [God] provide, as I 
sometimes think, some special work for those whose lives were unfulfilled here?  Oh so 
many, so many, all unfulfilled . . . and now both of my own are among them” 
                                                 
17
 Oliphant also lost two children in their infancies. 
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(Autobiography 124).  Oliphant, whose life works included a great many texts and essays 
on Christianity, whose “bedrock security, as she saw it, of her own faith in God's 
existence allowed her outbursts against God’s unfathomable ways” found comfort in the 
imaginative leaps she made toward her heaven-bound children (Jay 139).  The creative 
leap is a leap of faith. 
 In “The Library Window,” the narrator’s imaginative leaps are also, significantly, 
leaps of faith, but whereas Oliphant’s imaginative acts had as their foundation her 
unshakeable belief in divine justice, the narrator founds her imaginative acts on faith in 
her own abilities.  Early in the narrative, she confesses, “I had a sort of second-sight, and 
was conscious of things to which I paid no attention” (5).  Oliphant is certainly playing 
with the nuances of meaning inherent in the term “second-sight,” which in Scotland 
referred to a type of prescience often related to death or to the ability to “see” events 
occurring at a great remove from the seer.  Oliphant’s narrator is not foretelling the 
future, however, nor is she seeing a death (although she might be seeing the dead).  
Instead, her ability, in connection with the vision she has of the scholar within the library 
window, hints at the distances the narrator is overcoming: the distance between her life 
and his afterlife, the distance between the limitations placed on her as a young woman 
and his intellectual freedom, and perhaps, if the ghostly scholar is a reflection of her 
psyche, the distance between her conscious thoughts and her subconscious desires.  But 
in the day to day use of her “second-sight” Oliphant grants her narrator a different ability 
than those traditionally ascribed to the term.  Second-sight becomes no more and no less 
than a kind of extra-ordinary awareness, a heightened sensory perception.  It is an ability 
of the body rather than the mind: the narrator’s conscious thought is busy elsewhere 
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while her senses register the sights and sounds around her.  In seeing the library window, 
and in seeing through the library window, the narrator credits her physical ability: “For 
certainly there was a feeling of space behind the panes which these old half-blind ladies 
had disputed about whether they were glass or only fictitious panes marked on the wall.  
How silly! when eyes that could see could make it out in a minute” (11).  The narrator 
contrasts her youth with the other ladies’ age in order to claim for herself a physical 
strength these other women lack.  Sight and second-sight are markers of bodily power. 
 While claiming physical power might be considered tantamount to admitting 
mental weakness based on Victorian notions of female development, the narrator of “The 
Library Window” refuses to acknowledge any such deficiency.  In trying to understand 
her ability to see through the library window she   
  would have been better pleased to make out to myself that it  
was some superiority in me which made it so clear to me, if it  
were only the great superiority of young eyes over old—though  
that was not quite enough to satisfy me, seeing it was a superiority  
which I shared with every little lass and lad in the street.  I rather  
wanted, I believe, to think that there was some particular insight  
in me which gave clearness to my sight . . . . 
         (17)  
 
        
     It is to the combination of sight and insight, of physical and mental powers, that the 
narrator hopes to attribute her vision of the window.  The young girl whose intellect has 
been ridiculed at home, and whose physical wellbeing has been called into question (thus 
her removal to St. Rule’s for her undefined “illness”), sees in this sight of the window a 
sign of self-worth.  While the narrator does not “fit in” at home, and while at her aunt 
Mary’s she is likewise ill-suited for days spent in the drawing room, in her ability to see 
into the room beyond the library window, she is able to escape the narrow confines of her 
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window seat.  The window seat – on the margins of the drawing room, at the edge of 
social life, in the liminal space between inside and outside worlds – is the only place 
where the narrator feels comfortable, but through that imaginative leap based on faith in 
herself, she is able to occupy the library chamber.  Her belief in what she is seeing 
literally pushes back the gray spaces of the room.   
 In her literary biography of Oliphant, Elisabeth Jay writes, “It was in the world of 
fancy, or fantasy, in her Stories of the Seen and Unseen . . . that Mrs. Oliphant discovered 
a place to ponder further upon irresolvable paradoxes and gender-related confusions” 
(157).  This “uncolonized” space, as Jay terms it, between the living and the dead in 
Oliphant’s early ghost stories is likewise the place where “The Library Window’s” young 
narrator works out her own gender issues and where Oliphant reconciles a lifelong 
ambivalence toward female sexuality with the exigencies of female intellectual growth.  
While St. Rule’s is the panacea prescribed in the narrator’s family for any sort of illness, 
it seems particularly suited for treatment of young girls who are straying off the socially 
acceptable path toward womanhood.  It is, after all, a town where women take tea and 
gossip on one side of the street, while the men are ensconced in the seat of learning, the 
college, on the other side of the street.  It is a town where Mr. Pitmilly, the only man in 
Aunt Mary’s drawing-room, is deferred to as a matter of course, “talking with mild 
authority like a little oracle among the ladies” (8).  It is a town where the women are 
synecdochely represented as dresses and bonnets in the narrator’s mind.  It is a town, 
where, as its name implies, life is carefully ruled, physically by the clean lines of the 
street separating men’s and women’s activities, and socially, for as the narrator remarks, 
“In St Rule’s they have a great way of throwing stones at each other” (27).  Innocent 
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childhood diversion carries the double entendre of a carefully policed society.  The 
narrator resists efforts to assimilate her into this ruled world through her imaginative 
forays across the street.  As Heller notes, the specter of the student is “an idealized form 
of her escape from domesticity” (28).  The narrator is metaphorically crossing a line, 
breaking a rule, and entering the (in this case, literally) gray space that constitutes 
Oliphant’s world of fancy.  In this space, the narrator achieves a triumph of intellectual 
and sexual expression not reconcilable with the ruled world’s expectations for women.   
 The climax of Oliphant’s story highlights the tension between the narrator’s 
personal triumph and the impossibility of such a triumph carrying any meaning in the 
rule-bound reality of St. Rule’s.  The narrator is finally lured from her liminal position by 
an invitation to a party in the College library.  The visit to the library is more than a 
simple walk across the street, though.  In going out, the narrator is coming out, crossing 
the formal threshold between sexually innocent child and sexually available young lady.  
Her desire to physically occupy the space of her vision and physically interact with the 
visionary scholar is explicitly sexualized. The narrator writes,  
  It occurred to me, however, when I was dressing . . . that he  
might perhaps, it was just possible, be there.  And when I  
thought of that, I took out my white frock—though Janet had  
laid out my blue one—and my little pearl necklace which I  
had thought was too good to wear. . . . though I did not think  
much of my appearance then, there must have been something  
about me—pale as I was but apt to colour in a moment, with  
my dress so white, and my pearls so white, and my hair all  
shadowy—perhaps, that was pleasant to look at . . . .  
       (34) 
 
The narrator’s choice of white on white – white dress and white pearls – emphasizes her 
chastity, certainly, but this dress also emphasizes the sexual allure of chaste young 
women.  The narrator’s pearls are another version of Lady Carnbee’s flashing diamond 
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ring, a sign of enticement which a number of scholars have pointed to as a symbol of 
sexuality in the text.  That the narrator is “apt to colour in a moment” again suggests her 
position on the threshold of womanhood: she is virginally pale, but ready to shift into the 
ruddy, full-blooded color of sexual arousal.  Most significant, though, is the fact that the 
narrator chooses this attire with the scholar in mind.  In deliberately donning the garb of 
the debutante, the narrator effectively marks the transition from child to adult as a matter 
of choice rather than a biological inevitability.  The narrator’s curiosity, her awakened 
empathy, and her desire do more to move her into adulthood than her vague illness or any 
exertion of St. Rule’s social pressure.  In this, Oliphant grants the mind much greater 
control over the body than is accounted for in Maudsley’s pubescent theory.  In fact, in 
transmuting the narrator’s mental longings into a sexual urge, Oliphant unites mind and 
body, and demonstrates that they can have a single purpose. 
 The narrator’s disastrous experience in the library points to the lack of space for 
her combined mental and sexual desires.  Quite literally, the room the narrator seeks, the 
room she had viewed so many times from her side of the street, does not exist in the 
library building.  As the narrator traverses the large room where the party is taking place, 
she begins to grow uneasy, realizing that the space does not physically match the room 
she viewed from across the street.  She writes,   
  On that side of the wall which was to the street there seemed no  
  windows at all.  A long line of bookcases filled it from end to end.   
  I could not see what that meant either, but it confused me.  I was  
  altogether confused.  I felt as if I was in a strange country, not  
  knowing where I was going, not knowing what I might find out  
  next.  If there were no windows on the wall to the street, where  
  was my window?  My heart, which had been jumping up and  
  calming down again all the time, gave a great leap at this, as if it  
  would have come out of me—but I did not know what it could  
  mean.       
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        (35-36) 
 
Significantly, Oliphant portrays the narrator’s moment of realization as both a mental and 
physical experience.  Her mental confusion is mirrored in the erratic beating of her heart, 
and further exemplified in the confused roles played by mind and heart.  Instead of a 
mental leap, it is the narrator’s heart that leaps into knowledge.   
The lack of a room in the library holding the object of her desire signals a lack of 
space in the world outside her head for that desire to exist.   Jenni Calder argues that in 
contrast to her realist fiction, Oliphant’s ghost stories “approach the physical and the 
emotional in a rather different way.  In them . . . she explores vulnerable areas of feeling 
and belief, testing the powers of faith and imagination against the intellectual 
infrastructure that was being put into place through the nineteenth century. That 
infrastructure was almost entirely the work of men” (173).  Oliphant’s ghost story, like 
the library room, can only exist outside the parameters – social and scientific – of a 
masculinely-defined reality. 
 Given the lack of space, both physically and in terms of social conventions, for 
the narrator’s desire to exist, her persistent belief in the scholar and his room pushes her 
beyond the bounds of acceptable behavior.  She seems to have undergone a psychic 
break, a mental breakdown, leaving Mr. Pitmilly exclaiming “It’s peetiful, it’s peetiful,” 
and causing the maid to “burst out crying” (39).  But what seems so clearly a breakdown 
is, in another sense, a breakthrough.  The narrator states, “Never in all these days had I 
seen that room so clearly” (39).  The narrator’s belief in the scholar and his room despite 
her sure knowledge that neither are possible lends an urgency to her desire and a strength 
to her vision.  It is only after the narrator is shown that he cannot be that the Scholar 
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looks at her, opens the window, and acknowledges her with a wave.  What her mind has 
yearned for – surer sight of him – has been fulfilled.  She achieves a bodily fulfillment as 
well.  As a number of scholars have noted, the moment is rife with the language of 
orgasm, ending with the narrator feeling “so content, and . . . so worn out and satisfied” 
(41).  The ambiguity surrounding this encounter hinges on a central set of questions: is 
Oliphant, by portraying the narrator’s vision as a kind of madness (in the eyes of the 
minor characters, and in showing the reader as well as the narrator the physical 
impossibility of either the Scholar or his room existing) equating female vision and the 
unchecked imagination with sexual malady?  Or is she instead, as I have argued in this 
chapter, claiming that women might have true vision, and great intellectual abilities as 
exhibited in the strength of their imaginations, and healthy, undiminished sexuality?  Is 
her story challenging readers to accept that mental power and reproductive ability can 
coexist in the female body by asking them to accept that the Scholar’s room and the 
physical library can occupy the same space?  There is no one answer to this; as Elizabeth 
Winston notes, the story “yields no stable meaning” and is marked most by “elusiveness 
and indeterminacy” (53). 
 Reading the moment of recognition between the narrator and the Scholar as a 
spiritual encounter (rather than, say, a moment of delusional madness or a symbolic 
exchange) is useful in this context.  Indeed, the moment seems to invite such a reading.  It 
is only after the narrator repeatedly exhorts him, “Say something to me!” that the Scholar 
draws her closer to the window “as if [she] were a puppet moved by his will” (40).  He 
finally sees, the narrator relates, that she all along “was watching him, looking for him, 
believing in him” (40).  From the need-filled prayer that captures the Scholar’s attention, 
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to the narrator’s sense of being guided by his will, to the question of belief, the scene 
resonates with Christian overtones.  Whether the Scholar’s wave is a salutation or a 
warning, his presence before the narrator is benign.  It is an answer to her prayer though 
the Scholar makes no utterance.  His recognition of her “speaks” to the narrator by 
reassuring her that her vision is true, but more than this, she is reassured that she is being 
watched, she is acknowledged, she is not alone.  The narrator receives the comfort sought 
for by so many spiritual doubters in this great Age of Doubt.  That the narrator’s doubt is 
self-doubt, doubt in her mental abilities, suggests that the spiritual recognition of her 
sanctions these abilities.  To underscore the strength of this spiritual sanctioning, 
Oliphant ensures that the reader cannot easily dismiss the narrator’s vision as delusion.  
The baker’s boy, who the narrator sees “staring up at the open window, with his mouth 
open and his face full of wonder” is brought before Aunt Mary and Mr. Pitmilly and 
made to confess that he was looking at “yon windy yonder in the library that is nae 
windy.  And it was open – sure’s death.  You may laugh if you like” (43).  The narrator’s 
vision is confirmed not by some other young girl, possibly hysterical, but by the practical, 
down-to-earth baker’s boy, who must acknowledge what he saw even against his will, 
and even as his judgment tells him it is impossible.   
 
   
III.  Broughton’s Haunted Female Body 
 
 Like “The Library Window,” Rhoda Broughton’s “The Man with the Nose” is a 
story about a young woman, Elizabeth, haunted by repeated sightings of an unknown 
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man.  It, too, is a story about liminal spaces: focused on one couple’s honeymoon, it 
captures Elizabeth’s transition from maiden to wife, a status change that carries with it an 
implied shift into sexual experience.  Thus, like the narrator of “The Library Window,” 
the transformative epoch Elizabeth has arrived at is underwritten by her sexuality.  The 
initiation into sexual activity was not, for women, precisely akin to other activities they 
took up upon entering the married state, though it was certainly considered one of their 
many domestic duties.  Instead, medical practitioners theorized that sexual activity had a 
psychic effect on women, awakening a potentially dangerous sexual desire in them.  This 
belief aligns sexual activity with puberty in terms of a shared influence on a woman’s 
mind.  While Oliphant’s specter in “The Library Window” signals a sort of divine 
approbation of the combined mental and physical desires of women, the specter in 
Broughton’s story seems only to point inward, at the division science had created 
between a woman’s mind and her body.  So estranged is Elizabeth from her body’s 
functions – its demands and its desires – that she registers these functions as a spectral 
other, a sexualized figure whose existence is as mystifying as it is frightening.  In 
portraying Elizabeth’s encounters with this figure as a battle of wills, Broughton critiques 
the ideology that taught women to distrust their bodies; in further portraying the battle of 
wills as one that Elizabeth loses, Broughton points to the futility of women living up to 
the standard set for them by the medical profession.  
 King Lear’s famous denunciation of his daughters and all the female sex – “Down 
from the waist they are Centaurs / Though women all above” – was given scientific 
validation of a sort in the mid-nineteenth century (Shakespeare 4.6 124-125).  Beneath 
the many and voluminous layers of the Victorian woman’s skirt, frightening, monstrous 
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things were afoot (ahoof?).  The pseudo-Darwinian theories that differentiated between 
man’s and woman’s mental abilities based on sexual function helped shape the rhetoric 
and practice in the burgeoning obstetrical and gynecological field, while arguments in 
psychology surrounding the potential mental crisis of puberty found continuance in the 
Victorians’ understanding of menstruation and sexual activity.  As James McGrigor Allan 
argues, at puberty, “The boy, springing into manhood, is at once and for ever developed, 
and, so far as sex is concerned, completed.  Whereas the woman, for a period varying 
from twenty to thirty years, is an admirably constructed apparatus for the most 
mysterious and sublime of nature’s mysteries—the reproductive process” (cxcviii).  In 
Allan’s account, a man’s body is stable, “at once and for ever developed,” whereas 
puberty signals for women not only the advent of adulthood, but the beginning of 
instability and chaos.  The adult woman’s body is not solid flesh but a casing, an 
“apparatus” for a “mysterious process.”  It is never fixed, never at rest, always in flux.  
The price of this constant change, was, according to the medical profession, paid in 
emotional and mental well-being.  Referring to the medical profession’s iteration of 
Spenser’s notion of arrested development, Mary Poovey writes,  
  The model of the human body implicit in this physiology is  
that of a closed system containing a fixed quantity of energy;  
if stimulation or expenditure occurred in one part of the system, 
corresponding depletion or excitation had to occur in another. . . .  
for women, it grounded an economy that was perceived to be  
continuously internally unstable.  This instability was considered  
a function of what medical men denominated female 'periodicity,'  
a state inaugurated by puberty, signaled by menstruation, and  
epitomized in childbearing.  
       (36) 
 
As a system, the female body was constantly striving for balance, but just as constantly 
thrown off balance by its reproductive organs.  As S. Weir Mitchell, a celebrated 
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specialist in hysterical disorders, implies, the “spasms, rigours, nervousness, and curious 
mental states, which haunt the times of sexual change in a woman’s life” are 
commonplace, the stuff of everyday (219).  “Haunted” by the work of her reproductive 
organs, the Victorian woman was told to live in perpetual fear of the sharp beat of 
hooves, the attack of the beast from which she could never escape. 
 While Margaret Oliphant had come to rethink many of her conservative views on 
women by the time she wrote “The Library Window,” in 1867 she was firmly opposed to 
the more liberated women found in sensation fiction.  The “fleshly inclinations” Oliphant 
decries in her Cometh Up Like a Flower review are one of the most characteristic features 
of Broughton’s heroines.  R.C. Terry writes that the “archetypal Broughton heroine [is] . . 
. full of feminine warmth, and sexuality” (114).  Tamar Heller similarly describes 
Broughton’s protagonists: “Broughton's full-bodied heroines are female Oliver Twists, 
asking for more of everything they are not allowed--sexual, intellectual, and emotional 
fulfillment” (89).  For Terry, Broughton’s significance as a novelist “lies in this 
uninhibited directness about women’s strong feelings, and by implication, their sexual 
needs in a male-dominated society” (110).  So frank are Broughton’s typical heroines that 
they might confess, like Kate Chester in Not Wisely but too Well, to a willingness to “do 
anything wicked, anything insane” for the men they desire (51).  Broughton’s work 
explores not only the ways women express sexual desire, but the repercussions of such 
expressions. 
 Elizabeth, Broughton’s protagonist in “The Man with the Nose,” is at odds with 
the “full-bodied,” “uninhibited” heroines of her other fiction.  The appellation Broughton 
consistently applies to Elizabeth’s dialogue is “meek” and she is repeatedly referred to as 
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“timid” – characteristics that align Elizabeth with Dickens’s domestic angels rather than 
with the bold heroines common in sensation fiction.  Broughton is quick to establish 
Elizabeth’s timidity specifically in relation to her sexuality.  The opening scene of the 
story finds Elizabeth and her then-fiancé (who serves as the story’s narrator) discussing 
their honeymoon plans, a subject superficially centered on possible destinations but 
fraught with a subtext focused on their upcoming sexual encounter.  The two characters’ 
nervousness about sex is sublimated instead into fear of appearing ridiculous in public as 
“honeymooners”; their wish to appear like any long-married couple on holiday speaks to 
their desire to be past the sexual awkwardness of the wedding night and the honeymoon 
period.  Tellingly, the figurative language they use to convey their fears of conspicuity is 
laden with references to sin.  In response to Elizabeth’s suggestion that they disguise 
themselves, the narrator says, “With an old portmanteau and in rags, we shall still have 
the mark of the Beast upon us” (37).  Such phrasing alludes both to an association with 
the devil and connects the honeymoon period with a time given to bestial inclinations.  In 
the couple’s decision to “betake [them]selves to some spot where such as [they] do 
chiefly congregate – where [they] shall be swallowed up and lost in the multitude of 
[their] fellow-sinners,” we see their surface concern with gaucherie disturbed again by 
uneasy allusions to immorality and loss of control (38).  In one sense, these allusions 
seem misplaced: Broughton is weighing down her characters with fears of sexual 
temptation more appropriate to couples with no intention of marrying.  In another sense, 
however, Broughton uses the concerns of Elizabeth and her fiancé to criticize the rigor of 
the Victorian denigration of sexuality.  She implies that the stringent moral code that 
taught both men and women to abhor sexual expression as the deepest depravity was not 
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so easy to set aside at the moment when the sexual act was sanctioned by the Church and 
society.  The lessons of childhood are not easily forgotten, it seems. 
More pointedly, Broughton connects the narrator’s sexual anxieties with an 
aversion to female physicality.  After the wedding night has taken place (“I have got over 
it; we have both got over it tolerably, creditably,” (44) the narrator states – a tongue in 
cheek reference to sex masquerading as information about the ceremony itself), the 
narrator becomes fixated on the female body.  During a boating excursion, he notes 
“There are few actions more disgusting than eating can be made.  A handsome girl close 
to us – her immaturity evidenced by the two long tails of black hair down her back – is 
thrusting her knife halfway down her throat” (57).  Specifically, the narrator is disgusted 
with the girl’s actions as she satisfies one of the needs of her body.  His initial attraction 
to her “handsome” form is overruled by repulsion at the uninhibited expression of her 
enjoyment of food.  The description of her eating seems deliberately sexualized, as if to 
imply that for the narrator, all displays of female desire are the same, all sexualized and 
disgusting.  Only moments later, the narrator spies “a fat woman,” who, interested in a 
bird on the water, “leans over the back of the boat, and, by some happy effect of 
crinoline, displays to her fellow- passengers two yards of thick, white cotton legs. She is, 
fortunately for herself, unconscious of her generosity” (59).  The biting sarcasm of this 
remark betrays the narrator’s anger, his outrage at being confronted with the intimate 
details of the female body.  Like the young girl whose eating so offends him, this woman 
is acting on a desire, oblivious to the judgment of those around her.  The narrator’s 
characterization of her as “fat” links her to the eating girl: she is unable to control the 
excesses of her physical desires.  Both women, then, are precisely the type that 
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Broughton’s fiction generally focuses on – literally “full-bodied” and decidedly 
“uninhibited.” 
Elizabeth’s meekness and timidity – the characteristics that differentiate her from 
these women –are called into question because of the narrator’s strong judgment.  His 
vituperative response to the two random women on the boat indicates that where 
women’s expressions of desire are concerned, he is far from an objective observer.  Thus, 
when he states that Elizabeth’s purchase of a feathered bonnet creates for him so 
“delicious [a] picture of a child playing at being grown up, having practised a theft on its 
mother's wardrobe, that for the last two hours I have been in a foolish ecstasy of love and 
laughter over her and it” (47), he seems to illustrate his own need to infantilize Elizabeth 
rather than her actual childishness.  Elizabeth buys the bonnet, as she says, “in order to 
look married”; in other words, she is laying claim to her new status as a wife and a 
sexually active woman (47).  The narrator dismisses Elizabeth’s acknowledgment of her 
newly acquired sexual knowledge by characterizing it as childish playfulness.  He refuses 
to allow Elizabeth the space to be a knowing adult, marking all attempts at adulthood on 
her part as pretend. 
In “The Library Window,” the narrator’s intellectual ambitions are figured partly 
as sexual longings, demonstrating the unity of her mind and body and pointing toward a 
connection between society’s dismissal of both types of feminine desire.  Neither is 
acceptable; Oliphant’s narrator crosses the threshold of puberty into an adulthood of 
mental and physical repression.  The adult female body is constantly in flux, as Allan 
argues; during menstruation, women were even thought to “suffer under a languor and 
depression which disqualify them for thought or action, and render it extremely doubtful 
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how far they can be considered responsible beings while the crisis lasts” (Allan cxcviii).  
However, the virtuous woman was required to remain aloof from her body, she was to 
ignore the click of her centaur’s hooves and instead focus her thoughts heavenward.  Her 
initiation into sexual activity was a potentially dangerous time for her in the struggle 
between mind and body.  In his essay on prostitution, W. R. Greg (discussed in the 
previous chapter) writes, “there is a radical and essential difference between the sexes . . . 
. In men, in general, the sexual desire is inherent and spontaneous, and belongs to the 
condition of puberty.  In the other sex, the desire is dormant, if not non-existent, till 
excited; always till excited by undue familiarities; almost always till excited by actual 
intercourse” (qtd  in Poovey 5).  In other words, a first sexual encounter, whether as a 
prostitute or wife, could plunge women into the depths of their animal natures, revealing 
an until-then unknown physical desire.  Sex was a betrayal of their virtuous selves, a fall 
for the prostitute and the wife alike.  Elizabeth’s seemingly innocent purchase of a hat is 
in this context fraught with frightening possibilities for her new husband.  He must 
wonder whether her desire to look like a married woman is an acknowledgement of the 
sexual urges any virtuous woman would adamantly deny.  
Elizabeth’s purchase of the hat and the narrator’s response to it encapsulate the 
central struggle of the story between Elizabeth’s feelings of sexual desire and her desire 
to remain virtuous in the eyes of a husband who is disgusted with all forms of female 
desire.  This struggle is also at the heart of medical debates regarding women in the 
decades leading up to Broughton’s composition of “The Man with the Nose.”  Mary 
Poovey writes in Uneven Developments, “the division among medical men about whether 
woman’s nature – and therefore her difference from man – would be formulated 
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primarily in terms of morality or physiology constituted an important impediment to the 
professionalization of medicine at the same time that it exposed the contradiction written 
into the Victorian image of woman” (25).  Poovey’s research in Victorian obstetrics, 
particularly regarding the debate about chloroform use, reveals that the medical 
profession was deeply uncomfortable with any discoveries that pointed toward woman’s 
physiological (i.e. sexual) natures rather than their moral natures.  The use of chloroform 
was repeatedly denigrated, not because of chloroform’s inefficacy, but because of 
women’s reactions to it prior to unconsciousness.  Poovey notes that many British 
journals’ focus was not on “random ‘instances of delirium, and spasms, and convulsions,’ 
but specifically female displays of sexual excitation” (30, italics original).  These 
displays, which ranged from “involuntary confidences [and] emotions,” (qtd in Poovey 
34) to “the movements attendant on the sexual orgasm,” (qtd in Poovey 31) were deeply 
disconcerting to the attending doctors, but rather than discuss their own anxieties 
regarding women’s sexual natures, medical professionals weighing in on the chloroform 
debate stressed their female patients’ distress at these unconscious actions.  W. Tyler 
Smith writes, “Still, I may venture to say, that to the women of this country the bare 
possibility of having feelings of such a kind excited and manifested in outward 
uncontrollable actions, would be more shocking even to anticipate, than the endurance of 
the last extremity of physical pain” (qtd in Poovey 31).  Smith’s assertion suggests that 
women would rather undergo “the last extremity of physical pain” than publicly express 
sexual desire.  This powerfully underscores the public’s faith in the strength of women’s 
moral natures, but Smith’s assertion also serves as a challenge to women considering the 
use of chloroform.  If the virtuous woman would forego such relief because of the risk it 
 130 
 
involved, how is the woman who accepts chloroform to be judged?  Indeed, following 
public enthusiasm for chloroform use, a number of medical professionals suggested that 
women sought the anesthetic for sexual gratification, while more virtuous women, 
uninformed about the dangers of chloroform use, were being “decoyed to their 
destruction” (qtd in Poovey 48).  
The details of Elizabeth’s medical history – her sudden illness after an encounter 
with a mesmerist and her lengthy convalescence in Ulleswater – draw directly on 
descriptions of women under the influence of chloroform and suggest that Broughton was 
herself interested in this medical debate.  Prior to their marriage, Elizabeth confesses to 
the narrator, “I was very ill, very – I lay in bed for five whole weeks, and – and was off 
my head, and said odd and wicked things that you would not have expected me to say” 
(41).  Like the anesthetized women discussed by W. Tyler Smith and others, Elizabeth’s 
loss of bodily control exhibits itself through socially unacceptable expressions.  While 
Elizabeth’s utterances are vaguely “odd and wicked,” we can infer that they are of a 
sexual nature because she thinks that her fiancé would never have expected them from 
her.  His refusal to acknowledge her sexuality is one of the characteristics that defines 
their relationship.  The context in which Elizabeth confesses to this illness – during the 
discussion of honeymoon plans –  also links it to her sexual fears.  Significantly, while 
Elizabeth’s behavior while ill mimics the initial actions of an anesthetized woman, her 
loss of control is due to no drug.  Instead, she falls ill immediately after being 
mesmerized. 
Broughton’s use of mesmerism as a catalyst for Elizabeth’s illness provides a 
more pointed critique of the medical profession’s collective response to displays of 
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female sexual desire.  Like chloroform, mesmerism was largely used in treating pain and 
anxiety.  Dickens, for example, treated Augusta de la Rue for chronic muscle spasms and 
insomnia through a months-long course in mesmeric trances.  His work as a mesmerist 
reveals much about the practice as a whole.  Peter Ackroyd writes of Dickens, “he would 
never allow himself to be mesmerised, not on any account, and this in turn emphasises 
other aspects of [mesmeric] powers: in Dickens it was part of his need to control, to 
dominate, to manipulate” (245).  Dickens’s desire for this type of power (and Madame de 
la Rue’s choice to give it to him) echoes Victorian gender constructs.  As scholars have 
noted, the mesmerized subject was most often female, the mesmerizer male.  Figure 1, an 
image of Franz Anton Mesmer and a subject, illustrates these gendered notions of power.  
The female, slumped over the chair, is entirely passive and entirely in the power of 
Mesmer, whose figure looms over her just as his hands and eyes control her.  More to the 
point in regards to the gendered power dynamic between mesmerizer and mesmerized, 
Sharrona Pearl argues, “By providing the means to control women's bodies, mesmerism 
also allowed men to control their sexuality.  Women entered ecstatic states under male 
physical direction, leading to potentially compromising situations.  Consequently, the 
intimate relationship between mesmerizer and mesmerized led to suspicion about the 
morality of the experience” (163).  Certainly Catherine Dickens harbored such suspicions 
regarding her husband’s work with the de la Rues.  Just as the chloroform debate seemed 
at times to focus less on efficacy and more on the propriety of some of its more 
sensational side-effects, Broughton’s mesmeric episode is centered on spectacle.  
Elizabeth undergoes mesmerism not for the treatment of an illness, but for the titillation 
of an audience.  The traveling mesmerist she goes to see with her parents asks to  
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Figure 1. Anonymous French cartoon, Mr. Mesmer's tub, 1780s. 
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mesmerize her and she acquiesces: “I thought it would be quite good fun, and – and – I 
let him” (40).  Elizabeth tells the narrator that while mesmerized “I believe I did all sorts 
of extraordinary things that he told me – sung and danced, and made a fool of myself – 
but when I came home I was very ill, very” (40-1).  This mesmeric episode, by cutting 
out the middle man, so to speak – removing chloroform from the encounter – more 
emphatically points to male control of the female body.  Portrayed as a physical power 
here, the episode suggests the ideological control over the female body being exercised 
by the medical profession.  Both medical practitioners and mesmerists are concerned with 
the ways in which a woman exhibits herself. 
The episode also reveals the latent desire underlying Elizabeth’s decision to be 
mesmerized.  “I thought it would be quite good fun, and – and – I let him,” she tells her 
fiancé.  She wants to have fun, but her hesitancy in the halting admission “and – and – I 
let him” suggests a sense of guilt at such a seemingly innocent diversion.  It is a strange 
apprehension unless at some level Elizabeth also realizes that her desire to place herself 
in the mesmerist’s control is implicitly sexual.  Knowledge of her own sexual desire (or 
sexual curiosity) is so unwelcome to Elizabeth that she tries to abolish it completely.  She 
refuses to go anywhere near Ulleswater, despite the narrator’s teasing, and admits “I try 
to think about it as little as possible” (41).  This episode from her past is not one she will 
forget in the normal march of time; it is one that she must work at repressing.  Elizabeth’s 
attempt to achieve a disconnect between her mind and body is already compromised; 
even before she falls prey to the specter who visits her during her honeymoon, she is 
haunted by her sexual needs. 
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Elizabeth’s honeymoon chronicles both her increasingly desperate struggle to 
repress her sexuality and, directly related to this, the narrator’s increasingly dismissive 
attitude toward her.  Shortly after the newlyweds reach their honeymoon destination, 
Elizabeth begins to be nightly visited by a peculiar specter.  At the foot of her bed – the 
bridal bed – she sees a man.  He is no one she recognizes, and initially, she is only able to 
tell her husband, “he had a nose!” (52, italics original).  After the narrator laughs at her, 
she continues, “But it was such a nose . . . . It was very prominent . . . and very sharply 
chiseled; the nostrils very much cut out” (52, italics original).  The detailed, phallic 
description of the specter’s physical presence links him with Elizabeth’s repressed sexual 
urges, as does the timing of his visits – while Elizabeth for the first time in her life lies in 
bed beside a man, one who, significantly, would prefer to think of her as innocent and 
child-like.  The specter is also connected to Elizabeth’s subconscious sexual desire 
through his power over her self-control.  Elizabeth is not only horrified by the large-
nosed spectacle her nightly visitor presents, she also feels compelled to somehow be with 
him.  She tells her husband, “I hated it . . . I loathed it – abhorred it.  I was ice-cold with 
fear and horror, but – I felt myself going to him” (54, italics original).  Like her 
experience with the mesmerist, Elizabeth feels terror, not in regards to the specter 
himself, but at her reaction to him, her inability to control her physical response to him.  
The struggle between her mind and body grows stronger over the course of her 
honeymoon, and eventually Elizabeth seems to recognize that she will not be able to 
resist her specter on her own.  She begs the narrator to physically restrain her: “‘Tighter, 
tighter!’ she is crying, wildly. ‘What are you thinking of?  You are letting me go!’” (48).  
Her husband is, of course, the ideal figure to check her growing physical desire.  As the 
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embodiment of the medical profession’s attitude toward female sexuality, he has been 
actively working to contain and stifle Elizabeth’s desires throughout the narrative.  His 
disgust at displays of female desire (again mirroring the attitude of the medical 
profession) has all along made it impossible for Elizabeth to both express desire and live 
as a respectable, virtuous young woman.  That Elizabeth disappears completely and 
without a trace upon finally giving in to her physical desire pointedly illustrates the lack 
of space for such desire to exist.  
Elizabeth’s waning ability to control the clamors of her physical desire exists in 
an inverse relationship to the narrator’s growing need to dismiss her feelings altogether.  
Prior to her initial encounter with the specter, the narrator reveals that his sense of 
Elizabeth’s “nervous temperament” is both fixed and inaccurate.  He takes his blushing 
bride to – of all places – an exhibition by Wiertz18 featuring a “horrible cholera-picture – 
the man buried alive by mistake, pushing up the lid of his coffin, and stretching a ghastly 
face and livid hands out of his winding-sheet toward you, while awful gray-blue coffins 
are piled around, and noisome toads and giant spiders crawl damply about” (45-6).  It is 
hardly the type of entertainment likely to set the mood for romance, as the narrator 
belatedly seems to realize.  He writes, “On first seeing it, I have reproached myself for 
bringing one of so nervous a temperament as Elizabeth to see so haunting and hideous a 
spectacle; but she is less impressed than I expected – less impressed than I am myself” 
(46).  Working under the assumption that Elizabeth will have an innocent, child-like 
ignorance of the horrors of disease and death, he expects her to react strongly to Wiertz’s 
                                                 
18
 Antoine Wiertz (1806-1865), Belgian painter and sculptor.  His often disturbing and graphically-detailed 
subject matter includes decapitated heads, suicide, and the impact of a bullet with a would-be rapist's skull.  
The image the narrator here refers to is The Premature Burial (1854). 
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graphic painting.  Her lack of response disconcerts him but does not alter this 
preconceived notion.  That the narrator still believes Elizabeth should be horribly shaken 
by Wiertz’s painting is evident when he attributes her first sighting of the large-nosed 
specter to viewing the painting earlier that day.  This assessment renews his confidence in 
his ability to understand wife, and it allows him to dismiss her vision as an example of 
the female nervousness he thinks is common and acceptable to the sex.  The narrator is 
almost jolly in his response to his wife’s terror because this terror, if it points to a nervous 
temperament, also highlights Elizabeth’s childish innocence.  The narrator’s reactions to 
Elizabeth’s spectral encounters over the course of the honeymoon increasingly cast her as 
a child.  After the first encounter, he labels her “my little one” (51).  Elizabeth becomes 
“my dearest child” (62) the next time she sees the specter, and this remains the only term 
of endearment the narrator uses for the remainder of the story.  His tone, too, shifts, so 
that by the end of the honeymoon, he is addressing her “with an air of worldly experience 
and superior wisdom” (69) and “dictatorially” (73).  In other words, as Elizabeth 
becomes increasingly dominated by her body’s sexual needs, the needs that most make 
her want to join the specter, her husband is increasingly trying to push her in the other 
direction, casting her as more and more child-like.  His inability to see her as she really is 
becomes symbolically represented in her disappearance at the story’s end.  When the 
narrator learns of his wife’s disappearance, apparently with a strange man, he is outraged.  
He exclaims, “So this is it!  With that pure child-face, with that divine ignorance – only 
three weeks married – this is the trick she has played me!” (78).  The irony of the 
situation is that this is the trick he has played on himself – seeing a child instead of a 
woman, willfully pressing upon her the Victorian period’s notion of “divine ignorance.”  
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Elizabeth pops out of existence much like the room in Oliphant’s library.  A 
social/scientific space does not exist for her to be both morally good and sexually 
uninhibited; the crucible of her honeymoon period brings these two warring sides of her 
together, to her destruction. 
In her study of supernaturalism in the novels of Gaskell, Eliot, and Charlotte and 
Emily Brontë, Vanessa Dickerson argues that Victorian men and women wrote ghost 
stories in different ways.  While male authors (Dickerson cites Le Fanu and Dickens 
specifically) wrote “from the hegemonic position in a society in which the masculine 
ways of knowing, thinking, and doing were automatically acknowledged as best,” women 
wrote ghost stories with less self-assurance and more critical resistance to the ideologies 
that defined them.  My earlier chapters, I hope, demonstrate that male writers of ghost 
stories could be equally resistant to the theological and scientific frames that attempted to 
define their individuality; however, I agree with Dickerson that women’s supernatural 
tales are fundamentally different.  Cast as an other scientifically and socially, women 
writers had in the ghost stories to contend not just with current psychological theories in 
general, but specifically with those that placed women in their marginal position.  As 
Oliphant’s “The Library Window” and Broughton’s “The Man with the Nose” illustrate, 
this response was as much about reclaiming the female body as it was about protecting 
individuality.  The victories achieved by the female protagonists in both stories are 
perhaps pyrrhic, but the stories themselves represent small but positive gains in the battle 
for female equality.  As Broughton repeatedly said of herself later in her life, “she who 
had once been looked upon as the Zola of English fiction was now regarded as its 
reincarnated Miss Younge” (Arnold 274).  The change Broughton notes was not in her 
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fiction, but in the public’s attitude toward female sexuality.  By 1920, the heroines who 
had shocked Oliphant were “that host of bonny healthy English girls” (Arnold 262). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Spirit Photography and the Victorian Culture of Mourning 
 
 
 
“All photographs are memento mori.  To take a photograph is to 
participate in another person’s (or thing’s) mortality, vulnerability, 
mutability.”   Susan Sontag, On Photography 
 
 
 
November 18, 1852 – London.  A cold, gray, blustery day in one of the rainiest 
months Londoners had seen in years, yet the streets, from the Horse Guards to Charing 
Cross, Buckingham Palace to Constitution Hill, Piccadilly to St. James’s Street, were 
crammed with 1.5 million spectators – over a fifth of the total population of England at 
the time.19  They were there to witness the funeral procession of the Duke of Wellington, 
and given the title of this chapter, a description of the proceedings may seem an odd 
place to begin.  After all, the first rappings of the Spiritualist Movement, which helped 
popularize and promote spirit photography, had been heard only four years prior at the 
home of the Fox sisters in Hydesville, New York.20  The spirit photograph itself would 
                                                 
19
 Weather conditions according to the Times: “Day broke heavily, the wind being loaded with moisture, 
the sky threatening-looking . . . . It was as cold and cheerless a morning as could well be conceived” 
(November 19, 1852).  See also the various accounts listed by Pearsall, page 378.  Parade route according 
to Wolffe.  Population according to the census of 1851 – England and Wales, pop. 17,914,148.  For 
information pertaining to the rest of Great Britain, see Gendocs: Geneological Research in England and 
Wales, http://www.gendocs.demon.co.uk/pop.html#EW. 
 
20
 Kate and Margaret Fox claimed to be communicating with a spirit through a series of raps heard in their 
home.  Their story drew a great deal of attention, and thanks to their older sister Leah’s managerial skills, 
they turned their story into a lucrative career, giving demonstrations in public venues.  The popularity of 
their performances and the idea that communication with the spirit world was possible gave rise to the 
Spiritualist Movement.  In 1888, Margaret publicly confessed that the spirit rapping was actually the sound 
of her toe joint popping; she recanted this statement in 1889. 
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not be born until the engraver William Mumler produced “extras” on a photographic 
plate in 1861 – nearly ten years after the Iron Duke’s death.  Nonetheless, my reasons for 
beginning with Wellington’s funeral are two-fold.  First, my objective in writing this 
essay is to establish the spirit photograph’s importance within its intended context: as a 
part of the elaborate culture of mourning in Victorian England.  A handful of illuminating 
essays have focused on spirit photography in recent years,21 but none do so through the 
lens (no pun intended) of mourning practices.  Wellington’s funeral, as the largest and 
most elaborate of the century, illustrates mourning rituals taken to an extreme, almost 
grossly exaggerated as some believed, and thus usefully highlights the controversial 
practices of which the spirit photograph was a part.  My second reason for beginning with 
the Duke’s funeral is that I believe the event helps mark a paradigmatic shift in the 
practice and beliefs associated with mourning, a shift that both prepared the way for the 
spirit photograph and help explain the spirit photograph’s significance within the context 
of mourning rituals.   
By all accounts, the Duke’s funeral was quite a show.  Those gathered along the 
streets, in the windows of shops, and on the rooftops watched solemnly as over 10,000, 
marching and in carriages, accompanied a funeral car of gigantic proportions.  Twenty-
seven feet long and seventeen tall, the car weighed over ten tons and required a team of 
twelve horses to pull it forward and a team of men to hold it back on slopes lest it crush 
the horses.  Intended as a fitting tribute to the Duke’s greatness and his contributions to 
the state both in war and at peace, it seems the car was more a celebration of Victorian 
                                                 
21
 See Paul Firenze, “Spirit Photography: How Early Spiritualists Tried to Save Religion by Using 
Science,” Tom Gunning, “Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations: Spirit Photography, Magic 
Theater, Trick Films, and Photography’s Uncanny” and Paola Cortés-Rocca, “Ghost in the Machine: 
Photographs of Specters in the Nineteenth Century.” 
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materialism than anything else.  As one observer wrote, “Behold! a lumbering pile 
creaking heavily on its 6 low wheels!  A confused heap of banners and ill-wreathed 
laurels tossed disorderly about; a tasteless mound of bronze and gilding and black and 
silver mingled without reason; surmounted by a tawdry flapping canopy” (E. A. Napier, 
qtd in Wolffe 43).  Such a description could serve as the definition for the mid-Victorian 
aesthetic.  Dickens, with even more than his usual asperity, noted “for forms of ugliness, 
horrible combinations of colour, hideous motion, and general failure, there was never 
such a work achieved as the Car” (qtd  in Ames 165). 
The Duke’s funeral car proved to be the rule rather than the exception in terms of 
the materialism surrounding his death.  Dickens wrote a scathing review of the events 
leading up to the funeral parade in Household Words, calling his readers’ attention to 
some of the more mercenary aspects of this solemn occasion.  He cites a number of goods 
advertised in the Times including “Duke of Wellington Funeral Cake,” “Duke of 
Wellington Funeral Wine,” and “the celebrated lemon biscuits” which Dickens writes 
“were considered by the manufacturer as the only assuagers of the national grief” (98).  
These consumables, as wholesome and delicious as they undoubtedly were, are but a 
small sampling of the material goods associated with the great man’s death.  Indeed, 
advertisements such as these could be likened to vendors hawking peanuts and ice cold 
beer before the big game.  Even more material gain could be had by selling seats to the 
parade, and Dickens lists example after example of shopkeepers and private citizens 
advertising seats in front of windows looking over the parade route.  Upper floors were 
advertised for genteel families desiring “unobstructed views” while the lower classes 
could find room on a per-seat basis in ground floor shops.  In fact, the classified section 
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of the Times for the days leading up to the funeral was filled almost completely by 
advertisements for seats, rooms, autographs, letters, portraits, etc. – all associated with 
Wellington.22  Without doubt, though, it was the parade’s organizers, rather than the 
enterprising inhabitants along the parade route, who truly turned the Duke’s death into a 
paean to Victorian materialism.  As a number of scholars have noted,23 the splendor of 
Napoleon’s 1840 interment in Paris’s Les Invalides would still have been fresh in the 
minds of the public officials planning the parade, and it was not to be thought that 
Napoleon, who couldn’t best his rival in life, would be allowed to best him in death.  The 
British were playing an international game of “keeping up with the Jones’s,” and this 
time they won.  The Duke’s funeral was considered one of the greatest public events of 
the century. 
The crowd that gathered for the Duke’s funeral, both to pay its respects and 
demonstrate its respectability, was of unprecedented size – a rather unpleasant surprise 
for the authorities, but of note here because it points to another shift in attitudes about 
mourning: in this case, a sliding of the sacred into the realm of secular entertainment.  To 
say that the size of the crowd was an unpleasant surprise to authorities is a bit of an 
understatement.  In fact, on the opening day of the lying-in-state at Chelsea Hospital, the 
number of visitors combined with an uncontrolled flow of traffic into and out of the 
hospital and a smaller than necessary police force resulted in the deaths of two people 
and “many accidents, such as broken bones, dislocations, severe bruises, wounds from 
                                                 
22
 Two consecutive advertisements from November 16, 1852 issue of the Times serve as a striking example: 
“RELICS of the late Duke of WELLINGTON. For SALE, a WAISTCOAT, in good preservation, worn by 
his Grace some years back,” followed by “REFRESHMENTS, on the Day of the Funeral of the Duke of 
Wellington . . . .”  Clearly, any possible angle by which money could be had was being exploited. 
 
23
 See Wolffe, page 29, Curl, page 216, and Pearsall, page 369. 
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being thrown down and trodden under foot, and permanent injury to health from pressure 
and extreme fright” (Times, November 15, 1852).  The police were not wholly to blame, 
however.  Wolffe writes: “The commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, Sir Richard 
Mayne, openly admitted that, unduly influenced by the limited public interest at the 
funerals of William IV in 1837 and the Duke of Sussex in 1843, he had seriously 
underestimated the likely size of the crowd” (36).  Mayne had no real indication, given 
the public turnouts for the last two state funerals, that Wellington’s would be any 
different.  Pearsall argues that the increase in the number of spectators can partially be 
accounted for by the hero-worship that surrounded Wellington.  This hero worship, while 
it certainly surrounded the Duke’s figure, was not much in evidence at the news of his 
death.  Wolffe recounts various reactions:  
The news [of the Duke’s death] reached Doncaster on the  
morning of the St Leger, but, Charles Greville recalled,  
‘most people were too much occupied with their own concerns  
to bestow much thought or lamentation on this great national  
loss.’  At Hereford the Three Choirs Festival was in full swing.   
The ‘Dead March’ was played before the evening oratorio on 16 
September and seen as reflecting a unanimous sentiment in the  
audience.  On the following day, however, the programme  
continued and the mood appeared anything but sombre.   
(28)  
 
Clearly, the news of the Iron Duke’s death did not elicit the attitude of mourning that 
would account for the number of spectators at his funeral.  Likewise, on the day of the 
funeral this sentiment seemed somewhat missing.  A writer for the Star of Freedom 
reported: “We saw crowds of decent-looking people, hungry, tired and dirty, coming 
from ‘the sight,’ and indulging in jokes and laughter, and we noticed a considerable 
number of drunken men and women with any quantity of short pipes.  But we did not see 
– we really did not – and we grieve to make the announcement – one solitary tear” (qtd  
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in Wolffe, 47).  I would argue that this air of levity is partially accounted for by the 
spectators’ interest in being entertained by the funeral.  Ample evidence seems to point in 
this direction.  There is the wholesale commodification of the event – from Wellington-
themed foodstuffs, to souvenir prints, to choice seats to the show – all of which point to a 
carnivalesque environment.  There is, too, the reaction of the crowd, members of which 
most frequently described the parade and interment in terms of their theatricality.  The 
Times reporter writes of the marching soldiers: “The men, of course, carried their arms 
reversed, which, combined with the mournful music and the slow funeral pace at which 
they marched, had a singularly imposing effect” (November 19, 1852).  Similarly, a 
writer for the Illustrated London News described the moment when the coffin was 
lowered into the crypt at St. Paul’s Cathedral as a “scene” that was “probably the most 
impressive of all” (qtd in Pearsall 379).  “Imposing effects” and “impressive scenes” are 
more the language of secular entertainment than sacred event. 
 The enjoyment of the theatrical flourishes surrounding the funeral was 
partly due to the technological innovations behind the magic, so to speak.  Pearsall notes 
that the “struggle of the undertakers with the coffin, machinery and draperies, enacting a 
drama showcasing technological novelty, became indistinguishable from any other aspect 
of the ceremony” (378).  I would go further and say that the “drama showcasing 
technological novelty” was an integral part of the entire event, from the lying-in-state to 
the final interment.  Spectators marveled at the mechanical canopy used on the funeral 
car (lowering itself to pass under Temple Bar).  The newly installed gas lights in St. 
Paul’s – between five and seven thousand of them – began to draw a crowd well before 
the actual funeral.  Two days prior to the event, one observer wrote,  
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[Went] to St. Paul’s to see it lit up.  The effect was good, but  
is was like a great rout; all London was there strolling and  
staring about in the midst of a thousand workmen going on  
with their business all the same, and all the fine ladies scram- 
bling over vast masses of timber, or ducking to avoid the great  
beams that were constantly sweeping along.      
     (Greville 289) 
 
From this account it is clear that the technological marvel was itself the attraction; 
however, the lights caused quite a stir during the interment as well: “The memory of 
those [gas lights] in the interior of St. Paul’s will ever be dear to those who have, with 
artistic eyes, drunk in the beauty of the chiaroscuro,” said one reporter (qtd in Morley 
85).  Finally, it was the contraption that lowered the coffin through St. Paul’s floor in 
such dramatic style that caused more than one observer to call it “something to be forever 
remembered.”  In this awestruck reaction, we can see how easily a feat of technology can 
seem almost magical and mystifying; technology that so fluidly becomes part of the 
religious experience might one day just as easily be the religious experience itself.  In 
fact, Pearsall notes that the Crystal Palace Exhibition, held in London just one year before 
Wellington’s funeral, might have contributed to the number of spectators (370).  Many 
were hungry to recreate the excitement of Prince Albert’s tribute to technology.  In the 
duke’s funeral, this taste was well-sated. 
 Materialism and a focus on technology within the context of religious ceremony: 
these mark seeds of change in cultural attitudes toward mourning in the Victorian period.  
In looking at the spirit photograph in the context of Victorian mourning rituals, I hope to 
show the seeds come to bloom.  The popularity of the spirit photograph in the second half 
of the nineteenth century points to a culture which saw its materialism spilling over into 
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religious doctrine, and culture whose interest in technology was transforming into a type 
of religious faith.    
                            
 
I. Materiality in Mourning and Beyond 
 
“ . . . the most grandiose result of the photographic enterprise is to give  
us the sense that we can hold the whole world in our heads.”   
Susan Sontag, On Photography  
 
 A parlor cluttered with mismatched furniture, wallpapered in some busy pattern, 
lace doilies covering every surface like a thick layer of cobwebbing, enough bric-a-brac 
to make the average-sized person feel like an overgrown bull in a china shop – this is the 
stereotype of Victorian décor.  We tend to think of the Victorians as surrounded by 
things, a perception with some basis in fact.  Following on the heels of the Industrial 
Revolution, the Victorian period ushered in the age of commodity culture.  Mass-
produced goods were widely marketed and easily affordable, and a newly risen middle 
class was eager to buy, buy, buy.  Some, like Carlyle, who urged the leaders of the new 
capitalist system to “retire into their own hearts, and ask solemnly, If there is nothing but 
vulturous hunger for fine wines, valet reputation and gilt carriages there” were outraged 
at the “mammonism” of the age (1116).  Others, like Disraeli, saw celebrations of 
Victorian materialism such as the Crystal Palace Exhibition positively: “It is a privilege 
to live in this age of rapid and brilliant events.  What an error to consider it a utilitarian 
age.  It is one of infinite romance” (qtd. in Victorian Age 1049).  Whether derided or 
applauded, the period is marked by its materialism. 
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 The funeral trade was no exception to this general trend.  While no nineteenth-
century funeral was quite as extravagant as Wellington’s, even the average middle-class 
affair involved a great deal of show and expense.  A typical undertaker provided an array 
of goods, from the inner and outer coffins, hearse, and mourning coach, to the various 
items of dress worn by the mourners – gloves, hatbands, and scarves – to professional 
mourners, or “mutes” (a position Oliver Twist holds early in his career).  These goods 
covered the actual funeral but only scratch the surface of the “trade in death.”  Entire 
London shops specialized in mourning clothes, and mourning fashions were advertised in 
leading periodicals.  Mourning cards, mourning stationery, mourning fans, mourning ear 
trumpets – all were commonplace.  Mourning jewelry such as jet earrings and necklaces 
and mourning brooches and lockets were also popular.  These last two items generally 
contained a photograph of the deceased on one side and some of the deceased’s hair on 
the other.  In fact, “hair art,” skillfully woven in a crosshatched pattern or delicately 
pasted to paper backing and cut into elaborate shapes, reached its zenith during the 
Victorian period.  Photography too, held an important place in the clutter of mourning 
artifacts.  Louis Kaplan notes, “Funerary images of dead children in an age of high infant 
mortality were a popular genre of daguerreotype from the beginnings of photography.” 
So high was the demand for post-mortem photographs, many photographers were able to 
make a living from them alone (Firenze 76).   
As ubiquitous as the collection of mourning ephemera was, the practice still had 
its detractors.  Dickens called Victorian mourning rituals a “barbarous” system “which, 
while it could possibly do no honor to the memory of the dead, did great dishonour to the 
living, as inducing them to associate the most solemn of human occasions with 
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unmeaning mummeries, dishonest debt, profuse waste, and bad example in an utter 
oblivion of responsibility” (“Trading”).  Part of Dickens’ discomfort with his era’s 
mourning rituals stems from the view that much of the display was prompted by class-
consciousness rather than the desire to honor the departed.  James Curl, in his catalogue 
of mourning artifacts, notes “expressions of social position and status found in coffin-
plates and –handles, in hearses, in mourning-cards, and in dress” (194).  Mourning 
practices, like other ritualized familial events – births, baptisms, marriages – were, in 
large measure, a socially accepted (and expected) time to put on a show of wealth and 
rank.  Given a rising middle class eager to mark its place in the social fabric, mourning 
rituals could, and did, get out of hand.  Much of what became standard fare in middle- 
and even lower-class funerals – the mutes, the ostrich plumes, the scarves, the placement 
of mourners – was a pantomime of the funerary rites of the nobility24, a show of heraldry 
which could have no significance for the majority of the population.  In fact, Pat Jalland 
records one undertaker, who “called as a witness was obliged to confess his ignorance 
that funerals were based on the heraldic array of the baronial funeral” (195).  The 
Victorian funeral was, in some ways, a performance where neither the actors nor the 
audience knew what the play was about – “unmeaning mummery” indeed. 
 Yet viewing the materialism surrounding Victorian death as a mere show of social 
status belies the real feelings of grief, the profound sense of loss experienced by 
mourners.  Jalland chides, “criticism [of Victorian mourning artifacts] tends to judge 
surviving artefacts by later twentieth-century standards and assumptions.  It neglects the 
significant role of visible symbols of remembrance in the natural dynamics of grief” 
(299).  Wearing the carefully woven hair of a deceased loved one may seem morbid or 
                                                 
24
 See Curl, page 195 for a description of heraldic significance of common funeral practices. 
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maudlin by twenty-first century standards, but it was common practice for Victorian 
mourners, for whom it provided an outlet for grief in an era not known for displays of 
excessive emotion. 
 When William Mumler produced the first photograph with “extras” – a spirit 
photograph – in Boston in 1861, he was both extending the tradition of the post-mortem 
photograph and cashing in on the growing popularity of Spiritualism, a movement 
concerned with producing physical evidence of life after death.  His “extras” were aptly 
named – appearing in addition to the person actually being photographed, and costing 
quite a bit extra in comparison to a normal portrait.  For many mourners, however, the 
expense was worth it.  As Mumler’s business partner disingenuously replied when 
questioned about the exorbitant fee: “persons who had lost their relatives and others dear 
to them . . . sometimes would not part with [their spirit portraits] for thousands of dollars” 
(qtd in Leja 1).  Taking Nancy Armstrong’s assertion that “the so-called material world to 
which Victorians were apparently so committed was one they knew chiefly through 
transparent images, images which in turn seemed to bring them conceptual and even 
physical control over that world” as my starting point, I would like to discuss the ways 
the spirit photograph, within the material world of mourning, offered a unique form of 
conceptual and physical control over grief (5).   
The spirit photograph differed from other types of mourning ephemera in that it 
offered mourners a different view of themselves.  Figures 2 and 3 are representative 
examples of spirit photographs by Mumler, and Frederick Hudson respectively.25  
Though the photographs vary in their details, the basic composition of each is the same: a 
                                                 
25
 The pioneers of spirit photography in the United States and England.  Édouard Buguet, discussed below, 
pioneered spirit photography in France. 
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centralized sitter (the camera’s focal point) with a “spirit” hovering in the upper left or 
right of the frame.  While there is a practical component to this composition – the  
 
  Figure 2. William H. Mumler.  “Mrs. French of Boston with 
  her son’s spirit,” ca. 1870.  Wm. B. Becker Collection,  
American Museum of Photography.  
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 Figure 3.  Frederick Hudson, “Lady Helena Newenham and the Spirit of her 
Daughter,” ca. 1872.  Wm. B. Becker Collection, American Museum of 
Photography. 
position of the sitter leaves a considerable amount of empty space above them for the 
photographer to work with – it also creates a powerful message about mourning.  
Mourning ephemera such as hair art, mourning cards and post-mortem photographs focus 
on the figure of the departed.  Likewise, funerals, such as the parade for Wellington with 
which I began, saw the departed at center-stage, rolling down the street in great state, 
while the grieving watched from the sidelines.  In the spirit photograph, the relative 
positions of mourned and mourner are reversed – as these photographs show, it is now 
the mourned who watches the mourner.  This positioning, this focus on the grieving, says 
at a glance what Tennyson devotes 133 cantos to in In Memoriam.  Like In Memoriam, 
the spirit photograph is, on the surface, a tribute to one departed, but also like In 
Memoriam, the spirit photograph is a reflection on the act and value of mourning itself. 
 Mourning rituals in Victorian England were not only ostentatious displays of 
social position, they were also highly regulated.  “Mourning” during the period was more 
noun than verb, referring to the state of one’s dress rather than the state of one’s feelings.  
Socially prescribed rules were in place from the length of time one mourned (varying by 
degree of relation) to the particular fabric mourning clothes were cut from.  Physical 
displays of grief were expected to be kept under control by both men and women, and as 
Jalland notes “Women did not usually attend upper- and middle-class funerals in the 
early and mid-Victorian periods, on the grounds that allegedly they could not control 
their feelings” (221).  These social regulations seem to suggest not only that displays of 
grief were improper, but also that there was a psychological “norm” to grief: two years 
for a husband, two weeks for a second cousin, and so on.  Feelings ranging from “thank 
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God the bastard’s dead” to “my life! my soul! I shall never be the same” could be viewed 
as deviant behavior, a subversion of the public good.  The regulation of mourning 
devalued and discouraged individual feeling, an idea Tennyson raises in In Memoriam.  
Imagining public reactions to his grief, he writes: 
  The traveller hears me now and then, 
  And sometimes harshly will he speak: 
  ‘This fellow would make weakness weak, 
  And melt the waxen hearts of men.’ 
 
  Another answers: ‘Let him be, 
  He loves to make parade of pain, 
  That with his piping he may gain 
  The praise that comes to constancy.’ 
 
  A third is wroth: ‘Is this an hour 
  For private sorrow’s barren song, 
  When more and more the people throng 
  The chairs and thrones of civil power?’ 
     (XXI, 5-16) 
These various responses – first, that inspiring grief is irresponsible, second, that an 
“excess” of grief is selfish vanity – culminate in the third speaker’s anger that an 
individual would let useless or “barren” personal feelings become a diversion from his or 
her public duty.  Each stanza pits the community against the individual; each shows the 
individual’s expression of mourning under attack.  Mourning that stepped outside socially 
mandated norms amounted to a crime against one’s community.  The publication of In 
Memoriam could thus be seen as an act of defiance: Tennyson’s public announcement 
that his grief exceeds the standard prescribed by his society.  It is an assertion of the merit 
of individual feeling, a negotiation of the place of that feeling within the confines of the 
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social sphere.  The spirit photograph makes this same claim.26  Photography has been 
called a modern form of mummification, and in the spirit photograph, the mourner is 
frozen forever in a state of grief.  Grief becomes objectified, tangible and visible; it takes 
on a presence outside the mourner.  Unlike the post-mortem photograph, which allows 
the mourner to meditate on the departed, the spirit photograph lets the mourner meditate 
on themselves.  In a society where mourning was highly visible in dress, but where grief 
was all but taboo, the spirit photograph provided a space to gain conceptual control over 
one’s feelings. 
 More significantly, the spirit photograph helped Victorians conceptualize the 
nature of the soul and the afterlife.  Paola Cortés-Roca writes that the poignancy of spirit 
photography is in the “effect caused by the coexistence of life and death in the same 
space” (160).  This is the surface jolt, the instant recognition of the two extremes yoked 
together.  But there is also a startling and important sameness in the spirit photograph.  In 
Camera Lucida, Roland Barthes notes that the experience of being photographed is “a 
micro-version of death,” it is “truly becoming a specter” (14).  In the static, deadened 
image of the self, the mourner becomes like the ghostly image projected onto the film and 
is forcefully reminded of his or her own mortality.  The message is not necessarily a 
negative one, however.  Armstrong writes, “the transparency of the woman’s image in the 
spirit photograph tells us she has detached herself from that image and gone on with life 
outside the frame” (175).  More specifically, the spirit photograph makes an assertion 
about what kind of existence the “spirit” went on with outside the frame.  It serves as a 
                                                 
26
 It could be usefully argued that remaining in mourning after the proscribed period for such dress is ended 
makes this same statement, as Victoria’s example illustrates.  A key difference is in the spirit photograph’s 
separateness from the body, a space which allows for the contemplation of the act of mourning. 
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stage where Victorians could plot out a reassuring version of the afterlife, particularly in 
an age of eroding faith. 
 The nature of the soul was a point of contention and anxiety during the Victorian 
period.  One strain of nineteenth-century theological thought saw individuality as a 
temporary state.  As W. Newnham puts it, “it is absurd to suppose, that there are souls of 
different kinds” (76).  Newnham’s assertion, found in his 1830 Essay on Superstition, is 
part of a larger argument in favor of a physiological basis for the mind.  Characteristics of 
personality, Newnham claims, can all be traced to physiological causes.  For example, 
“peculiarity of manner, odd habits, whim, ill-humour, or eccentricity” are the result of 
bodily disturbances rather than attributes of personality (76).  One’s soul, on the other 
hand, is identical to every other soul; once its physical shell is cast off, the soul would 
enter upon its permanent state.  Tennyson’s vision of the afterlife describes this state: 
“each, who seems a separate whole, / Should move his rounds, and fusing all / The skirts 
of self again, should fall / Remerging in the general Soul” (xlvii 1-4).  In this doctrine, 
man only “seems a separate whole,” but he is doomed to “fall” into the collective, 
eternally god-worshipping soul.  As one young girl in Elizabeth Stuart Phelps’ 
Spiritualist novel, The Gates Ajar, more comically describes it, “I always supposed . . . 
that you just floated round in heaven – you know – all together – something like ju-jube 
paste!” (83).  “General Soul” or great glob of “ju-jube paste,” Tennyson sums up the 
feelings of a great many when he writes that this doctrine is “vague as all unsweet” (xlvii 
5).  In fact, in this doctrine Tennyson may have seen to his dismay the doomed end to the 
constant struggle between the needs of the individual and the needs of the community he 
portrays in Canto XXI.  The spirit photograph was thus viewed with relief because it 
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directly refuted the collective soul doctrine.  As the spirit photograph clearly shows, 
spirits have discrete bodies after death, and furthermore, they retain (at least to the eyes 
of eager-to-believe relatives) the same physical appearance.  This seems to suggest that 
the self is retained in the afterlife, and that the dissolution into the collective soul that so 
many feared does not take place.  Also in support of this hypothesis is the fact that the 
spirit appears on the photographic plate in the first place.  Spirit photographers asserted 
that they themselves had no control over or knowledge of how spirits appeared in their 
photographs.  Thus the appearance of the spirit on the developed film indicates that the 
spirit chose to appear, proof that individual autonomy and willful action survives death.  
Further, that the spirit manifested itself in the photograph of a loved one signifies the 
retention of personal feelings and memories.  The spirit appeared because it still 
remembers and cares for its living relatives.  This belies the belief that the afterlife will 
consist of a generalized devotion to the divine. 
 The appearance of autonomous, material spirits in photographs by Mumler and 
his ilk pointed not only to a concept of the soul which refuted worrisome orthodoxy, it 
also suggested a specific, and for many a reassuring, version of heaven.  This particular 
vision is one notable for its similarity to everyday life, its recognizability.  Ghosts, these 
photographs suggest, not only retain human form, they also still wear clothing and sport 
fashionable hairstyles.27  Not only do spirits appear in fashionable dress, they also have 
stuff – wispy bits of fabric to wave about, wreaths of flowers, jewelry, even potted plants.  
It seems that you can, in fact, take it with you.  The very materialism derided by Dickens 
and others as unmeaning mummery, seen as a sign of the godlessness of the times, is in 
                                                 
27
 Obviously, this represents the limits of the photographers responsible for these images – their ghosts 
were after all, taken from life, be they models or cut-outs from periodicals. 
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the spirit photograph given a heavenly endorsement.  From the material goods 
surrounding the spirit in the photograph, much concerning the nature of heaven could be 
extrapolated.  It was no giant leap to move from a potted plant in heaven, to supposing 
there would be a table for that potted plant to rest upon, and if there is a table in heaven, 
surely there exists a matching loveseat and a drawing room to hold such furniture in 
heaven as well.  A house would be necessary to contain the drawing room, and from 
there, a celestial city and surrounding countryside come into easy view.  Rather than a 
heaven where everyone just “floats around,” as the young girl in The Gates Ajar puts it, 
the heaven presented in the spirit photograph is a material one, like to earth as a mirror 
image, but a mirror image that reflects only the good, and none of the blemishes. 
This “material heaven” was one endorsed and promoted by Spiritualists 
particularly, and is fully articulated in Phelps’ three Gates novels.  Nina Baym notes that 
each of the three novels “conveys the same notion of the spiritual world as a perfected, 
beautified version of the world we live in.  Except for the absence of sin, death, and 
defect, the next world is recognizably our own, with landscapes, towns, homes, people.  It 
is the world as one would wish it to be” (viii).  The spirit photograph seems to uphold this 
vision of perfection.  Although one cartoonist imagined spirits seeking vengeance against 
a Bluebeardian husband who sat for Mumler (see figure 4), in the actual practice of spirit 
photography, the spirit extras were invariably identified as departed friends or loved 
ones.28  Love and compassion appear to be the only motivation behind the spirits’ visits, 
suggesting that all “rougher” emotions have been transcended.  The translucent 
appearance of the photographed spirits also pointed toward a more perfect state.  During 
                                                 
28
 That is, if they were identifiable.  A large percentage of spirit extras were too faint or vaguely formed for 
sitters to recognize.  A number of Mumler’s clients, for example, reported sitting multiple times before they 
received satisfactory results.  See Coates, pages 7-13 for detailed accounts of Mumler’s process. 
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Mumler’s trial for fraud, Judge John W. Edmonds testified, “I believe the camera can 
take a photograph of a spirit, and I believe also that spirits have materiality – not that 
gross materiality that mortals possess . . .” (qtd in Coates 5).  The ethereal body presented 
in spirit photography is refined: its otherworldly beauty signifies its inner transformation. 
 
Figure 4. Harper’s Weekly, May 8, 1869. 
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The particular version of heaven promoted by the Spiritualist Movement and embodied 
through spirit photography had tremendous appeal during the nineteenth century: the 
“spirits” first came knocking in 1848, and by the century’s end over six million in 
England and the United States alone had answered their call.  In the United States, part of 
the popularity of Spiritualism and spirit photography was due to the impact of the Civil 
War.  So many loved ones met early and tragic deaths that it was a comfort to think of 
them getting a second chance to live out the life they were meant to have.  In England, 
the fervor for the version of heaven portrayed in spirit photography is attributable to an 
equal fervor for – and oftentimes frustration with the failures of – social reform.  Class 
inequality, workhouse and factory conditions, overcrowding in the cities, all of Dickens’s 
poor starving orphans – everything that made Victorians lament the “condition of 
England” would find redress in a material heaven.  Phelps illustrates this in a scene from 
The Gates Ajar.  Deacon Quirk questions Aunt Winifred for having promised one poor 
girl in her Sunday school class a piano in heaven.  She responds: 
I am surprised that you should be [surprised], Deacon Quirk.   
Do you believe that God would take a poor little disappointed  
girl like Clo, who has been all her life here forbidden the  
enjoyment of a perfectly innocent taste, and keep her in His  
happy heaven eternal years, without finding the means to  
gratify it?  I don’t.   (85-86)  
  
Victorians, striving to perfect their society but finding it an uphill climb, could see in the 
spirit photograph’s heavenly vision their dreams come to fruition.  In fact, many 
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reformers were drawn to the Spiritualist Movement and the version of heaven it 
proffered.  As Tom Gunning notes, “Spiritualists as a rule supported abolitionism and 
temperance reforms, experimented with founding communistic communities, and 
championed a host of women’s rights issues, including dress and marriage reforms, as 
well as suffrage” (46).  Like Tennyson who saw the perfect “Christ-type” in Arthur 
Hallum and with him, reassurance that evolution was divinely guided, Victorians could 
see in the spirit photograph a similar reassurance about the evolution of society. 
 It is not surprising that the spirit photograph became a popular mourning artifact 
in the second half of the nineteenth century.  It offered Victorians the space for personal 
grief, asserted individuality in the face of societal pressure to conform, but more than 
this, in its vision of a material heaven, it helped Victorians move beyond grief.  Its 
ultimate message was one of hope. 
   
  II. Science, Technology, and the New Faith 
 
  “Photographs furnish evidence.  Something we hear about, but 
  doubt, seems proven when we’re shown a photograph of it.” 
      Susan Sontag, On Photography 
 
 
 The intellectual climate of the Victorian period was particularly receptive to 
supernatural beliefs of all sorts.  As Mrs. Crayford wryly remarks in Wilkie Collins’s The 
Frozen Deep, the nineteenth century is marked by the great many who “believe in 
dancing tables, and in messages sent from the other world by spirits who can’t spell” (5).  
The works of Dickens and Elizabeth Barrett Browning for example, are at times touched 
with supernatural elements – Dickens’s Christmas ghosts, the hints of hauntings in his 
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more “realistic” fiction (Bleak House’s “Ghost Walk” for example), Browning’s 
superstitious ritual in “A Romance of the Ganges”  – and these elements, presented 
without bias for the reader’s examination, make it easier to reconcile the brilliant minds 
responsible for Great Expectations and Aurora Leigh with their stranger convictions, 
such as Dickens’s devotion to animal magnetism (he was a practicing mesmerist), and 
Browning’s belief in a medium’s ability to conjure physical spirits (she was convinced 
after “spirit hands” crowned her with a flowered wreath at a séance).    The supernatural 
elements in works by Dickens and Browning hint at their beliefs, but more difficult is the 
attempt to square the paragon of logic, Baker Street’s dispassionate detective, Mr. 
Sherlock Holmes, with his creator, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, author of such Spiritualist 
texts as The New Revelation, The Edge of the Unknown, and The Vital Message.  Indeed, 
it seems hardly conceivable that the mind capable of creating a character whose cold 
logic and powers of observation could cut through every deception was so easily swayed 
by the parlor tricks of swindling mediums and scurrilous spirit photographers.  Readers of 
the Sherlock Holmes stories might well have been astounded after reading Doyle’s 
account of lunching with a medium possessed of a hunchbacked ostler named David,29 
filled as it is by circular logic and touches of naiveté.  Incredible might Doyle’s firm 
endorsement of the Cottingley fairies, published in The Strand (also home to Sherlock 
Holmes), seem to his fans.  It is easy to imagine the scores of readers who upon finishing 
his article scratched their heads, looked skyward, and asked in fearful wonder, “Sir 
Arthur Conan Doyle believes in fairies?  What is the world coming to?”  A 1926 Punch 
cartoon (figure 5), showing Doyle chained to a chair, his head wreathed by clouds, while 
                                                 
29
 In The Edge of the Unknown, pages 77-80, Doyle lists as proof that the episode was genuine the changed 
expression on the medium’s face and her ability to accurately describe the type of clothing worn by a 
groom at the start of the nineteenth century. 
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Sherlock Holmes stands nearby deep in troubled thought, is a good measure of the 
public’s reaction.  To some extent, this is still the public reaction today.  The popular 
notion of Doyle’s Spiritualistic beliefs is nicely summed up by Mark Haddon’s 
protagonist in The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time: “when [Doyle] got old  
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Figure 5. Punch, May 12, 1926. 
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he joined the Spiritualist Society, which meant that he believed you could communicate 
with the dead.  This was because his son died of influenza during the First World War 
and he still wanted to talk to him” (88).  However, Doyle’s interest in Spiritualism is not 
something he came to late in life when despair set in and his mind started to wander; in 
fact, this interest predates the Sherlock Holmes stories.  I would argue that Doyle’s 
spiritualistic beliefs and the Sherlock Holmes stories use the same ideological 
framework: one that sees all knowledge as obtainable through observation, and believes 
that all things are reducible to physical signs.  In drawing a connection between the world 
of Sherlock Holmes and the world of spirits in which Doyle believed, I hope to clarify the 
place of spirit photography as a marker of a change in Victorian faith. 
 The publication of The New Revelation in 1918 was not, in fact, Doyle’s first 
public declaration in favor of Spiritualism.  His earliest fiction, including the short stories 
“The Mystery of Sarassa Valley” (1879), “John Barrington Cowles” (1884), and “The 
Great Keinplatz Experiment” (1885), deals heavily in supernatural occurrences; demons, 
ghosts, and murdering mesmerists stand as a testament not only to the tastes of the times, 
but to Doyle’s growing fascination with Spiritualism and the pseudo-sciences 
surrounding it.  Doyle gave up Catholicism as early as the start of the 1880s, and by the 
middle of that decade he had already attended a number of séances.  The 1883 story “The 
Captain of the Pole-Star” demonstrates the influence Spiritualists such as Alfred Drayson 
had over the young doctor.  Doyle’s narrator writes  
In discussing [the nature of the soul] we touched upon modern 
spiritualism, and I made some joking allusion to the impostures  
of Slade, upon which, to my surprise, [Captain Craigie] warned  
me most impressively against confusing the innocent with the  
guilty, and argued that it would be as logical to brand Christianity  
as an error, because Judas who professed that religion was a villain.  
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(294) 
   
The story presupposes the existence of ghosts and paints Captain Craigie as a tragic hero 
of sorts.  Most tellingly, Captain Craigie’s argument in favor of Spiritualism is based on a 
similar analogy Drayson shared with Doyle.30   Doyle’s hints of Spiritualist leanings 
solidified into fact in 1887, when he wrote a letter to the Spiritualist journal, Light, 
endorsing Spiritualism.   He writes, “I could no more doubt the existence of the 
phenomena than I could doubt the existence of lions in Africa, though I have been to that 
continent and have never chanced to see one.  I felt that if human evidence – regarding 
both the quantity and the quality of the witnesses – can prove anything, it can prove this” 
(qtd. in Coren 46).  Such a declaration, if written by a famous author, would have created 
a great deal of public noise; however, when written by a small town doctor with a shaky 
practice and a few short stories to his name, the letter was, understandably, not much 
fodder for public gossip.31 Thus Doyle’s return to Spiritualism (not that he left off the 
belief, but he was busy racing other hobbyhorses – full-time writing, the Boer War, 
running for office, solving real crimes, etc.) was marked by such public surprise and 
dismay. 
 Coincidentally, the first Sherlock Holmes story, the novella A Study in Scarlet, 
was also published in 1887.  On the surface, Spiritualist letter and detective novella could 
not be more different; however, the same basic system of beliefs underlies each.  In A 
                                                 
30
 See Coren, pages 44-45. 
 
31
 Not much fodder for public gossip, though Coren is right to assert that the letter “was a courageous act 
because spiritualism was not taken seriously by everybody and though not openly mocked as it is today it 
was nevertheless thought to be on the edge of foolishness.  There was a strong move within the medical 
profession to parody and marginalize it until it was virtually impossible for a doctor to continue to practice 
if he held such views” (48). 
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Study in Scarlet, Sherlock Holmes outlines his detective method in an article called “The 
Book of Life.”  Dr. Watson, who does not know the author of the piece, notes 
The reasoning was close and intense, but the deductions appeared  
to me to be far fetched and exaggerated.  The writer claimed by a 
momentary expression, a twitch of a muscle or a glance of an eye,  
to fathom a man’s inmost thoughts.  Deceit, according to him, was  
an impossibility in the case of one trained to observation and analysis.   
His conclusions were as infallible as so many propositions of Euclid.   
So startling would his results appear to the uninitiated that until they 
learned the processes by which he had arrived at them they might  
well consider him as a necromancer. (14) 
 
Dr. Watson’s assessment, that such an ability seems “far fetched and exaggerated,” is apt, 
but this very ability is the appeal of Sherlock Holmes.  He has developed a system 
whereby a man’s entire history may be traceable in his appearance.  Fears, passions, 
motives: each manifests itself in something physical and discernable to the well-trained 
eye.  Such a system fulfills the promises made by phrenology and physiognomy; it 
reduces man to the categorizable.  It is a god-like power, and indeed, Sherlock Holmes 
often swoops in after the stumblings and bumblings of Dr. Watson or the incompetent 
Scotland Yard detectives, Gregson and Lestrade, with all the answers and the mystery 
unraveled from beginning to end.  Michael Levine refers to this moment at the end of 
each story as “apocalyptic” (249); I prefer the term “divine dénouement,” but either way, 
the big reveal is brought about through superhuman ability – a bit of wish fulfillment for 
an audience eager to understand their world through the visible, the physical. 
 Dr. Watson himself draws a connection between Sherlock Holmes’ system of 
detection and Spiritualism in noting that Holmes could be compared to a necromancer.  
Such a charge is easily leveled at a group of people trying to call up the dead and get 
them to write or rap out messages.  Sherlock Holmes practices his mediumship on the 
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living rather than the dead, but he is constantly met with the same skepticism and 
occasional accusations of trickery the Spiritualists faced.  Holmes’ interview with the 
cabman in A Study in Scarlet is typical: “John Rance sprang to his feet with a frightened 
face and suspicion in his eyes. ‘Where was you hid to see all that?’ he cried.  ‘It seems to 
me you knows a deal more than you should’” (31).  Fear coupled with suspicion (the 
basic ingredients for prejudice): this is the attitude Doyle became accustomed to when he 
began his championship of the Spiritualist Movement.  Further, Rance’s assertion that 
Holmes “knows more than [he] should” likens the detective’s ability to the supernatural 
while simultaneously marking a proper limit to human intelligence.  Prosecutor Elbridge 
T. Gerry, during Mumler’s fraud trial, makes a similar claim about the Spiritualist 
Movement: “The fundamental error of spiritualism consists in regarding the mind as 
infinite, whereas it is only finite. . . .  There are very many things which the human mind 
is incapable of comprehending at all” (26-28).  Though the areas of knowledge Sherlock 
Holmes and Spiritualists specialized in differed, both lay claim to a greater ability to 
know than was commonly attributed to man. 
 That which makes Sherlock Holmes so appealing – his ability to read the “Book 
of Life” – is precisely the appeal of the Spiritualist Movement.  The frontispiece to the 
first volume of the Spiritual Magazine states that Spiritualism aims “through a careful 
reverent study of facts, at a knowledge of the laws and principles which govern the occult 
forces of the universe; of the relations of spirit to matter, and of man to God and the 
Spiritual world.”  Spiritualism is premised on the notion that the divine and the afterlife 
can be broken down and systematically understood through physical signs – the “reverent 
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study of facts.”  Thomas Brevior, in defining the Spiritualist, could be another Sherlock 
Holmes:  
The man accustomed to regard things from the external, will  
see only – and will care to see only – the outward manifestations  
of spirits; while the philosophic thinker will look beyond, and  
seek to discover the principles and internal truths to which they  
lead.  He will try to gain from them new insight into the affinities  
and laws of spirit and matter.  
(28)  
 
Like the “philosophic thinker,” Sherlock Holmes has looked beyond the outward 
manifestations of physical appearance in order to understand the laws of human nature.  
Holmes’ “manifestations” are the incidentals of dress and bearing – the mud on one’s 
boots or a nervous twitch; for the Spiritualist, manifestations included spirit writing and 
rapping, ectoplasmic emanations, and photographs of “extras.”  
 Like many Spiritualists, Doyle championed the abilities of the spirit 
photographers.  He sat for a number of spirit portraits with various photographers, and in 
his study of these photographs, he noted the different methods employed by the 
photographers and their varied results – the differences in appearance of the spirit extras.  
A skeptic of spirit photography might see this as evidence of fraud: each photographer 
had developed unique methods for practicing their deception, and the differing models 
they used as spirits – the old plates of previous sitters, cut-outs from magazines, posed 
dummies – were the cause of the varied look of the spirits.  None of this occurred to 
Doyle, however.  Despite the general skepticism voiced by his fellow members of the 
Society for Psychical Research,32 Doyle saw the spirit photograph as one more proof of 
                                                 
32
 The Society addressed the subject of spirit photography at their 46th General Meeting, and again in a 
series of letters to the editor of the Journal of the Society for Psychical Research in 1891-2.  Eleanor 
Mildred Sidgwick dismissed the claims of spirit photographers, writing, “I think it unlikely that satisfactory 
evidence in so difficult a matter could be obtained when the bona fides of all concerned is not above 
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an underlying order to the spirit world.  He writes of these differences: “Whatever the 
eventual explanation, the only hypothesis which at present covers the facts is that of a 
wise invisible Intelligence, presiding over the operation and working in his own fashion, 
which shows different results with different circles” (History 56).  Doyle’s assertion is a 
mark of how compelling was the belief in a knowable spirit world, and how strong a hold 
was the idea of it having physical signifiers.  Doyle’s unswerving faith is in man’s ability 
to catalog and scientifically explain the divine as much as it is in the divine itself – he is 
as sure of an “eventual explanation” as he is of the “invisible Intelligence” pulling the 
strings. 
 While the spirit photograph had its most eager and willing-to-believe audience in 
Spiritualists like Doyle, growing faith in science and new technology also contributed to 
its popularity.  In fact, of the “manifestations” Spiritualists claimed as proof of a spirit 
world in constant contact with the world of the living, the spirit photograph had perhaps 
the most widespread appeal, combining as it did man’s modern ingenuity and the 
neutrality of scientific observation.  Paul Firenze writes, “Since nearly everyone agreed 
that the camera operated on scientific principles and that the photographic image was a 
neutral and accurate record of the subject, if something appeared on the negative that had 
not appeared to the human eye, then it was obvious that the human eye was in error, not 
the unflinching gaze of the camera eye” (75).  The rise of spirit photography as a proof of 
                                                                                                                                                 
suspicion, or even when a person whose co-operation is essential has a direct pecuniary interest in the 
result” (159).  It is perhaps ironic that while the Society’s and Sherlock Holmes’ methods of inquiry 
corresponded (the Society’s aim was “to approach [its subjects] without prejudice . . . in the same spirit of 
exact and unimpassioned inquiry which has enabled science to solve so many problems”), Doyle himself 
was passionately prepossessed in favor of Spiritualistic phenomena such as spirit photography (Sidgwick, 
Proceedings 4).  Doyle’s eventual public criticism of the SPR was partially due to its investigation of 
“psychic photographer” William Hope, which Doyle claimed bore “some signs of a conspiracy against the 
medium” (History 87).  See Doyle’s chapter on the SPR in The History of Spiritualism, Volume 2 and his 
The Case for Spirit Photography (1923) for a more detailed account. 
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religious doctrine was a source of contention in scientific circles, and resulted in formal 
charges being brought against Mumler in 1869.  Mumler’s trial quickly made clear that it 
was not a simple matter of some doctored photographs at stake.  A complexity of issues 
came into focus in the courtroom regarding truth and the nature of modern faith.  
 From the early days of the daguerreotype and the calotype, the camera had been 
heralded as a conveyer of Truth and Fact.  One newspaper predicted photographers would 
travel the world, taking pictures of famous monuments and natural wonders “and bring 
home exact representations of all the sublime and ridiculous objects which it now costs so 
much to see” (qtd in Pollack 84).  The photographic representation of the monument is 
equated with the real thing, the only difference being the cost of the view.  The 
applications for journalism are readily apparent, as this same article notes: “a gardener 
cannot elope with an heiress, or a reverend bishop commit an indiscretion, but 
straightaway, an officious daguerreotype will proclaim the whole affair to the world” (qtd 
in Pollack 85).  Likewise, various branches of the sciences began to put photography to 
work for them.  As early as the 1840s, the daguerreotype was being used in conjunction 
with the microscope and telescope to produce detailed images of celestial bodies and 
cellular structures.  Not only did the new photographic process allow scientists to collect 
data more quickly and accurately, it also helped them disseminate their findings.  Larry J. 
Schaaf notes, “The authenticity of photographic images, cheaply made and conveniently 
distributed on sheets of paper, could encourage the spread of scientific knowledge 
throughout a society increasingly eager for information” (26).   
 Unsurprising then, that the Photographic Section of the American Institute, “an 
organization of amateur and professional scientists and photographers” were behind the 
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undercover investigation into Mumler’s work (Leja 24).  Michael Leja notes, “The PSAI 
desired to establish photography as a legitimate scientific technology and as a truthful 
form of representation.  It sought to protect the medium from fraudulent practitioners and 
con artists such as Mumler (26).  Mumler’s work created images which met with (quite 
appropriate) skepticism, and if people began questioning the veracity of one type of 
photography, they might question other, more legitimate types as well.  Further, 
Mumler’s photographs were dangerous not only because they were (to most people) 
recognizably fakes, they also demonstrated how easily photographic images could be 
faked.  Depending on who was holding it, the mirror held up to nature could be as warped 
as one found in a funhouse.  Over the course of the trial, prosecuting attorney Elbridge T. 
Gerry brought in a number of photographers to demonstrate how Mumler’s spirit portraits 
might have been produced.  The testimony of these witnesses – reproduced in leading 
newspapers – had an unintended effect, Leja explains: “press coverage of the trial only 
increased public awareness that photography could be used fraudulently” (45).  Another 
unwanted consequence of the publicity surrounding the trial, at least in the eyes of the 
prosecution and the PSAI, was the public’s increased awareness of spirit photography 
itself.  According to Coates, “there was a little ‘boom’ in spirit photography from 1872 
till 1877” (44).  He notes that the “success of Mr. Mumler’s mediumship in the United 
States and the discussion of the subject through the Press in London led many there to 
have a keen interest in the matter,” directly resulting in the first British spirit 
photographs, produced in 1872 (22).  Instead of ending the threat Mumler’s work posed 
to the legitimacy of photography, those responsible for prosecuting him caused the threat 
to spread. 
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 Courtroom demonstrations of photographic manipulations did little to dissuade 
those who believed spirit photographs were “real.”  Witness after witness for the defense 
positively identified deceased loved ones in Mumler’s photographs, despite the almost 
derisive treatment they met with during Gerry’s cross-examination.  Gerry built the 
prosecution’s case around the idea that Mumler’s supporters were naïve and easily led.  
Of Judge Edmonds, Gerry concludes, “He knew nothing of photography, and as he was 
already a believer in spiritualism, it is fair to presume that he did not require very strong 
proof to insure his belief that Mumler’s spirit forms were supernatural” (13).  Another 
defense witness he belittles as “a credulous old lady [who] identified [her son] by the 
length of his ears!” (17).  Finally, he says of Mr. Charles F. Livermore, “Polonius-like, he 
sees in the clouds either a whale or any other shape the adroit operator claims that it 
assumes . . . . and even the most powerful microscope will not detect the likeness – 
showing the credulity of a mind prepared to believe” (18).  Gerry’s line of reasoning 
amounted to an attack on faith itself, equating as it does belief with “credulity.”  In fact, 
Gerry attempted to put faith on trial when he considered calling to the stand a Dr. 
Parsons, who “was to testify that seeing spirits was a symptom of a malfunctioning 
imagination.  Gerry was persuaded by the objections of the defense lawyer and by the 
advice of the presiding judge that the prosecution’s case would be ill served by arguing 
that religion was insanity” (Leja 32).  This did not stop Gerry from equating some forms 
of belief with mental aberrations however.  Of defense witnesses Edmonds and Paul 
Bremond, both of whom claimed to have had interactions with the spirit world, Gerry 
states, “Their extraordinary testimony, as to what they saw and heard, can be accounted 
for only as statements of hallucination; in other words, that what each described was ‘a 
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false creation, proceeding from the heat oppressed brain’” (30).33  If we regard Gerry’s 
attitude toward faith as part of a general trend toward religious skepticism, the role of the 
spirit photograph in helping to stem this tide becomes clear.  At the loss of a loved one, 
when even the strongest faith might be shaken, spirit photography offered proof positive 
of the Divine. 
 The trial of Édouard Buguet in 1875 even more readily demonstrates the strength 
of the new faith in technology.  While Mumler maintained his innocence throughout his 
hearing,34 Buguet immediately confessed to doctoring his photographs, and even created 
a series of images to demonstrate how he fooled his clients.  Incredibly, this was not 
enough to shake the faith of those who had spirit photographs taken by him.  Over one 
hundred former clients came forward to acknowledge their belief in the veracity of 
Buguet’s work (Chéroux 51).  In his account of the trial, Coates makes a clear distinction 
between Buguet and his photographs: “Mediumship neither implies manliness, honesty 
nor spiritual worth, and in this case Buguet’s mediumship did not save him from being a 
worthless fellow . . . .  This self-confessed knave could not and did not explain how all 
his spirit pictures were obtained, and his demonstrations only went to show how some 
could be made” (62).  Clement Chéroux claims that this type of reasoning resembles a 
species of mental acrobatics: “Bending over backwards to maintain their belief, 
convinced that behind the trial lay a settling of political scores, a new Inquisition or 
Galileo affair, the spiritualists refused to accept that they had been duped” (51).  I would 
                                                 
33
 Although here, Gerry goes on to note “I do not assert that they are insane.  They are not the only men of 
intelligence who have been afflicted in this way with mental delusions” (30).  A rather equivocal 
concession, that. 
 
34
 In fact, he maintained his ignorance, claiming to have no idea how spirit extras appeared in his 
photographs: “[Mumler] asserts that these so-called spirit forms are produced by means wholly beyond his 
control, for which he cannot account, and that those means are unknown, and not human” (Gerry 8). 
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argue that rather than demonstrating a stubborn refusal to appear foolish, Buguet’s clients 
illustrate how strong the faith in technology was at the time.  They believed that the 
camera, like a logical, dispassionate Sherlock Holmes, was not susceptible to corruption. 
 Ironically, both sides were trying to achieve the same end: the champions of 
science were trying to preserve the integrity of the photographic image, while 
Spiritualists were trying to preserve their faith in the camera’s abilities.  Part of the reason 
the two sides were at cross purposes was more than just the matter of fraud, but had to do 
with the purpose to which each side was putting the photograph.  Employed as a tool of 
religion, the photograph is always subject to skepticism – such is the case with anything 
that claims to be a physical manifestation of divinity.  The PSAI was both aiming to 
distance themselves from this type of usage, and to discount the Spiritualists’ results.  
They may not have won the battle (Mumler was acquitted on insufficient evidence), but it 
appears that they won the war.  Most reasonable people, on seeing a photograph of a 
“ghost,” wonder whether it is fraud or a failure of the camera (reflected light, dust on the 
lens).  Even when viewing the most fantastic photographs of spiral galaxies, these same 
questions do not arise.  
In the short-term, however, science’s refusal to share, its reluctance to allow 
Spiritualists to use its methods and guiding principles in the search of the supernatural, 
was seen by many as narrow-minded prejudice of the highest order.  The nineteenth-
century ghost story was often the battleground for conflicts between faith and science, 
and in Rudyard Kipling’s “At the End of the Passage” the scientific minds that refused to 
recognize photography’s ability to reveal spiritual truths come under attack.  In the story, 
four men face the bleakness of the dry season in India – the horrors of heat and disease 
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and solitude.  One of the four, Hummil, cracks under the strain and dies.  Spurstow, the 
man of science, the doctor, explains that before he died, Hummil claimed to be haunted 
by dreams of “a blind face that cries and can’t wipe its eyes, a blind face that chases him 
down corridors” (340).  Spurstow is dismissive of the claim, and more than likely at this 
point, so is the reader.  When Kipling introduces the archaic superstition that the eyes can 
record the last thing they saw at the moment of death through the “grey blurs” Mottram 
sees on Hummil’s pupils, Spurstow is still skeptical: “‘Tisn’t medical science . . . . Things 
in a dead man’s eyes,” he says (343).  As a man of science, however, Spurstow needs 
proof, and he uses his camera as the objective tool to arrive at it.  Spurstow snaps a 
picture of Hummil’s eyes, 
and the doctor retreated into the bathroom with a Kodak  
camera.  After a few minutes there was the sound of some- 
thing being hammered to pieces, and he emerged, very white  
indeed. 
‘Have you got the picture?’ said Mottram.  ‘What does the 
 thing look like?’ 
‘It was impossible, of course.  You needn’t look, Mottram.   
I’ve torn up the films.  There was nothing there.  It was  
impossible.’        
(344) 
 
This is the moment of the camera’s triumph.  It has revealed a truth too difficult for the 
biased, skeptical eye of Spurstow to bear.  In destroying his camera, Spurstow himself 
becomes the “blind face that cries and cannot wipe its eyes” from Hummil’s dream.  He 
has blinded himself to the camera’s truth, to the greater spiritual truths of the story, but 
the horror of what he has seen, like the tears, cannot be wiped from his mind.  The 
poignancy of Kipling’s story rests on the reader’s acceptance of the camera’s power of 
perception.  The story would lose its thrill of horror if the reader couldn’t conceive of the 
camera’s ability to see more clearly and more truthfully than the human eye. 
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 The popularity of spirit photography is thus a mark of a shift toward faith in 
science and technology and away from faith in traditional Christian doctrine.  The 
afterlife needn’t remain a mystery when its inhabitants could be seen on the photographic 
plate.  Like the six thousand gas lights installed in St. Paul’s cathedral in honor of 
Wellington’s funeral, the spirit photograph was, in part, a technological triumph over the 
darkness of death. 
  The spirit photograph offered multiple benefits in the context of mourning 
practices.  Not only did spirit photography give the bereaved the necessary space to 
mourn, it offered them hope in a pleasing concept of reunification in a material heaven.  
As a relic of the Spiritualist Movement, spirit photography confirmed faith in some, and 
rescued others from doubt.  More broadly, the spirit photograph is a marker of a shift in 
faith, of a belief in man’s ability to reveal the nature and workings of the Divine, and in 
technology’s ability to enhance man’s powers of perception.  In an age of eroding faith, 
the spirit photograph helped Victorian man negotiate the place of spirituality in an 
increasingly modernized, technologically advanced society.   
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